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This dissertation consists of three chapters that represent separate pa-
pers in the area of asset pricing. The rst chapter studies commodity
risk and asks how this risk is priced in both stock and futures markets.
The second and third chapter study the impact of macroeconomic risk
on expected stock returns. The rst two chapters are joint work with
Frans de Roon and Marta Szymanowska.
The rst chapter is motivated by the surge in institutional invest-
ment in commodity futures markets since 2003, which has spurred a
widespread interest in how these markets are linked to the stock mar-
ket. Moreover, commodity prices are a risk factor that is an important
input to many consumption, production and investment decisions. For
this reason, we study the question of whether commodity risk is priced
in the stock market and whether this price is time-varying with in-
vestors recently improved access to commodity futures markets.
We develop a model that links the commodity (futures) and stock
market through investors that are exposed to commodity risk, but who
are initially unable to invest in commodity futures. The model yields
three main predictions. First, when investors have no access to com-
modity futures, the stock market price of commodity risk is negative
through investors cross-hedging demand for stocks that comove with
commodity prices. Second, when investors can hedge directly with a
futures contract, the stock market price of commodity risk changes
and may, in fact, switch sign. In this case, stock market risk is also
priced in the futures market, which is the third main prediction. Con-
sistent with these predictions, we nd that commodity risk is priced in
1
the stock market, but in opposite ways before and after 2003. More-
over, we indeed nd that stock market risk is an important factor in
the cross-section of commodity futures returns after 2003.
The second and third chapter are at the intersection of macroeco-
nomics and asset pricing. The second chapter is motivated by the
introduction of Treasury Ination Protected Securities (TIPS), real
bonds issued by the United States Treasury, and a poor empirical
track record for this important macroeconomic factor. We sort stocks
on their exposure to ination risk and nd that there exists an ina-
tion risk premium in the cross-section of US stocks that reverses over
time.
We identify empirically the proximate causes of this time-variation
and derive a simple model that explains these dynamics. First and
foremost, the reversal is driven by the introduction of TIPS in 1997,
which are a better hedge for ination risk than the cross-section of
stocks. Second, the ination risk premium and the e¤ect of TIPS
are larger in recessions, when investors risk aversion is largest. Fi-
nally, the time-varying relation between ination and macroeconomic
activity has also contributed to the reversal.
The third chapter is motivated by the observation that an element
that is common to most asset-pricing models is often overlooked in
empirical tests. This element is time-series and cross-sectional consis-
tency: a factor can only be important in the cross-section of expected
returns if it is related to investment opportunties or the real econ-
omy in the time-series. Moreover, this time-series relation puts a sign
restriction on the factors risk premium.
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This chapter estimates risk premiums in the cross-section of indi-
vidual stocks for exposure to a range of popular state variables. The
chapter nds that these risk premiums are consistent with how these
state variables predict macroeconomic activity in the time-series and
therefore with investors incentive to hedge business cycle risk.
The main contribution of this dissertation to the literature is twofold.
First, the chapters resuscitate a central role for classical real factors
in asset pricing, which have a poor empirical track record relative to a
range of empirical factors that lack such a clear economic motivation.
Second, the rst two chapters identify a new channel through which a
factors risk premium in the stock market varies over time, that is, the
introduction of an alternative asset that allows investors to hedge the
underlying risk more e¢ ciently. Practically, this dissertation suggests
that individual stocks can be used in devising strategies that are ex-
posed to various risks, which is particularly relevant for investors who
desire to hedge, because their portfolio is exposed to these risks, or




I The stock market price of commodity risk
Abstract
We nd that commodity risk is priced in the cross-section of US stock returns. Fol-
lowing the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) in 2000, investors can hedge
commodity price risk directly in the futures market, primarily via commodity index in-
vestments, whereas before the CFMA they could gain commodity exposure mainly via
the stock market. As a result, we nd that the mean return on high-minus-low commod-
ity beta stocks changes from -8% per year pre-CFMA to 11% per year post-CFMA. In
addition, as stock market investors increasingly participate in commodity future markets
post-CFMA, we nd that stock market risk also a¤ects mean commodity futures returns.
5
Commodity prices are a risk factor that a¤ects consumers, produc-
ers and investors alike. Before the passage of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act (CFMA) in December, 2000, (institutional) in-
vestors seeking commodity exposure mainly had to do so via (expen-
sive) investments in physical commodities or via commodity-related
equity investments. Until then, most investors faced position lim-
its set by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) on
traded futures contracts as well as swaps and other over-the-counter
derivatives related to commodity futures. This is no longer the case
after the CFMA, leading to a strong increase in institutional index
investment in commodity futures markets from less than $ 10 billion
in 1998, to $ 15 billion in 2003, and to $ 250 billion in 2009 (Irwin and
Sanders (2011)).
In this paper, we use this increase in institutional index investment
as a quasi-natural experiment that changes the risk-return trade-o¤
in stock and commodity futures markets. In particular, we analyze
the e¤ect of commodity risk on expected stock returns, as well as the
e¤ect of increased commodity index investment following the CFMA
on pricing in stock and commodity futures markets.
We develop a model in the spirit of Hirshleifer (1988, 1989) that
establishes an important link between these markets. We model in-
vestors that are exposed to commodity price risk, for instance be-
cause high commodity prices feed into ination or because they pre-
dict consumption-investment opportunities with a negative sign, and
producers that maximize utility over income from these commodities,
which they hedge in the futures market. When investors cannot hedge
6
their commodity price risk in the futures market, but need to do so
using stocks highly correlated with commodities, a hedge portfolio of
high-minus-low commodity beta stocks will command a negative risk
premium.
When investors are able to hedge directly with a futures contract,
the hedging premium in the stock market goes to zero if the contract is
used exclusively for hedging. When the futures contract is attractive
from an investment (or, speculative) point of view as well, our model
indicates a reversal in the stock market price of commodity risk and
an increasing role of stock market risk in explaining the cross-section
of commodity futures returns. We derive plausible conditions similar
to Hirshleifer (1988, 1989) for a positive speculative investment in
commodity futures to be optimal: the presence of su¢ ciently many
producers relative to investors (speculators) and producers that are
su¢ ciently more risk averse than investors.
Empirically, we nd that commodity risk is priced in the cross-
section of stock returns, but in opposite ways before and after the
CFMA. Sorting stocks according to their beta with respect to a broad
index of 33 commodity futures, we nd a cross-section of expected
returns that cannot be explained by the traditional portfolio return-
based asset pricing models.1 Pre-CFMA, high commodity beta stocks
underperform by about -8% in average returns, which translates into
-11.5% to -8.5% in risk-adjusted returns. Post-CFMA, this perfor-
mance reverses to around 11% in both average and risk-adjusted re-
1These are the CAPM (Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966)), the Fama-French
three-factor model (Fama and French (1993)), and the Fama-French-Carhart model (Carhart
(1997)). Although unreported, our conclusions are unchanged when adding the liquidity factor
of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).
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turns. The magnitude of these returns is similar to other sorts reported
in the literature, such as momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)).
Likewise, stock market risk does not show up in the cross-section of
commodity futures returns Pre-CFMA, but we do nd evidence that
stock market risk is a priced factor in this cross-section Post-CFMA.
As discussed in Lewis (2007), the most common approach for insti-
tutional investors to gain commodity exposure has historically been
via equity investments. However, with the emergence of commodity
index-based products, these products have become the most popular
route. Figure 1 illustrates this surge in commodity investments. The
gure plots total open interest in 33 commodities over time (200312 =
100) in US $ and the number of contracts outstanding. For both
measures we see that open interest increases to record-high levels in
each sector around 2003 without ever returning to historical levels.
Even more important for our analysis, the share of total open inter-
est in the futures market that is attributable to institutional index
investment has grown from around 10% in 2003 ($ 15 billion) to 40%
in 2009 ($ 250 billion) (Irwin and Sanders (2011)). In line with the
conditions mentioned above, we show that these index investments are
well-accommodated by traditional hedgers in futures markets (see also
Stoll and Whaley (2009) and Cheng et al. (2011)).
Our ndings contribute to the literature on cross-sectional asset
pricing and commodities. Our rst contribution is to establish an
important link between stock markets and commodity (futures) mar-
kets. These markets were previously thought to be segmented, given
that the traditional portfolio return-based stock market factors play a
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weak role, if any, in explaining the cross-section of commodity futures
returns (see, e.g., Dusak (1973), Bessembinder (1992), Bessembinder
and Chan (1992) and Erb and Harvey (2006)). We show that, con-
versely, commodity risk does play a role in explaining the cross-section
of stock returns and that stock market risk plays a role, Post-CFMA,
in explaining the cross-section of futures returns. Our results imply
that the two markets are linked due to investors need to hedge com-
modity risk Pre-CFMA and, in addition, their speculative demand in
commodity futures markets Post-CFMA. Thus, our ndings are also
an important addition to papers that investigate the nancialization
of commodity futures markets (see, e.g., Tang and Xiong (2012), Ir-
win and Sanders (2011), Stoll and Whaley (2009), Buyuksahin et al.
(2010), Buyuksahin and Robe (2010), Cheng et al. (2011), and Basak
and Pavlova (2013)).
We nd that the reversal is driven by commodities from the Energy
and (Precious) Metals sectors, consistent with the fact that the largest
share of index investment is owing into these sectors. Also, we show
that the commodity premium in the stock market, and its reversal,
show up using only the between-industry or only the within-industry
variation in commodity betas. This nding indicates that within-
industry variation, due to, for instance, corporate hedging practices,
market power, or the place of a rm in the supply chain, is priced
in addition to the pricing of between-industry variation due to dif-
ferences in fundamental exposures to certain commodities. In fact,
our regression-based measure of commodity risk essentially controls
for the fact that some rms hedge (or unhedge) their exposures and
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therefore provides for a more natural measure of commodity risk than
looking at SIC codes alone, as in Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006).
In the next section, we derive a model that links stock and com-
modity (futures) markets. Section 2 describes the institutional back-
ground, the data and method. Section 3 presents returns along the
cross-section of commodity exposures. In Section 4 we analyze sec-
tor and industry e¤ects as well as the relation between ination and
commodity risk. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
1 Theoretical framework
We start out by developing a model that links the commodity market
to the stock market. We initially think of the commodity as a basket
of commodities, that is, an index. Our model uses a standard two-
date mean-variance framework in the spirit of Hirshleifer (1988, 1989)
and Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002). An important di¤erence with
these papers is that we do not model the stock market as one security,
rather we model it as consisting of multiple stocks. The markets are
linked through (institutional) investors that are exposed to commodity
risk, but do not invest in commodity futures initially. We will see that
the cross-hedging demands of these investors in the stock market imply
a commodity risk premium in the cross-section of stocks. Mimicking
the recent inux of institutional investment in commodities, the model
shows how changing participation in the futures market by these same
investors may impact the stock market price of commodity risk.
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A Economic setting
There are three types of agents: NP commodity Producers that can
hedge their commodity risk in the futures market, NS specialized Spec-
ulators that only trade in the futures market, and NI Investors that
initially only trade in the stock market. Producers and Speculators
only trade in the futures market and not in the stock market. Similar
to Hirshleifer (1988) this element of segmentation can be motivated
with trading costs, in the form of explicit charges or the costs of be-
coming informed, or because of wealth restrictions. Investors initially
do not trade in the futures market, which is consistent with narrow
position limits set by the CFTC for this class of traders to prevent
"excessive speculation" historically.
B The stock market with Investors facing position limits in the futures
market
In this subsection, we derive equilibrium demand and expected returns
in the stock market. There are NI Investors that are each endowed
with one dollar that they can invest in the risk free asset, with re-
turn Rf;t, and K risky stocks, with excess return vector rt+1. These
Investors may also want to add the futures contract, with (pseudo-)
return RFut;t+1, but may be prevented from doing so because of po-
sition limits, which were historically imposed by the CFTC. We rst
model the case with position limit, such that Investors cannot take a
position in the futures market. Subsequently, we model the case with-
out position limit, when Investors can optimally choose their position
in the futures contract.
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Wewrite the portfolio return of the Investors exposed to commodity
price risk as
yI;t+1 = Rf;t + w
0
rrt+1 + wFutRFut;t+1 + 'RS;t+1. (1)
Here, wr is the K-dimensional vector of weights in stocks, wFut is the
position in the futures contract and ' is the size of the exposure to
spot commodity price risk RS;t+1 per dollar invested. This exposure
can be motivated in (at least) three ways. First, Investors are ex-
posed to ination risk and commodity prices represent a large and
volatile component of ination. Second, commodity prices are a state
variable for many investment, production and consumption desisions.
Finally, in the model of Basak and Pavlova (2013), Institutional in-
vestors care about their performance relative to a commodity index,
such that marginal utility increases in the performance of the index.
This assumption can be approximated by setting ' =  1, such that
the agent solves a mean-variance utility problem in relative returns.
In the presence of position limits, investors choose the optimal port-
folio of stocks alone: w = (w0r 0)
0, whereas in the absence of position
limits they can add a futures position: w = (w0r wFut)
0. Likewise,
 = (0r Fut)
0 is a K + 1 vector of expected excess stock returns and
the expected futures return,  is their corresponding (K + 1)(K + 1)
covariance matrix and S = (0rS FS)
0 is the corresponding K + 1
vector of covariances with the spot commodity return. Assuming that
relative risk aversion I is homogenous, Investors solve the following
12






















In order to express the optimal portfolio weights, we assume the
futures contract is perfectly correlated with the commodity return
and for simplicity that the two returns have equal variances, i.e.,
FF = SS = FS.2 Using the above assumptions, the partitioned
inverse of , and the auxiliary regression of the futures return on the
stocks
RFut;t+1 = a+ b
0rt+1 + et+1; with (3)
ee = V ar(et+1), (4)
Appendix A shows that the optimal portfolio in the two cases is
With limits wr =  1I 
 1
rr r   ' 1rr rS; (5)
Without limits wr =  1I 
 1
rr r   wFut;spec 1rr rS (6)







In the presence of position limits, the optimal demand for stocks in
Equation (5) combines a standard speculative demand (the tangency
portfolio) with a minimum-variance hedge demand for commodity risk,
2This perfect correlation is true conditionally. Further, we only need a perfect correlation for
expositional purposes: the hedge demand will tilt towards the futures contract as long as it is a
better hedge than the available stocks, such that the models main implications go through. The
assumption of equal variances is a matter of scaling alone.
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which is similar to Merton (1973) and Anderson and Danthine (1981),
for instance. The hedge demand is dened over the coe¢ cients from a
regression of RS;t+1 on rt+1:  1rr rS and the exposure '. If ' < 0 (' >
0), Investors adjust upward their demand for high (low) commodity
beta stocks in order to hedge.
Without position limits, the optimal futures demand in Equation
(7) combines a speculative demand with a hedge demand. The hedge
demand ' focuses completely on the futures contract, because rFut;t+1
is perfectly correlated with the commodity return RS;t+1. Thus, hedg-
ing of commodity risk takes place entirely via the futures market and
no longer via a cross-hedging demand in the stock market. For in-
stance, Investors go long in the futures contract to hedge when ' < 0.
The speculative demand for futures wFut;spec =  1I 
 1
ee a is a standard
speculative demand for the futures contract given that it is hedged
with the stocks using Equation (3). Here, a is a (generalized) Jensen
measure of the futures contracts versus the available stocks. A positive
a, combined with low enough residual risk ee, implies positive diver-
sication benets from adding a long position in the futures contract
to the stock portfolio and therefore a positive speculative demand.
Finally, Equation (6) demonstrates that the optimal demand for
stocks, wr, adjusts the tangency portfolio with a minimum-variance
hedge demand dened over the speculative demand for futureswFut;spec.
Thus, if the agent seeks additional exposure to futures (beyond the
hedge demand ') when a > 0, he will hedge this additional expo-
sure among the K risky assets. This result follows directly from the
tangency portfolio of the extended set of assets, as shown in Stevens
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(1998). Importantly, the composition of this hedge portfolio is deter-
mined by  1rr rS, as in the case with a position limit.
Because only Investors participate in the stock market, wr in Equa-
tion (5) and (6) is the market portfolio of stocks wm. Using this,
Appendix A shows
Proposition 1 When Investors are exposed to commodity risk and
face possible position limits in the futures market, expected excess stock
returns depend on their covariance with the market portfolio (rm;t+1)
and the commodity return (RS;t+1):
With limits E(rk;t+1) = Ikm + I'kS (9)
Without limits E(rk;t+1) = Ikm + IwFut;speckS. (10)
Propostion 1 shows that expected stock returns depend on their
covariance with the market portfolio as well as on their covariance
with the commodity return, due to the hedge demand. The e¤ect of
commodity hedging on expected returns is di¤erent in the two cases.
When the Investor faces a position limit, he cannot hedge the expo-
sure to commodity risk ' directly in the futures market, such that
cross-hedging demands in the stock market are optimal. As a result,
commodity risk is priced in the stock market and the price per unit of
covariance is I'. Thus, if ' < 0, the price of commodity risk is nega-
tive: Investors adjust upward the demand for stocks that move in-sync
with the commodity, because these stocks are attractive as a hedge,
which increases (decreases) their equilibrium price (expected excess
return). Conversely, if ' > 0, the stock market price of commodity
15
risk is positive.
When there are no position limits in the futures market, Investors
hedge their exposure to commodity risk directly using the futures con-
tract. Consequently, ' no longer a¤ects expected stock returns. How-
ever, if there is a speculative demand (long or short) for commodity
futures when a is non-zero, Investors hedge this speculative demand
in the stock market. Thus, commodity risk is again priced in the
cross-section of stock returns. The size and sign of the commodity
risk premium in the two cases depends on the size and sign of I'
versus IwFut;spec.
C The futures market
In this subsection, we derive the optimal futures demand for Producers
and Speculators and analyze the impact of lifting the position limits
initially faced by Investors on the futures risk premium.
With position limits, there are two classes of traders that partic-
ipate in the futures market: Producers and Speculators. The NP
Producers are each endowed with one dollar with which they (each)
produce qt+1 units of a commodity. The amount produced is sto-
chastic and has expectation one, but is assumed to be the same for
each producer. Thus, total endowed wealth of the Producers is NP
and total (stochastic) output of the commodity is Qt+1 = NP qt+1:
Consumers are characterized by the inverse demand function for the
commodity: QDt+1 = g (St+1), such that spot market equilibrium im-
plies Qt+1 = QDt+1. We normalize the Producers problem similar to
Investors, such that he maximizes a mean-variance utility function
16
over his portfolio return
yP;t+1 = qt+1RS;t+1 + hRFut;t+1, (11)
which combines the uncertain return from output (qt+1RS;t+1) with a
hedge position in h futures contracts. Assuming again that relative







Using the notation introduced before and the assumption that FF =
SS = FS, Appendix B shows that a Taylor series approximation of





  (1 + ) FS
FF
; (13)








is a demand elasticity, as in Hirshleifer
(1988), and  1FFFS = 1 as assumed before. Equation (13) is a well-
known result that separates the optimal futures position in a specu-
lative demand and a pure hedge demand. The pure hedge demand
reects both price and quantity risk by adjusting the futures position
according to the demand elasticity.
The NS Speculators are likewise endowed with one dollar each,
which they invest in the risk free asset and s futures contracts. Thus,
Speculators maximize a mean-variance utility function over their port-
folio return
yS;t+1 = Rf;t + sRFut;t+1. (14)
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Assuming again that relative risk aversion is homogenous, the optimal







which is analogous to the speculative demand by Producers.
Without position limits, there are three classes of traders in the
futures market: Producers, whose demand is given in Equation (13),
Speculators, whose demand is given in Equation (15) and Investors,
whose demand is given in Equation (7). Since futures contracts are in
zero net supply, futures market equilibrium requires for the two cases
With limits 0 = NPh+NSs (16)
Without limits 0 = NPh+NSs+NIwFut. (17)
Using these market clearing conditions, Appendix C shows
Proposition 2 In a futures market where Investors face possible po-
sition limits, the futures risk premium equals:
With limit E(RFut;t+1) =
P
P + S
P (1 + )FS (18)
Without limit E(rFut;t+1) =
PP (1 + ) + II'




P + S + ~I
FT (20)





where FT denotes covariance with the tangency portfolio of stocks
only, with weights wTan =  1I 
 1
rr r and excess return rTan;t+1.
18
Thus, when only Producers and Speculators participate in the fu-
tures market, the futures risk premium depends on the covariance of
the futures and the spot return FS, the risk aversion of the Producers
P , and the risk aversion-adjusted market share of Producers in the
futures market, P= (P + S). The term P (1 + )FS reects the
hedge demand for futures contracts by Producers. This hedge demand
is increasing in the covariance of the futures with the spot, adjusted
for the demand elasticity, and in Producer risk aversion. With  >  1,
the hedge demand will be a short position, and the futures risk pre-
mium will be positive. This nding is the familiar hedging pressure
e¤ect: a short hedge position has to be compensated by the specula-
tive demand from Speculators and Producers themselves. This specu-
lative demand can only be a long position if the futures risk premium
is positive. The risk adjusted market share of the Producers versus
Speculators reects the strength of the hedging pressure e¤ect: when
there are more Speculators or their risk aversion is lower, there is a
bigger speculative demand to absorb the hedge demand of Producers,
thereby lowering the futures risk premium.
When the position limits for Investors are lifted, the futures risk
premium in Equation (19) contains a hedging pressure e¤ect simi-
lar to Equation (18), except that now also Investors enter both the
numerator and the denominator. Investors hedge commodity risk in
the futures market, which adds to the hedging pressure e¤ect by an
amount II'. If ' < 0, the long hedge demand of Investors (partly)
o¤sets the hedge demand by Producers, thus lowering the futures risk
premium. Even if Investors do not have an exposure to commodity
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risk, i.e., ' = 0, they enter the rst term via the denominator, thereby
lowering the futures risk premium. This e¤ect is similar to the pres-
ence of Speculators.
The second term in Equation (19) follows from the fact that In-
vestors combine the futures contract with the stocks for speculative
reasons. This makes stock market risk priced via the covariance of
the futures return with the return on the tangency portfolio of stocks,
wTan. Since only Investors invest in both stocks and futures, the weight
assigned to this stock market risk is the risk aversion weighted market
share of Investors in the futures market. Because Investors care about
the residual risk of the futures ee rather than total risk FF , their
market share I is adjusted for this according to Equation (22).
2 Empirical framework
A Institutional setting
The model outlined above relies on an assumption that a structural
break must have occurred in the investment practices of a large group
of agents (Investors). We argue that this break occurred following the
passage of the CFMA on December 21, 2000. The act allowed institu-
tional investors (insurance companies, pension funds, foundations and
hedge funds e.g.) and wealthy individuals to take large positions in
commodity futures and other commodity derivatives, whereas before
2000 most of them faced narrow position limits imposed by the CFTC
to prevent excessive speculation.
In terms of our model, this means that Investors could not hedge
their commodity risk exposure in the futures market historically, but
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had to resort to hedging in the stock market or to directly invest-
ing in physical commodities, which is expensive (Lewis (2007)). Af-
ter the CFMA, Investors can get the desired commodity exposure
directly via futures (and other commodity derivatives) markets. As
a result, commodity index investment by such investors in over-the-
counter swap agreements, exchange-traded funds (ETF), exchange-
traded notes (ETN), and managed funds, benchmarked to well-diversied
and transparent indices like the SP-GSCI and DJ-UBSCI, jumped
from $ 15 billion in 2003 to $ 250 billion at the end of 2009, which
translates to an increase from 10% to over 40% in the share of commod-
ity futures market open interest attributable to institutional investors
(Irwin and Sanders (2011)). These numbers underestimate the true
investments in commodities, because the exchange-traded market still
represents less than 10% of the total market for commodity derivatives
(Etula (2010)).
In line with, among others, Domanski and Heath (2007) and Tang
and Xiong (2012) we use the observable change in total open interest
seen in Figure 1 to motivate splitting our sample at December 31, 2003.
We refer to the period before December 31, 2003 as Pre-CFMA
and the period thereafter as Post-CFMA. Below we show that our
results are not sensitive to the exact breakpoint chosen.
B Commodity futures data
We construct an index of commodity futures to represent the futures
contract modeled in Section 1. We collect data on prices and open in-
terest of 33 exchange-traded, liquid commodities from the Commodity
21
Research Bureau (CRB), supplemented with data from the Futures In-
dustry Institute (FII). A detailed overview of the sample is given in
Table I. The commodities are divided into four broad sectors: Energy,
Agriculture, Metals and Fibers, and Livestock and Meats.3
Table I about here.
We calculate futures returns using a roll-over strategy of rst and
second nearest-to-maturity contracts.4 First, we focus on contracts
that are relatively close to maturity, because these are most liquid.
Second, this strategy is similar to the construction of commercial in-
dexes, like the SP-GSCI and the DJ-UBSCI. We roll out of the rst
nearest contract (and into the second nearest contract) at the end of
the month before the month prior to maturity. In this way, we guard
against the possible confounding impact of erratic price and volume
behavior commonly observed close to maturity.5 For the Energy sector
we have contracts maturing in all months of the year; for most other
commodities we have between four and eight delivery months avail-
able. For all contracts except Sugar and Pork Bellies, the delivery
months are never more than three months apart.
Table I reports average returns, standard deviations (both in an-
nualized percentages) and median total open interest (TOI) in US$
3For instance, Hong and Yogo (2012) use a similar partitioning.




where Ft;T is the futures price at the end of month t of the nearest contract whose expiration date
T is after the end of month t + 1. These uncollateralized futures returns are comparable with
excess returns on stocks and are made up of both the spot return and the roll return.
5By rolling over approximately one to two weeks before most commercial indices do, our index
is not a¤ected by their short-term market impact, which may partly cause this erratic behavior
(Muo (2010)).
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for each individual contract.6 Historically, the Energy (Livestock and
Meats) sector has contained the largest (smallest) commodities in
open interest and trading volume. Throughout, we focus on an open
interest-weighted total index (OIW) that aggregates all 33 commodi-
ties. Similar to value-weighted stock indices or production-weighted
commercial commodity indices, OIW weights month t commodity re-
turns according to TOI at the end of month t  1. We show that the
main results are robust for an equal weighted total index as well as
the SP-GSCI Excess Return Index and present additional evidence for
OIW sector indexes.
C Estimating commodity exposures
To nd out whether commodity prices are a relevant risk factor in the
stock market, we apply the Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) port-
folio approach. We sort both individual stocks (that is, all ordinary
common shares traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ excluding -
nancial rms) and 48 industry portfolios on their beta with respect to
the OIW commodity index.7
At the end of each month t 1, we re-estimate the commodity beta
for stock (or industry) i, i;t 1, over a 60-month rolling window using
Ri;s  Rf;s = i;t 1 + i;t 1Roiw;s + "i;s, for s = t  60; :::; t  1, (23)
where we require that at least three out of the last ve years of returns
are available. We apply Equation (23) from January 1975 onwards to
6TOI is dened as the sum of the open interest of all outstanding contracts (i.e., contracts with
di¤erent maturities) for a specic commodity, multiplied by the rst-nearest futures price.
7The 48 industry portfolios are sourced from Kenneth Frenchs Web site.
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ensure that the OIW total index consists of at least 20 commodities,
such that it can be reasonably expected to mimic the important macro-
economic impact that commodities have. As a result, the sample of
post-ranking portfolio returns spans from January 1980 to December
2010, which we split into a period of 288 months Pre-CFMA and 84
months Post-CFMA. In a robustness check, we control for the bench-
mark factors of the CAPM (Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin
(1966)), the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993, denoted as
FF3M) and the four-factor model of Carhart (1997, denoted as FFCM)
when estimating commodity beta.
First, we construct market value-weighted stock portfolios from
both a one-dimensional sort in ve commodity beta groups and an
independent, two-dimensional sort in ve commodity beta and ve
size groups. Second, we perform a one-dimensional between-industry
sort, which constructs ve industry-portfolios that equally weight nine
or ten industries each. We apply the time-series regression approach
of Black et al. (1972) to analyze average returns and risk-adjusted
returns (relative to the CAPM, FF3M and FFCM) of the portfolios
introduced above as well as the High minus Low commodity beta
(HLCB) spreading portfolios constructed therefrom.
D Expected commodity futures returns
Although the model of Section 1 contains only one commodity, the
commodity futures risk premium in Proposition 2 can be generalized
to multiple commodities, which provides us with a set of predictions
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for the cross-section of expected commodity futures returns.8
First and foremost, we focus on the prediction that in the absence
of position limits for Investors, stock market risk is a priced factor in
commodity futures (Equation (19)). This focus is motivated by ev-
idence that suggests stock market risk, as measured by MKT, SMB
and HML, is not priced in commodity futures historically. This nd-
ing is consistent with our model, because institutional investors did
not enter commodity futures markets en masse until after the CFMA.
In our model, stock market risk is dened as covariance with the tan-
gency portfolio of stocks, which combines the market portfolio and the
hedge portfolio for commodity risk (see Equation (5) and (6)). Accord-
ingly, we sort commodity futures one-dimensionally at the quartiles of
ranked covariance with each of the two portfolios.
Proposition 2 also implies that a hedging pressure e¤ect is present in
futures returns both with and without position limits. Hence, we also
sort on a hedging pressure variable, using a smaller cross-section (26
commodities) and time-series (1986 to 2010), dictated by the availabil-
ity of public CFTC data. Following, Basu and Mi¤re (2013), hedging
pressure is calculated as a 12-month moving average of the di¤erence
between the number of short and long positions of commercial hedgers
relative to their total position.9 These results need to be interpreted
with caution, however, because (i) there are classication errors in the
8Note, this generalization requires segmentation between the commodity markets for the Pro-
ducers and Speculators, which can be motivated by (explicit or implicit) trading costs as in
Hirschleifer (1988, 1989). Moreover, because Investors are present in all futures markets, the
returns on futures l = 1; ::; L must be independent conditional on the stock returns, otherwise the
generalization is only approximate.
9Unlike the model in Section 1 this allows Producers (hedgers) to take both long and short
positions in futures contracts, but we show in the Internet Appendix that the model is easily
extended by allowing Producers to have either long or short exposures.
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CFTC data (see, e.g., Cheng et al. (2011) and Acharya et al. (2013))
and (ii) these data do not contain the hedging positions for Investors
that we need to measure hedging pressure in the exact manner sug-
gested by our model in the Post-CFMA period.
3 The cross-section of stock and futures returns
We start out by documenting the main implications of the model,
which are summarized in Propositions 1 and 2 of Section 1. First,
commodity risk is priced in the stock market and this price changes
Post-CFMA. Second, stock market risk is priced in the futures market,
but only Post-CFMA.
A Commodity risk in the stock market
Our rst main results are presented in Table II. Here, we analyze
whether a commodity risk premium is present in the cross-section of
stock returns and test if the risk premium varies over the two sub-
periods. We present average returns and standard deviations for the
period Pre-CFMA and Post-CFMA in Panel A and Panel B, respec-
tively, whereas Panel C tests the di¤erence in average returns.
Table II about here.
In average returns, stocks and industries with high commodity be-
tas underperform consistently Pre-CFMA. Also, for all size quintiles
except the smallest, average returns are decreasing monotonically in
commodity beta. The High minus Low Commodity Beta (HLCB)
spread is economically large and statistically signicant at -8.11%
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for the one-dimensional sort of stocks and at -4.72% for industries.10
On the contrary, high commodity beta stocks outperform consistently
Post-CFMA. Average returns increase monotonically in commodity
beta in all control groups, which adds up to a HLCB spread that is
economically large and statistically signicant at 12.08% for the one-
dimensional sort of stocks and at 12.22% for industries. In both sub-
periods, portfolio standard deviation increases almost monotonically
in commodity beta, which is consistent with the idea that commodity
beta captures an exposure to risk.
Finally, the results in Panel C demonstrate that the di¤erence in av-
erage returns between the two sub-periods is highly signicant around
20% for the HLCB portfolio of individual stocks and 17% for the HLCB
industry portfolio. Moreover, going from Low to High among the long-
only portfolios, we see that the di¤erence is increasing monotonically
in commodity beta. Highlighting the importance of controlling for
size, we nd that the reversal is strongest among the bigger stocks in
both sub-periods.
Table III about here.
Next, we see in Table III that the previously documented performance-
beta relation and its reversal are robust when controlling for the usual
risk factors. Table III is structured similarly to Table II except that
we now present risk-adjusted returns (alphas) for the two sub-periods
in Panels A and B, respectively. Pre-CFMA, the HLCB spread actu-
10We nd Construction, Steel Works (etc.), Petroleum and Natural Gas, Precious Metals, Min-
ing, Coal and Machinery among the industries with consistently high commodity betas and Retail,
Insurance and Consumer Goods among the industries with consistently low commodity betas.
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ally widens to large and signicant CAPM, FF3M and FFCM alphas
of between -8% and -10% for the one-dimensional sort of stocks and
around -6% for industries. Post-CFMA, only about 2% of the HLCB
spread is captured by the MKT factor, leaving HLCB alphas that are
over 10% for both stocks and industries. Again, in almost every case
the alphas are monotonically decreasing Pre-CFMA and increasing
Post-CFMA in commodity beta. Panel C summarizes this evidence
and shows that the di¤erence in the two commodity risk premiums
adds up to an economically large and highly signicant di¤erence of
about 20% for stocks and 17% for industries.
The reversal from a negative to a positive commodity risk premium
reported above is consistent with our model. Pre-CFMA, when insti-
tutional investors hedge their commodity risk in the stock market,
Equation (9) implies that the commodity risk premium is negative
when the fundamental exposure ' < 0. Post-CFMA, when com-
modity futures represent a considerable fraction of many institutional
investorsportfolios, Equation (10) implies that the commodity risk
premium is zero when these positions solely reect a hedge demand,
i.e., wFut;spec = 0, and positive when these positions also reect a
speculative demand, i.e, wFut;spec > 0.
A negative fundamental exposure is consistent with (i) investors
incentives to hedge ination, which risk premium is also negative (see,
e.g., Chen et al. (1986) and Ferson and Harvey (1991)), and (ii) the
interpretation of commodity prices as a state variable. For instance,
Driesprong et al. (2008) and Jacobsen et al. (2013) nd that energy
and metals prices predict stock market returns with a negative sign
28
over our sample period, such that the Intertemporal CAPM of Merton
(1973) implies a negative risk premium. Moreover, Hamilton (2008)
notes that "Nine out of ten of the U.S. recessions since World War II
were preceded by a spike up in oil prices", such that oil (and other
Energy) prices are also "recession state variables" along the lines of
Cochrane (2005, Ch.9).
A positive speculative demand for commodities is consistent with
Greer (2000), Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) and Erb and Harvey
(2006), who argue that commodity futures provide large diversica-
tion benets when added to a portfolio consisting of stocks and bonds
alone. In fact, Irwin and Sanders (2011) assert that this evidence
was an important factor in promoting commodity-index related prod-
ucts to institutional investors. Going forward, however, a positive
speculative investment is hard to justify if index investment drives up
prices too much. Results from Irwin and Sanders (2011), Stoll and
Whaley (2009), and Buyuksahin and Robe (2010) question this price
impact. Moreover, Appendix C derives the equilibrium conditions for
wFut;spec > 0, which are su¢ ciently more Producers and su¢ ciently
risk-averse Producers, such that their short hedging pressure still in-
duces a positive futures risk premium.
These conditions are fairly mild and do not seem to be violated
Post-CFMA. Using data from the CFTC Commitment of Traders
Report from January 1986 to December 2010, Figure 2 shows that
commercial hedgers (net) short positions are su¢ cient to cover non-
commercial speculators (net) long positions. To be precise, Panel A
demonstrates that the OIW average net short position of hedgers has
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historically been larger than the OIW average net long position of
speculators, whereas the di¤erence is decreasing steadily since 1986.
Further, Panel B demonstrates that the total short position of hedgers
has always been larger than the total long position of speculators, al-
though this di¤erence is decreasing since 2000. In fact, using better
daily data from the CFTCs private Large Trader Reporting System,
Cheng et al. (2011) arrive at a similar conclusion: for the average com-
modity, traditional hedgersshort positions increase in lockstep with
index investorslong positions over the last decade.
B Stock market risk in the commodity futures market
Table IV presents our tests of the models implications for pricing in
the commodity futures market. Proposition 2 predicts that stock mar-
ket risk (dened as covariance with the tangency portfolio of stocks)
is priced in the futures market Post-CFMA. Therefore, Panel A and B
present average returns, Pre- and Post-CFMA respectively, for portfo-
lio sorts on covariance with the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio
(MKT) as well as the stock-based High minus Low Commodity Beta
portfolio (HLCB).11 In the last column, we sort on the average of these
two covariances, which is a simple proxy for covariance with the tan-
gency portfolio.12 Proposition 2 also predicts that there is a hedging
pressure e¤ect in futures markets in both sub-periods, which is an-
alyzed in Panel C. Finally, to ascertain that our results are not due
11HLCB is constructed from the one-dimensional sort of stocks on commodity beta (see Table
II) and is long (short) an equal weighted portfolio of the top (bottom) two quintiles.
12Although portfolios sorted on the average covariance cannot be ranked a priori, because the risk
premium for exposure to MKT and HLCB may di¤er (see Equation (10)), we nd that the post-
ranking beta with respect to each of the two factors lines up monotonically from the High to Low
exposure portfolio. Consequently, the model implies that average returns line up monotonically as
well.
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to equal-weighting the futures returns, we also present results for the
rank-based weighting scheme of Koijen et al. (2012).
Table IV about here.
Panel A demonstrates that stock market risk is not priced in the
futures market pre-CFMA, which is consistent with previous work.
Although there is a strong inverse relation between MKT exposure and
mean futures returns, there is no relation between HLCB exposure and
mean futures returns. Indeed, combining, the sort on the average of
the two covariances demonstrates that a consistent pattern in returns
is absent with a small and insignicant average return of 0.35% for the
High minus Low portfolio (-0.04% for the rank-weighted portfolio).
Panel B demonstrates that stock market risk is priced in the fu-
tures market Post-CFMA, as hypothesized. First, average futures
returns increase monotonically in MKT exposure, translating to an
economically large and marginally signicant High minus Low spread
of 13.38%. The outperformance of High versus Low HLCB exposure
futures is also large at 9.00%, but this spread is insignicant and
the relation between HLCB exposure and returns is non-monotonic.
Combining, the sort on the average of the two covariances presents
a monotonic relation between stock market risk and mean futures
return, however. Both the High minus Low spread and the rank-
weighted portfolio return are economically large and signicant at
14.59% and 11.78%, respectively.
Finally, Panel C demonstrates that mean futures returns are in-
creasing in hedging pressure unconditionally. The e¤ect is marginally
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signicant in both sub-periods, but larger economically in the recent
period. For instance, the average return for the High minus Low hedg-
ing pressure portfolio is 7.78% Pre-CFMA versus 13.43% Post-CFMA.
To conclude, futures returns are (i) increasing in stock market
risk, but only Post-CFMA, and (ii) increasing in hedging pressure,
in both sub-periods. This evidence is consistent with our model and
increased participation of (Institutional) Investors in futures markets
Post-CFMA, which integrates pricing. Indeed, the Post-CFMA spreads
we observe in the futures market due to stock market risk are similar in
magnitude to those observed in the stock market (see Table (II)). Con-
sistent with this evidence, Tang and Xiong (2012) document that the
correlation between individual commodities and the aggregate stock
market has increased substantially recently.
C Robustness checks
Exploring the structural break Our analysis sofar sets the structural
break at December 2003, consistent with the unprecedented increase
in open interest in the commodity futures market around that time
(see Figure 1). To test the sensitivity of our results, Table V reports
the HLCB reversal (in average return and FFCM alpha) for di¤erent
breakpoints from December 2000 until December 2005. A breakpoint
at December 2000 implies that the e¤ects of the CFMA are e¤ective
immediately after its passage, whereas subsequent breakpoints allow
the e¤ects to materialize gradually over time.
Table V about here.
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For all breakpoints, the one-dimensional sort for stocks and indus-
tries results in a reversal between 13% and 23% in average and risk-
adjusted returns, which is always statistically signicant. Thus, our
results are not sensitive to the exact dating of the breakpoint. Moving
from 2000 to 2005, we see an inverted U-shape. For individual stocks,
the largest di¤erence in average returns is obtained when we split the
sample in December 2002 (20.69%), whereas the largest di¤erence in
FFCM  is obtained when we split in December 2004 (23.00%). For
industries, both spreads are largest when we split in December 2002.
These results are consistent with formal structural break tests that
identify a break between 2002 and 2004 for the HLCB portfolios, giv-
ing further support to choosing December 2003 as in Domanski and
Heath (2007) and Tang and Xiong (2012).
A related issue is whether the composition of these portfolios is sta-
ble around the breakpoint. To this end, Table VI presents the time-
series average of the diagonal elements of Markov switching matrices
for the ve stock portfolios sorted one-dimensionally on commodity
beta for each of the ve-year sub-periods in our sample. For instance,
in the rst column, we see that on a month-to-month basis, 95% (93%)
of the stocks in the High (Low) beta portfolio do not switch. The dif-
ferent columns demonstrate that the average percentage of stocks that
do not switch portfolios varies between 82% and 89% in the di¤erent
sub-periods. Further, the unreported full Markov matrices show that
stocks hardly ever move more than one portfolio at a time in any
given sub-periods. Importantly, there is no substantial drop in this
percentage in the sub-period 2001-2005. On the contrary, we observe
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a relatively high percentage of 89%, suggesting that the portfolios are
stable.
Table VI about here.
In short, the stability Post-CFMA indicates that the documented
reversal is not driven by changing covariances. Rather, in line with
our model, the reversal is driven by changing returns. To further
substantiate this nding, we x the portfolio composition to what it
is in December 2003 and compare the performance of this strategy to
the strategy that updates its weights every month in Panel B of Table
VI. First, we see that the returns of the two strategies are highly
correlated Post-CFMA. For the one-dimensional sort of stocks (for
the industry sort), the correlation between the two HLCB portfolios
equals 90% (92%) from January 2004 until the onset of the crisis in
June 2007, and 0.66 (0.57) until December 2010. Second, we observe
similar reversals for the two strategies.
Other robustness checks We nd that our results are robust in a num-
ber of other dimensions, which results are reported in the Internet Ap-
pendix. First, our results extend to alternative weighting schemes for
the cross-section of commodities. Looking at the last columns in each
panel of Tables II and III, we observe a signicant reversal of around
14% when sorting on exposures to an EW commodity index, suggest-
ing that our results are not solely driven by changing shares of open
interest. Also, the Internet Appendix presents a signicant reversal of
over 16% for the (production-weighted) SP-GSCI commodity index.
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Second, we nd similar reversals in average and risk-adjusted re-
turns when we control for the benchmark factors (MKT, SMB, HML
and MOM) when estimating commodity betas. Third, our results
extend when estimating risk premiums using OLS and GLS cross-
sectional regressions with commodity beta-, size-, book-to-market-
and industry-sorted portfolios as test assets. Thus, commodity ex-
posures capture a risk factor that is separate from the traditional risk
factors. Fourth, given that both commodity beta and size are persis-
tent, transaction costs are unlikely to subsume the spreads. Indeed,
we nd similar results when rebalancing annually and when varying
the length of the rolling window from two to ten years. Finally, our
results are not driven by the recent nancial crisis, as excluding it only
strengthens the reversal.
4 Sectors, Industries and Ination
This section presents a ner description of both the origin and the
presence of the commodity risk premium in the stock market. In par-
ticular, we investigate (i) which commodity sectors drive our results,
(ii) whether our stock market sorts mainly reect industry e¤ects, or
are a pure stock-commodity play and (iii) whether our results are due
to the change in the correlation between stock returns and ination
around the turn of the century, or indeed represent a change in the
price of commodity risk.
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A Commodity sectors
Table VII presents average post-ranking returns and FFCM alphas
for portfolios sorted on Open Interest-weighted commodity sector in-
dexes.13 The evidence suggests that the reversal in the commodity
risk premium is driven by the Energy and Metals and Fibers sec-
tors. Pre-CFMA, stocks with a high exposure to these sectors under-
perform by 3.82% and 6.13%, respectively. Post-CFMA, these same
stocks outperform by 13.57% and 5.84%, respectively.14 The corre-
sponding reversal is particularly large and signicant for Energy at
17.40% (FFCM =17.50%), relative to a large but insignicant 11.97%
(FFCM =8.18%) for Metals and Fibers. In contrast, sorting on either
the Agriculture or the Livestock and Meats index does not yield a
consistent pattern in returns in either sub-period.
Table VII about here.
In the Internet Appendix, we present sorts on the ve largest com-
modities per sector to further analyze these e¤ects. First, we nd that
a (marginally) signicant reversal of about 15% is common to all en-
ergy commodities, although for Natural Gas the reversal is only large
and signicant in FFCM alpha. For Metals and Fibers, we nd a par-
ticularly large reversal for Precious Metals (Gold, Silver and Platinum)
of about 10%. For the remaining Industrial Metals and Fibers as well
as Agriculture and Livestock and Meats commodities, the reversal is
positive, but small.
13Similar results obtain for equal-weighted sector indexes.
14These returns are not a mirror image of the average return of the respective sector index
Post-CFMA, which equals -2% for Energy and 16% for Metals and Fibers.
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The fact that our results are driven by Energy and Precious Metals
is unsurprising given that these are the largest commodities in terms
of open interest. However, this result is also consistent with the model.
First, a relatively large proportion of index investment is owing into
the Energy sector Post-CFMA, whereas energies are a relatively large
and volatile component of ination. Second, swings in both Energy
and Precious Metals prices are likely most important for the macro-
economy. For instance, evidence in Hamilton (2008) suggests that
Energy prices spike before recessions, whereas precious metals, and
in particular Gold, are popular among investors as a safe haven and
a hedge against ination or currency risk. These views on Gold are
challenged recently in Erb and Harvey (2013), however.
B Within-industry e¤ects
The robustness of our main results for a one-dimensional sort of indus-
tries suggests that the reversal in the commodity risk premium can be
captured using only between-industry variation in commodity betas.
This subsection demonstrates that the reversal can also be captured
using only within-industry variation. To this end we construct ve
market value-weighted stock portfolios within each industry by split-
ting at the quintiles of ranked commodity betas within that industry.
Here, we exclude four nancial industries and industry-months that
contain fewer than ten stocks.
Table VIII presents average returns and FFCM alphas for the within-
industry sort in a similar vein as Tables II and III.15 In each block, the
15CAPM and FF3M alphas are similar but not presented to conserve space.
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rst ve rows and columns present results for portfolios that equally
weight the within-industry portfolios (i.e., within-industry group High,
2, 3, 4 or Low, where High consists of stocks whose beta is high rel-
ative to other stocks in the industry) of typically seven or eight in-
dustries that fall into the relevant group of the between-industry sort
(i.e., between-industry group High, 2, 3, 4 or Low). The sixth column
presents the average within-industry e¤ect, which is a portfolio that
equal-weights ve between-industry groups. The sixth row presents
the HLCB within-industry portfolios.
Table VIII about here.
Panel A demonstrates that low commodity beta stocks underper-
form high commodity beta stocks Pre-CFMA across the full spec-
trum of industry betas. In average returns, the underperformance
within industries ranges from -6% to -3% per year, which adds up to
a strictly monotonic commodity beta-return relation for the average
within-industry portfolio and a signicant HLCB spread of -4.35%.
These conclusions are even stronger in risk-adjusted returns.
In Panel B we demonstrate that the Post-CFMA reversal is present
across the full spectrum of industry betas, as well. The outperfor-
mance of high commodity beta stocks within each industry is monotonic
and adds up to signicant 11.69% for the average within-industry port-
folio and again extends to risk adjusted returns. Further, in Panel C
we show that this reversal is economically large and signicant in four
out of ve between-industry groups.
In summary, these within-industry e¤ects suggest that variation
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in commodity beta within industries, perhaps due to di¤erences in
corporate hedging practices, market power or the place of a rm in
the supply chain, is priced in a manner consistent with our hypoth-
esis. This indicates that our ndings are not merely picking up the
fundamental commodity exposure of a given industry. Rather, there
are important di¤erences in rm exposures to commodity risk within
industry, even when the industry at large is not exposed.
C Ination
One natural question is whether sorting on commodity returns is tan-
tamount to sorting on (unexpected) ination and therefore whether
the results are driven by the reversal in the correlation between in-
ation and the stock market after the turn of the century (see e.g.,
Bekaert and Wang (2010) and Campbell et al. (2013)). To verify
that the commodity e¤ect we document is separate, we consider sorts
wherein we rst orthogonalize stock returns from ination e¤ects.
Thus, in each rolling window, we run two regressions to nd i;t 1
ri;s = ai;t 1 + ci;t 1Is + ei;s (24)
ei;s = i;t 1 + i;t 1ROIW;s + "i;s, for s = t  60; :::; t  1,
where Is is either unexpected ination (UI) or a mimicking portfolio of
unexpected ination (UIF), which addresses the concern that stocks
exposures to non-traded factors are typically small and hard to esti-
mate. For the non-traded measure of ination UI, we follow e.g., Erb
and Harvey (2006) and Hong and Yogo (2012) and use the month t





assumes annual ination is integrated of order one.16 The ination fac-
tor UIF is constructed using a three-by-two sort on betas with respect
to UI and size, similar to Fama and French (1993).
In Table IX we present means and FFCM alphas for the usual one-
and two-dimensional sorts on these ination-controlled commodity be-
tas for both sub-periods of interest in Panels A and B. We test the
di¤erence in Panel C. Note, the left block of results orthogonalizes
returns from non-traded unexpected ination UI, the right block from
the traded unexpected ination factor UI1F.
Table IX about here.
When controlling for UI, we see that both mean and risk-adjusted
returns remain economically large and signicant in both sub-periods,
adding up to a HLCB spread in average returns of -7.36% (-5.14%) for
the one-dimensional sort on stocks (industries) in the rst sub-period
and 9.74% (10.12%) in the second sub-period. The performance dif-
ferentials add up to a di¤erence of around 15% for both stocks and
industries in case of both the OIW and the EW index, which is very
similar to what we found in Table II. Again, these performance dif-
ferentials are typically signicant, strengthen in risk-adjusted returns
and are strongest among the biggest stocks.
This result may not come as a surprise, given that one may not
expect the commodity beta to change much when stocksexposures
to non-traded ination are small. Indeed, we nd that commodity
16Our results extend using three alternative measures of (unexpected) ination used by others
in the past: (i) the di¤erence between the monthly ination rate and the short-term t-bill rate;
(ii) an ARIMA(0,1,1)-innovation extracted from the monthly ination series; and, (iii) monthly
ination itself.
40
betas are by and large similar with and without UI. However, the
right panel documents that the reversal in the commodity risk pre-
mium easily extends when controlling for UIF as well. Although in
the rst sub-period the HLCB spreads are slightly smaller, we see
that they remain economically large and signicant in risk-adjusted
returns. Post-CFMA the HLCB spreads are very similar, adding up
to a di¤erence of over 14%, which is only slightly smaller than what
we had before.
5 Conclusion
Because many investment, production and consumption decisions are
conditioned on commodity prices, one would expect them to be an
important risk factor. In this paper, we use the surge in institutional
index investment in commodity futures markets as a quasi-natural ex-
periment and study how commodity risk is priced before and after.
We develop a model where investors are exposed to commodity price
risk, but are not allowed to hedge their exposure in the futures markets
initially, which is consistent with the narrow position limits set by the
CFTC for this class of traders historically. In this model, commod-
ity risk is priced in the stock market. Conversely, stock market risk
is priced in the commodity futures market, but only after investors
position limits are lifted by the introduction of the CFMA.
Indeed, we nd a strong pattern in average stock returns existing
along the cross-section of commodity exposures. Pre-CFMA, High
commodity beta stocks underperform by -8% per year in average and
risk-adjusted returns, whereas Post-CFMA, these same stocks outper-
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form by 11% per year. This reversal is consistent with the structural
break in the behavior of investors who were seeking commodity expo-
sure in the stock market Pre-CFMA and subsequently in the commod-
ity futures market. This nding is also consistent with the fact that
stock market risk only shows up in the cross-section of commodity
futures returns Post-CFMA.
Our ndings are particularly relevant for stocks that are strongly
exposed to commodity price risk and suggest that commodity betas
can be used in devising strategies that use stocks to hedge or specu-
late on commodity prices. This nding is particularly important for
those institutions that might still be prevented or restricted, in any
way, from directly investing in commodity markets. Interestingly, the
performance di¤erentials we document extend to strategies that use
only between-industry variation in commodity betas and to strategies
that use only within-industry variation, which implies that commodity
risk can be hedged while holding industry exposures constant.
Appendix: Derivations
This appendix presents detailed derivations for the model outlined in
Section 1.
A Optimal portfolio for investors with and without position limits
The rst order conditions for an Investor that faces the position limit
in the futures market is
r   I frrwr + rS'g = 0; (1)
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rr r   ' 1rr rS: (2)












9=; = 0: (3)
Using that the partitioned inverse of  can be written as
 1 =
0@  1rr +  1ee bb0   1ee b
  1ee b0  1ee
1A ; (4)
where b and ee = V ar(et+1) follow from the regression
RFut;t+1 = a+ b
0rt+1 + et+1; (5)








0@  1I  1ee a 1rr rS
'
1A : (6)
Because only Investors participate in the stock market, the optimal
demand for stocks wr is the market portfolio wm, both with and with-
out position limits. Consequently, equilibrium expected excess stock
returns are given by a two-factor asset pricing model in both cases.
For each stock k we have
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With limit: E(rk;t+1) = Ikm + I'kS (7)
Without limit: E(rk;t+1) = Ikm + IwFut;speckS, (8)
or in the more familiar form in terms of betas to and expected returns
of the market portfolio (rm;t+1) and a hedge portfolio for commodity







E(rk;t+1) = kmE(rm;t+1) + ihE(rh;t+1). (9)
B Optimal futures demand
Total output for each Producer equals qt+1 = Qt+1=NP , with expected
value q = 1, such that we can write qt+1RS;t+1 =
Qt+1
NP
g (Qt+1). Using a









(Qg0(Q) + g(Q))(Qt+1  Q) + hrFut;t+1. (10)
By Taylor approximation we also have FS = Cov(RFut;t+1; RS;t+1) =
g0(Q)Cov(Qt+1 Q;RFut;t+1). Focusing on the components related to






(h2FF + 2h(1 + )FS) (11)
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where  = g(Q)
Qg0(Q
is a demand elasticity. The optimal futures demand
h follows immediately from the rst order condition
Fut   hFF   (1 + )FS = 0. (12)
C Futures risk premium
Using i = Ni=i for i = P; S; I, the futures risk premium in the
case with limit follows directly from the market clearing condition











Without limit, we combine the optimal futures demand of Producers,
Speculators and Investors. Using the assumption FF = SS = FS,
rewriting from the from the auxiliary regression in Equation (3): a =
Fut   0rF 1rr r = Fut   IFT with wTan =  1I  1rr r; and nally
imposing futures market clearing NPh + NSs + NIwFut = 0, we have
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Moreover, note that market clearing implies that in equilibrium we
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Figure 1: Total Open Interest in 33 commodities (1959 to 2010)
The top gure displays total open interest in 33 commodities in US$, which is
calculated as the sum of the US$ open interest in each commodity (number of
contracts outstanding times nearest-to-maturity futures price). The bottom gure
displays total open interest in terms of the number of contracts outstanding. Both
series are normalized to equal 100 in December 2003.
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Figure 2: OIW Positions of Hedgers versus Speculators (1986-2010)
The top gure displays the Open Interest Weighted average over all commodities
in the CFTCs historical Commitment of Traders (COT) reports of the net short
position (short minus long) of commercial hedgers versus the net long position (long
minus short) of non-commercial speculators. The bottom gure displays the Open
Interest Weighted average of the short position of commercial hedgers versus the
long position (long plus spreading) of non-commercial speculators. All series are
presented as a fraction of Open Interest. Traders are classied as in the COT
reports, which are available from 1986 onward.
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Table I: Overview of commodity futures
This table presents detailed characteristics of 33 commodity futures, divided over
four sectors: Energy (E), Agriculture (A), Metals and Fibers (M) and Livestock and
Meats (L). The table lists: (i) a commoditiessector (sec.) and symbol (sym.; as
it appears in the CRB data); (ii) the exchange on which it is traded (1); (iii) the
delivery months considered; (iv) the rst month in which both a return and total
open interest (TOI) are observed (the end date, December 2010, is common to all
contracts except propane and axseed, for which TOI approaches zero in 2007 and
2003, respectively); (v) annualized average return and standard deviation (in US$,
* indicates signicance at the 10%-level); and nally, (vi) the median TOI (in US$
MM).
(Sec.) Comm. (Sym.) Exchange Delivery Months First Obs. Avg. Ret. St. Dev. TOI
(E) Crude Oil (CL) NYMEX All 198304 12.75* 33.71 7793
(E) Gasoline (HU/RB) (2) NYMEX All 198501 18.35* 35.80 2353
(E) Heating Oil (HO) NYMEX All 197904 9.92* 31.95 2925
(E) Natural Gas (NG) NYMEX All 199005 -3.74 51.79 11233
(E) Gas-Oil-Petroleum (LF) ICE All 198910 13.59* 32.12 2491
(E) Propane (PN) NYMEX All 198709 27.13* 47.05 21
(A) Co¤ee (KC) ICE 3,5,7,9,12 197209 8.21 37.84 1234
(A) Rough Rice (RR) CBOT 1,3,5,7,9,11 198701 -2.82 28.90 76
(A) Orange Juice (JO) ICE 1,3,5,7,9,11 196703 5.50 32.75 217
(A) Sugar (SB) ICE 3,5,7,10 196102 7.73 43.73 941
(A) Cocoa (CC) ICE 3,5,7,9,12 195908 3.60 31.05 463
(A) Milk (DE) CME 2,4,6,9,12 199602 2.57 24.42 531
(A) Soybean Oil (BO) CBOT 1,3,5,7,8,9,10,12 195908 7.88* 29.85 822
(A) Soybean Meal (SM) CBOT 1,3,5,7,8,9,10,12 195908 9.13* 29.06 1005
(A) Soybeans (S-) CBOT 1,3,5,7,8,9,11 196501 5.69 26.98 3514
(A) Corn (C-) CBOT 3,5,7,9,12 195908 -1.38 23.43 2083
(A) Oats (O-) CBOT 3,5,7,9,12 195908 -0.46 29.16 51
(A) Wheat (W-) CBOT 3,5,7,9,12 195908 0.17 24.48 833
(A) Canola (WC) WCE 3,5,6,7,9,11 197702 0.38 22.18 196
(A) Barley (WA) WCE 3,5,7,10,12 198906 -2.59 22.15 18
(A) Flaxseed (WF) WCE 3,5,7,10,11,12 198501 1.27 20.26 21
(M) Cotton (CT) ICE 3,5,7,10,12 195908 3.20 23.30 1086
(M) Gold (GC) NYMEX 2,4,6,8,10,12 197501 1.70 19.47 6224
(M) Silver (SI) NYMEX 3,5,7,9,12 197202 6.48 32.50 2790
(M) Copper (HG) NYMEX 1,3,5,7,9,12 197210 10.77* 27.77 1250
(M) Lumber (LB) CME 1,3,5,7,9,11 196911 -3.15 27.62 121
(M) Palladium (PA) NYMEX 3,6,9,12 197702 13.26* 36.01 94
(M) Platinum (PL) NYMEX 1,4,7,10 197208 7.69* 27.79 324
(M) Rubber (YR) TOCOM All 199204 9.46 32.58 565
(L) Feeder Cattle (FC) CME 1,3,4,5,8,9,10,11 197112 3.90 16.40 516
(L) Live Cattle (LC) CME 2,4,6,8,10,12 196412 5.46* 16.49 1925
(L) Lean Hogs (LH) CME 2,4,6,7,8,10,12 196603 4.52 25.51 692
(L) Pork Bellies (PB) CME 2,3,5,7,8 196402 2.03 33.72 191
(1) CBOT = Chicago Board of Trade; CME = Chicago Mercantile Ex.; ICE = ICE Futures US; NYMEX
= New York Mercantile Ex.; TOCOM = Tokyo Commodity Ex.; WCE = Winnipeg Commodity Ex.
(2) Until June 2006 returns are based on the Unleaded Gasoline (HU) contract, from July 2006 on the
Reformulated Gasoline Blendstock (RB) contract
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Table II: Average stock returns over subsamples
This table presents average returns and standard deviations, in annualized %s,
for the commodity-beta sorted portfolios of interest. Panel A covers 1980 to
2003 (Pre-CFMA) and Panel B covers 2004 to 2010 (Post-CFMA). Panel C tests
the di¤erence between the two sub-periods. All t-statistics are based on Whites
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Panel A: Pre-CFMA Panel B: Post-CFMA
OIW OIW OIW OIW OIW EW OIW OIW OIW OIW OIW EW
Size quintile One-way Size quintile One-way
S 3 B Stocks 48 Ind. Stocks S 3 B Stocks 48 Ind. Stocks
Mean returns
H 5.88 3.55 2.33 1.91 5.00 4.45 12.13 15.29 15.10 14.85 14.57 11.93
4 8.88 6.90 7.04 6.58 8.23 5.77 12.02 9.97 4.78 5.64 5.97 7.33
3 10.56 9.44 6.32 7.04 7.84 8.25 11.07 8.58 2.08 3.58 6.62 5.16
2 10.55 11.32 9.24 9.53 10.07 8.81 9.25 7.91 3.08 3.87 6.47 5.07
L 8.93 13.03 10.01 10.02 9.72 9.33 1.88 1.98 3.25 2.77 2.35 3.24
HLCB -3.04 -9.47 -7.68 -8.11 -4.72 -4.88 10.25 13.31 11.85 12.08 12.22 8.69
t(HLCB) (-1.17) (-2.36) (-1.77) (-2.02) (-1.70) (-1.16) (1.98) (2.00) (1.88) (1.95) (1.92) (1.34)
Standard deviations
H 27.11 26.75 24.52 24.33 19.13 25.90 31.07 28.47 21.48 22.73 24.65 24.46
4 21.75 19.19 19.17 18.35 17.67 21.06 27.42 22.27 15.62 16.82 22.46 19.58
3 19.20 17.47 17.25 16.72 17.68 16.19 25.71 20.48 15.81 16.51 19.71 15.48
2 19.41 17.91 16.51 16.16 16.26 15.01 23.03 19.07 14.17 14.69 17.65 14.25
L 23.60 21.66 17.76 17.86 15.72 15.68 23.82 19.66 14.44 14.90 15.39 13.75
Panel C: Di¤erence
Returns t-statistics
H 6.25 11.74 12.78 12.94 9.57 7.48 (0.48) (0.97) (1.34) (1.30) (0.95) (0.70)
4 3.14 3.06 -2.26 -0.93 -2.26 1.56 (0.28) (0.33) (-0.32) (-0.13) (-0.24) (0.18)
3 0.51 -0.85 -4.24 -3.46 -1.22 -3.09 (0.05) (-0.10) (-0.61) (-0.49) (-0.15) (-0.46)
2 -1.30 -3.41 -6.16 -5.66 -3.60 -3.74 (-0.14) (-0.42) (-0.97) (-0.88) (-0.48) (-0.60)
L -7.04 -11.04 -6.75 -7.25 -7.37 -6.09 (-0.69) (-1.28) (-1.03) (-1.08) (-1.11) (-1.00)
HLCB 13.29 22.78 19.53 20.19 16.95 13.58 (2.29) (2.93) (2.55) (2.73) (2.44) (1.75)
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Table III: Risk-adjusted returns over subsamples
This table presents risk-adjusted returns (alphas, in annualized %s) for the
commodity-beta sorted portfolios of interest. We use the CAPM, FF3M and FFCM
as benchmark asset pricing models. Panel A covers 1980 to 2003 (Pre-CFMA) and
Panel B covers 2004 to 2010 (Post-CFMA). Panel C tests the di¤erence between the
two sub-periods. All t-statistics are based on Whites heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors.
Panel A:Pre-CFMA Panel B: Post-CFMA
OIW OIW OIW OIW OIW EW OIW OIW OIW OIW OIW EW
Size quintile One-way Size quintile One-way
S 3 B Stocks 48 Ind. Stocks S 3 B Stocks 48 Ind. Stocks
CAPM
H -3.59 -6.71 -6.95 -7.73 -2.67 -5.86 4.40 8.32 10.30 9.45 8.61 6.07
4 0.92 -1.19 -0.72 -1.30 0.72 -3.29 5.18 4.32 0.93 1.24 0.17 2.23
3 3.49 2.13 -1.25 -0.52 0.38 0.98 4.76 3.30 -2.01 -0.77 1.46 1.07
2 3.55 3.99 2.16 2.44 3.22 2.36 3.49 3.13 -0.54 0.06 1.88 1.37
L 0.60 4.59 3.21 2.82 3.18 2.91 -3.99 -2.93 -0.08 -0.92 -1.65 -0.25
HLCB -4.18 -11.30 -10.16 -10.54 -5.85 -8.77 8.38 11.25 10.38 10.37 10.26 6.31
t(HLCB) (-1.63) (-2.82) (-2.41) (-2.72) (-2.11) (-2.30) (1.91) (1.89) (1.71) (1.77) (1.70) (1.10)
FF3M
H -3.99 -6.34 -4.36 -6.19 -4.68 -3.78 1.47 6.71 11.42 9.91 8.65 6.33
4 -1.36 -3.02 1.22 -0.11 -1.40 -0.87 2.20 2.41 1.74 1.37 -0.92 1.72
3 0.27 -0.36 0.15 0.27 -2.57 1.15 1.43 1.57 -1.88 -0.99 1.01 1.16
2 -0.21 1.25 2.42 2.18 1.45 1.54 0.68 1.51 -0.48 -0.20 1.16 1.14
L -1.86 2.18 3.70 2.42 1.05 2.08 -6.71 -4.65 0.42 -1.02 -2.03 -0.04
HLCB -2.13 -8.53 -8.06 -8.61 -5.73 -5.86 8.17 11.36 11.00 10.93 10.68 6.37
t(HLCB) (-0.83) (-2.09) (-1.92) (-2.25) (-2.06) (-1.69) (1.96) (1.97) (1.84) (1.91) (1.89) (1.13)
FFCM
H -1.73 -6.12 -5.52 -6.67 -4.75 -3.52 1.65 6.81 11.30 9.82 8.60 6.23
4 0.69 -3.23 -0.97 -1.73 -0.92 0.40 2.40 2.46 1.67 1.33 -0.82 1.76
3 2.41 0.43 -0.61 -0.13 -1.99 0.76 1.60 1.66 -1.83 -0.93 1.08 1.16
2 2.82 3.48 3.22 3.33 2.13 1.08 0.77 1.53 -0.47 -0.19 1.23 1.18
L 2.75 5.59 5.88 4.99 2.12 2.77 -6.66 -4.67 0.36 -1.08 -2.01 -0.09
HLCB -4.48 -11.71 -11.39 -11.66 -6.87 -6.30 8.31 11.48 10.94 10.90 10.60 6.32
t(HLCB) (-1.91) (-2.85) (-2.75) (-3.10) (-2.44) (-1.80) (2.02) (1.98) (1.82) (1.90) (1.90) (1.12)
Panel C: Di¤erence
Alphas t-statistics
HLCB 12.57 22.55 20.54 20.92 16.11 15.09 (2.47) (3.14) (2.78) (2.98) (2.43) (2.18)
HLCB 10.31 19.89 19.05 19.54 16.41 12.23 (2.10) (2.82) (2.60) (2.84) (2.60) (1.85)
HLCB 12.79 23.19 22.33 22.56 17.47 12.61 (2.70) (3.27) (3.06) (3.28) (2.79) (1.90)
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Table IV: Sorting commodity futures on stock market risk and hedging
pressure
This table presents average returns (and Whites heteroskedasticity consistent t-
statistics in parentheses) for one-dimensional sorts of commodity futures on stock
market risk (Panel A and B) and hedging pressure (Panel C). Consistent with the
model of Section I, stock market risk is measured as covariance with the CRSP VW
MKT portfolio (lM) and the High minus Low Commodity Beta portfolio from a
one-dimensional sort of stocks (lH). In the last column, we present results for the
average of the two (cross-sectionally standardized) covariances. The main portfolios
of interest are the High minus Low spreading portfolio constructed from this sort
and the rank-weighted portfolio of Koijen et al. (2013), where the weight on futures




and qt is a scalar that ensures the portfolio
is long and short one unit. Panel A covers 1980 to 2003 (Pre-CFMA) and Panel
B covers 2004 to 2010 (Post-CFMA). The hedging pressure sorts in Panel C cover
the full sample as well as the sub-periods, but the sample runs from 1986 to 2010
dictated by data availability.
Sorting on MKT exposure: lM HLCB exposure: lH Average exposure
Panel A: Stock market risk Pre-CFMA
High -4.60 (-1.47) 3.72 (0.77) 1.39 (0.31)
2 -1.26 (-0.42) -2.07 (-0.74) -0.63 (-0.24)
3 2.52 (0.85) -0.07 (-0.02) 0.57 (0.20)
Low 5.64 (1.86) 0.66 (0.26) 1.04 (0.40)
High - Low -10.24 (-2.65) 3.06 (0.58) 0.35 (0.07)
Rank-weighted -7.62 (-2.27) 2.20 (0.49) -0.04 (-0.01)
Panel B: Stock market risk Post-CFMA
High 13.35 (1.70) 8.02 (0.78) 15.45 (1.72)
2 7.95 (0.99) 14.74 (1.99) 6.99 (0.84)
3 6.59 (0.85) 6.54 (0.85) 4.29 (0.54)
Low -0.02 (0.00) -0.98 (-0.19) 0.87 (0.18)
High - Low 13.38 (1.80) 9.00 (0.93) 14.59 (1.85)
Rank-weighted 9.37 (1.49) 7.42 (0.94) 11.78 (1.83)
Panel C: Hedging Pressure
Full sample Pre-CFMA Post-CFMA
High 8.93 (2.67) 5.85 (1.73) 16.42 (2.06)
2 7.34 (2.22) 6.35 (1.96) 9.74 (1.19)
3 2.52 (0.74) 4.67 (1.40) -2.72 (-0.33)
Low -0.50 (-0.18) -1.93 (-0.63) 2.98 (0.50)
High - Low 9.43 (2.59) 7.78 (1.92) 13.43 (1.75)
Rank-weighted 7.92 (2.61) 4.98 (1.47) 15.06 (2.37)
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Table V: Exploring the structural break
This table tests the di¤erence between the two sub-periods for alternative break-
points after the introduction of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, i.e.,
December 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. We report average returns
and FFCM alphas for the HLCB portfolios. All t-statistics are based on Whites
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Di¤erence in alternative breakpoints around CFMA
Alphas in ann.%s t-statistics
Dec. 2000
Means HLCB 9.18 12.63 14.49 15.72 15.38 9.44 (1.84) (1.73) (2.01) (2.33) (2.63) (1.27)
FFCM HLCB 8.93 15.18 17.92 18.31 15.59 9.79 (2.06) (2.17) (2.47) (2.76) (2.80) (1.58)
Dec. 2001
Means HLCB 8.65 14.81 19.77 19.00 15.29 10.30 (1.68) (2.02) (2.76) (2.81) (2.50) (1.42)
FFCM HLCB 8.92 17.79 21.60 20.75 15.18 8.22 (2.04) (2.49) (3.03) (3.15) (2.69) (1.32)
Dec. 2002
Means HLCB 13.38 18.60 21.31 20.69 18.89 15.76 (2.51) (2.53) (2.89) (2.95) (2.92) (2.17)
FFCM HLCB 11.90 18.65 23.40 22.21 18.03 12.32 (2.70) (2.75) (3.31) (3.38) (3.06) (1.97)
Dec. 2003
Means HLCB 13.29 22.78 19.53 20.19 16.95 13.58 (2.29) (2.93) (2.55) (2.73) (2.44) (1.75)
FFCM HLCB 12.79 23.19 22.33 22.56 17.47 12.61 (2.70) (3.27) (3.06) (3.28) (2.79) (1.90)
Dec. 2004
Means HLCB 12.56 22.19 20.13 20.48 17.15 15.85 (1.94) (2.59) (2.42) (2.52) (2.20) (1.90)
FFCM HLCB 12.24 22.63 23.17 23.00 18.14 15.83 (2.36) (2.95) (2.93) (3.06) (2.61) (2.20)
Dec. 2005
Means HLCB 10.91 22.19 15.11 16.97 13.60 13.40 (1.47) (2.29) (1.68) (1.89) (1.55) (1.43)
FFCM HLCB 9.51 21.29 18.32 19.37 14.15 13.34 (1.65) (2.52) (2.17) (2.36) (1.84) (1.64)
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Table VI: Stability of sort Post-CFMA
This table presents two results that demonstrate that our portfolios are stable after
the introduction of the CFMA. Panel A presents a summary of Markov switching
matrices for the ve one-dimensionally sorted stock portfolios (from H to L) for
ve-year sub-periods. Each column represents the diagonal of the switching matrix
(averaged over all months in the sub-period), which represents the fraction of stocks
that does not switch out of that respective portfolio. Panel B presents means and
FFCM alphas for stock and industry portfolios sorted one-dimensionally in ve
commodity beta groups, where we x the ranking on its December 2003 value. Note,
the stock portfolios contain only those stocks that are in the December 2003 sample.
We present average returns and FFCM alphas for the long-only portfolios and for the
high minus low commodity beta (HLCB) portfolios we also present the corresponding
t-statistics based on Whites heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Also, we
present two correlations of these portfolios with the original portfolios (that allow
the composition to change freely Post-CFMA): Corr(rfree; rfixed). This correlation
is presented for the period until June 2007, just before the nancial crisis, and until
December 2010.
Panel A: Diagonal of Markov switching matrices
1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010
H 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.94
4 0.87 0.83 0.87 0.79 0.86 0.83
3 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.75 0.84 0.79
2 0.85 0.82 0.87 0.77 0.87 0.81
L 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.89 0.95 0.92
Average 0.89 0.86 0.89 0.82 0.89 0.86
Panel B: Returns when portfolio composition is xed at December 2003
Stocks 48 Ind.
Means FFCM Means FFCM
H 9.98 5.71 12.20 7.61
4 4.74 1.43 8.78 3.34
3 3.13 -0.74 1.76 -3.79
2 5.93 0.87 7.67 1.79
L 2.88 -2.20 4.87 -1.45
HLCB 7.10 7.91 7.33 9.06
t-stat 1.55 1.67 1.41 1.97
June 2007 December 2010 June 2007 December 2010
Corr(rfree; rfixed) 0.90 0.66 0.92 0.57
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Table VII: Portfolios sorted on commodity sector indexes
This table presents means and FFCM alphas for stock portfolios sorted one-
dimensionally in ve groups on betas with respect to Open Interest-weighted com-
modity sector indexes, that is, an index of six energy commodities (Energy), an index
of 15 agriculture commodities (Agriculture), an index of eight metals and ber com-
modities (Metals & Fibers) and an index of four livestock and meat commodities
(Livestock & Meats). For the spreading portfolios (HLCB), the table also presents
corresponding t-statistics based on Whites heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors in parentheses.
Energy Agriculture Metals & Livestock &
Fibers Meats
Panel A: Pre-CFMA
Mean H 4.71 8.34 4.59 6.79
2 7.96 6.53 6.01 9.48
3 9.09 9.13 7.64 7.65
4 8.25 7.44 8.62 7.23
L 8.54 7.43 10.72 5.93
HLCB -3.82 0.92 -6.13 0.86
t-stat (-0.86) (0.29) (-1.46) (0.28)
FFCM  H -3.65 0.77 -0.92 -1.75
2 -0.01 -0.04 -0.90 1.14
3 1.50 1.75 1.26 -0.35
4 1.32 0.73 1.88 1.14
L 1.05 3.24 3.46 0.19
HLCB -4.69 -2.46 -4.38 -1.94
t-stat (-1.02) (-0.80) (-1.20) (-0.58)
Panel B: Post-CFMA
Mean H 14.84 4.91 8.67 11.63
2 6.40 6.59 5.76 5.21
3 3.54 5.41 6.61 4.46
4 3.81 8.17 4.95 4.19
L 1.26 3.80 2.83 5.51
HLCB 13.57 1.11 5.84 6.13
t-stat (2.22) (0.19) (0.89) (1.17)
FFCM  H 9.82 -1.03 2.66 4.96
2 2.32 1.75 1.10 -0.05
3 -1.13 1.72 2.69 0.35
4 -0.01 4.00 1.03 1.08
L -2.99 -0.62 -1.15 1.38
HLCB 12.81 -0.41 3.81 3.58
t-stat (2.19) (-0.08) (0.68) (0.96)
Panel C: Di¤erence for HLCB portfolio
Mean HLCB 17.40 0.20 11.97 5.26
t-stat (2.30) (0.03) (1.54) (0.87)
FFCM  HLCB 17.50 2.05 8.18 5.52
t-stat (2.36) (0.35) (1.24) (1.11)
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Table VIII: Within-industry sorted commodity beta portfolios
This table demonstrates the results from the within-industry sort as explained in
Section 2.C. First, we sort all stocks within each industry into ve commodity beta
bins (presented row-wise). Then, using the aggregate industry portfolios, we sort the
industries into ve bins (presented column-wise). Combining, in each 5-by-5 block,
a cell presents the equal weighted average of the respective (H,2,3,4 and L) within-
industry portfolios among the respective (H,2,3,4 and L) beta industries. The sixth
column presents the equal weighted average over rows, that is, an average within-
industry portfolio. The sixth row presents the HLCB within-industry portfolio.
Panel A presents the results for the rst sub-period, Panel B for the second sub-
period. In each panel we present average returns and FFCM s (in annualized
%s). To conserve space, we present corresponding t-statistics (based on Whites
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors) only for the average within-industry
portfolio and the HLCB within-industry portfolios.
Between-industry group
H 4 3 2 L Avg t-stat
Panel A: Pre-CFMA
Mean Within- H 3.39 4.06 4.53 7.87 7.72 5.52 (1.30)
industry 4 5.51 4.84 6.84 12.93 9.81 7.99 (2.22)
group 3 4.25 7.58 7.66 10.59 11.02 8.22 (2.47)
2 5.98 8.60 10.97 13.42 8.53 9.50 (2.84)
L 6.78 10.19 8.71 11.21 12.44 9.86 (2.71)
HLCB -3.39 -6.13 -4.17 -3.34 -4.72 -4.35 (-2.13)
t-stat (-1.02) (-1.96) (-1.54) (-1.14) (-1.62) (-2.13)
FFCM  Within- H -8.27 -6.09 -5.75 -2.46 -2.23 -4.96 (-3.62)
industry 4 -3.97 -4.64 -3.35 4.22 0.80 -1.39 (-1.24)
group 3 -5.71 -1.76 -2.09 2.64 3.57 -0.67 (-0.55)
2 -2.81 0.54 2.05 5.12 1.58 1.30 (1.09)
L -1.36 1.49 -1.38 2.40 6.78 1.58 (1.09)
HLCB -6.92 -7.58 -4.37 -4.86 -9.01 -6.55 (-3.40)
t-stat (-1.84) (-2.62) (-1.56) (-1.68) (-3.19) (-3.40)
Panel B: Post-CFMA
H 4 3 2 L Avg t-stat
Mean Within- H 18.91 15.32 13.10 18.52 9.95 15.16 (1.41)
industry 4 17.54 6.05 8.95 7.12 11.31 10.20 (1.20)
group 3 15.16 9.80 7.57 4.50 6.92 8.79 (1.26)
2 10.40 7.47 4.14 4.36 4.90 6.25 (0.94)
L 5.27 4.31 7.72 -0.53 0.58 3.47 (0.50)
HLCB 13.64 11.01 5.38 19.05 9.37 11.69 (1.98)
t-stat (1.67) (1.68) (0.70) (2.24) (1.29) (1.98)
FFCM  Within- H 12.60 6.54 3.90 7.64 1.59 6.45 (1.99)
industry 4 10.22 -1.71 2.52 -0.95 3.98 2.81 (1.70)
group 3 8.31 3.68 2.27 -1.25 2.21 3.04 (2.12)
2 4.39 1.29 -1.27 -1.01 0.20 0.72 (0.54)
L -1.33 -3.22 1.73 -6.95 -3.90 -2.73 (-1.48)
HLCB 13.92 9.76 2.17 14.58 5.48 9.18 (2.14)
t-stat (1.83) (1.60) (0.40) (2.54) (1.08) (2.14)
Panel C: Di¤erence for HLCB within-industry portfolios
Mean HLCB 17.03 17.14 9.55 22.39 14.08 16.04
t-stat (1.94) (2.36) (1.18) (2.49) (1.80) (2.57)
FFCM  HLCB 20.84 17.34 6.53 19.44 14.49 15.73


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































II Sorting out the time-varying ination risk pre-
mium
Abstract
This paper nds that the ination risk premium (IRP) in the stock market has reversed
over time. In both portfolio sorts and cross-sectional regressions, the unconditional IRP
is marginally negative, but masks a reversal from a signicant -8.0% in the sixties to
an insignicant 5.5% in recent years. We identify the proximate causes of this time-
variation and develop an asset pricing model with time-varying ination risk to explain
these dynamics. First, the reversal is driven by the growing market for TIPS since their
introduction in 1997, which are the preferred hedge for ination risk. Second, the IRP
and the e¤ect of TIPS are larger in recessions, consistent with time-varying risk aversion.
Finally, a pronounced upward shift in the nominal-real covariance at the end of the 90s
has also contributed to the reversal in isolation, but our evidence favors TIPS as the most
important driver.
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Ination is an important risk factor for investors, consumers, and
producers alike, because it threatens the real value of investments,
erodes purchasing power, and redistributes wealth unexpectedly. There-
fore, a natural question is whether this macroeconomic risk is priced.1
We follow Ang et al. (2012) and sort all US stocks monthly on in-
ation risk, measured as beta with respect to ARMA-innovations in
ination. We are the rst to uncover a reversal in the ination risk
premium (IRP) in the stock market, from a signicant -8.0% per an-
num in the sixties to an insignicant 5.5% per annum in recent years.
Consistent with previous work, however, we estimate an unconditional
IRP that is only marginally negative.2
In this paper, we identify the proximate causes of this time-variation
and develop an asset pricing model with time-varying ination risk to
explain these dynamics. We nd that, rst and foremost, the rever-
sal in the IRP is driven by the increasing market share of Treasury
Ination-Protected Securities (TIPS) since their introduction in 1997.
We argue that this result is due to the fact that TIPS allow investors
to hedge ination more adequately than the cross-section of stocks.
Second, the IRP and the e¤ect of TIPS are larger in recessions, con-
sistent with time-varying risk aversion. These dynamics are robust
and obtain in cross-sectional regressions when we (i) add an ination
mimicking portfolio to either of the traditional portfolio return-based
1Early theoretical work on the pricing of ination risk includes, for instance, Roll (1973), Long
(1974), Friend et al. (1976) and Elton et al. (1983). Previous empirical work on the pricing of
ination risk in the stock market, includes, for instance, Chen et al. (1986), Ferson and Harvey
(1991), Boudoukh et al. (1994) and Ang et al. (2012).
2Chen et al. (1986) and Ferson and Harvey (1991) estimate a negative IRP among a small set
of stock portfolios. Consistent with the fact that bonds are negative ination beta assets, Buraschi
and Jiltsov (2005), Ang et al. (2008), Gurkaynak et al. (2007) and DAmico et al. (2008) estimate
a positive IRP in the bond market.
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asset pricing models, (ii) add the non-traded ination innovations in-
stead, (iii) use either portfolios or individual stocks as test assets, and
(iv) control for characteristics.3
Finally, in isolation, the IRP is also predictable by various proxies
of the nominal-real covariance, i.e., the relation between ination and
macroeconomic activity, which extends evidence from the bond market
in Campbell et al. (2013). In a joint model, the contribution of the
nominal-real covariance is not easily disentangled from TIPS, because
TIPS were introduced around the same time the proxies experienced
a pronounced upward shift at the end of the nineties. Our evidence
favors TIPS as the driving force behind the reversal, however.
In our theoretical framework, ination may enter the investors
portfolio optimization for a number of reasons. For instance, ina-
tion is an exogenous risk for many investors, including pension funds
and insurance companies with real liabilities and individuals with
nominal wages. Also, ination is relevant as a state variable for fu-
ture consumption-investment opportunties in an Intertemporal CAPM
along the lines of Cochrane (2005, Ch.9), as ination forecasts nega-
tive changes in macroeconomic activity on average (Bekaert and Wang
(2010) and Campbell et al. (2013)).
Historically, investors exposed to ination risk are forced to hedge
partly in the stock market, because real bonds are not available and
nominal bonds are negatively exposed to ination. We present empir-
ical evidence that ination beta-sorted stock portfolios are indeed an
3The benchmark asset pricing models are the CAPM (Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin
(1966)), the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French (1993)), and the Fama-French-
Carhart model (Carhart (1997)). Although unreported, our conclusions are unchanged when
adding the liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).
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useful component of the investors optimal hedge portfolio for ination
risk. Because ination is typically bad news, this nding is consistent
with the observed outperformance of low ination beta stocks. Since
1997, however, TIPS are the most important component of the ina-
tion hedge portfolio. Accordingly, TIPS market size has grown dra-
matically from $30 billion at the end of 1997 to $800 billion in 2011. In
turn, this growth has spurred the development of ination derivative
contracts, which could satisfy more complex inationlinked hedging
demands as well (Bekaert and Wang (2010)).
Assuming TIPS are a perfect hedge, the model indicates a zero IRP
Post-TIPS, if TIPS are used to hedge exclusively. If TIPS are su¢ -
ciently attractive from a diversication (speculative) point of view,
however, the model indicates a reversal in the IRP. Indeed, the incen-
tive to hedge this speculative demand for TIPS will then dominate
in the stock market. Previous literature suggests a reasonable lower-
bound for the diversication benets of TIPS is zero, consistent with
our reversal to an insignicant positive risk premium in recent years.4
Time-varying risk aversion allows the model to t the business cycle
variation we document. In recessions, risk aversion is large, which
increases the incentive to hedge the negative exposure Pre-TIPS and
the non-negative exposure Post-TIPS. Further, the model suggests a
possible channel through which the investors fundamental exposure
to ination risk may vary over time, that is whether ination shocks
represent good or bad news about future macroeconomic activity. For
instance, Bekaert and Wang (2010) and Campbell et al. (2013) nd
4See, for instance, Roll (2004), Khotari and Shanken (2004), Mamun and Visaltanachoti (2006),
Briere and Signori (2009), Fleckenstein et al. (2013) and Campbell et al. (2009).
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that this nominal-real covariance has in fact reversed around the turn
of the century, thus contributing to the reversal in the IRP.
Our model is derived under the assumption of integrated markets.
Consequently, in the model, the ination risk premium in the stock
market is consistent with expected TIPS returns. Preliminary empir-
ical evidence using the short sample of noisy TIPS returns suggests
that pricing is indeed increasingly consistent between the two markets
as the TIPS market grows and matures.
Our main contribution is in establishing that the IRP in the stock
market is time-varying and has reversed sign around the turn of the
century. Duarte and Blomberger (2012) also note this reversal, but do
not investigate its proximate causes, as their focus is on the question of
why ination betas vary cross-sectionally. Campbell et al. (2013) nd
that term premiums in the nominal bond market have also changed
sign around the turn of the century and ascribe this change to a re-
versal in the nominal-real covariance, proxied by the stock market
beta of the long-term nominal bond. We extend this evidence to the
stock market, using also the time-varying relation between ination
and industrial production or consumption growth to proxy for the
nominal-real covariance.
In conclusion, however, our results suggest that the introduction
of TIPS is the most important driver of the reversal of the IRP in
the stock market. Thus, we argue that changing hedging preferences
are an important channel through which an expansion of the menu of
assets can impact risk premiums in the stock market. This argument
is reminiscent of the diversication-channel through which emerging
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market risk premiums are varying over time with the level of inte-
gration of these markets in the world stock market (see Bekaert and
Harvey (2000) and De Jong and De Roon (2005)). Finally, the busi-
ness cycle variation we document conrms early, albeit weak, evidence
in Chen et al. (1986) and Ferson and Harvey (1991) and is consistent
with countercyclical variation in the market risk premium.5
A second contribution is in establishing that stocks can be an im-
portant component of an ination hedge portfolio. Traditional stud-
ies focus on the time series of aggregate stock and bond returns and
nd that these standard asset classes are poor hedges against ina-
tion, especially at short horizons (see, e.g., Fama (1981), Schotman
and Schweitzer (2000) and Bekaert and Wang (2010)). We nd that
portfolios of individual stocks, which exploit heterogeneity in ination
betas, hedge more adequately. This nding obtains even though in-
ation betas are hard-to-estimate and vary substantially over time, as
shown in Ang et al. (2012).
In the next section we derive an asset pricing model with ination
risk and present the main testable implications. Section B presents
the methods used to estimate ination exposures and the IRP. Section
C presents the cross-section of ination beta-sorted portfolios. Section
D presents the rst tests of a time-varying IRP. Section E presents un-
conditional and conditional cross-sectional regressions. Section F asks
which assets are the best hedges against ination risk over our sample
period. Section G analyzes the role of the nominal-real covariance.
Section H concludes.
5See, e.g., Shiller (1984); Campbell and Shiller (1988); Fama and French (1989); Ferson and
Harvey (1991); Campbell and Cochrane (1999); Lettau and Ludvigson (2001).
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A Model and empirical content
We derive an asset pricing model with ination risk that indicates a
time-varying ination risk premium in the stock market. The Appen-
dix presents the full model in detail. In this section, we only highlight
the main testable implications and their empirical content. In its ba-
sic form, the model is conceptually similar to Fama (1996). In its
extended form, we introduce a hedge asset to model the introduction
of TIPS, which yields a rich set of new predictions.
A A CAPM with ination risks
Consider a general one period mean-variance Markowitz (1959) prob-
lem for risk-averse agents faced with ination risk. Denote the return
on the risk factor t+1, and denote each agent js predetermined expo-
sure as a fraction of wealth Xj;t: qj;t. Thus, the total return on agent







t+1 + qj;tt+1, (1)




t , the excess return on each of N risky
assets, with expected return vector A;t and covariance matrix AA,
respectively.6
Most of the time and for most investors the exposure qj;t is negative,
consistent with three non-exclusive interpretations.7 First, ination is
an exogenous risk that hurts, for instance, pension funds and insur-
6Throughout, we work with the version of the model in which only risk premia vary over time
but not the covariances. The testable implications and main empirical ndings are unchanged
using time-varying (co-) variances.
7In fact, a negative exposure is also generally implied by the anxiety consumers expressed about
ination in the survey of Shiller (1996).
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ance companies with real liabilities or individuals with nominal wages.
Second, ination is relevant as a state variable in an Intertemporal-
CAPM along the lines of Cochrane (2005, Ch. 9), because it predicts
real activity and consumption growth with a negative sign (Bekaert
andWang (2010), Duarte (2011) and Campbell et al. (2013)).8 Finally,
for investors that desire to maximize mean-variance utility over real
returns, the portfolio problem is approximated by setting qj;t =  1.
In the former two cases, it is natural to allow for time-variation in
this exposure. Indexation policies of pension funds are usually con-
ditional on funding ratios, whereas the relation between ination and
real activity is time-varying.
Assuming that the portfolio problem for every agent j only depends
on the mean and variance of the portfolio return in Equation (1) and
aggregating over all agents, we show in Appendix A that the wealth-
weighted market portfolio combines a standard speculative demand
with a minimum-variance hedge demand as in, for instance, Merton





AAA;t    1AAAqm;t. (2)
Here, m;t is the wealth-weighted risk aversion; A is the N -vector of
covariances with ination; and, qm;t is the wealth-weighted exposure.
With qm;t < 0, this market portfolio implies that agents adjusts up-
ward the demand for stocks that move in-sync with ination to hedge.
8In Panel A of Table VII we replicate some of this evidence.
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B Introducing a (perfect) hedge asset
Suppose there exists an additional asset that is perfectly correlated
with t+1, with returns r0t+1. We only need a perfect correlation for
expositional purposes. As long as the new asset is a better hedge
than the available assets, the hedge demand will tilt towards the new
asset, such that similar predictions obtain. We think of the hedge
asset to be an ination-linked bond. There is a wide spectrum of
assets that are considered potential ination hedges, such as nominal
bonds, commodities and real estate. In theory, however, TIPS are
most adequate, because both coupons and principal are indexed to
realized CPI ination (albeit with a three month lag), whereas the
latter is also guaranteed in case of deation. In Section F we verify
that TIPS are a crucial component of the optimal hedge portfolio for
ination risk.
Denoting the (N + 1)-vector of excess returns on the expanded set





0, we show in Appendix B that the total
demand for assets, separated in a speculative and a hedge demand,






























t+1 + e0;t+1 with V ar(e0;t+1) = ee.
The individual components of this demand have a natural interpre-
tation. First, the hedge demand, (qj;t 00N)
0, focuses completely on the
hedge asset, because it is perfectly correlated with the risk. Second,
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agents want an additional investment in the hedge asset, w0spec, if it
provides an abnormal return over the risky assets. Third, the optimal
demand for risky assets, wAj;t, adjusts the tangency portfolio with a
minimum-variance hedge demand for w0spec, instead of the exposure
qj;t in Equation (2). Thus, if the agent seeks additional exposure to
the hedge asset (beyond the hedge demand qj;t) when a0 > 0, he will
hedge this additional exposure among the N risky assets. This result
follows directly from the speculative demand for the extended set of
assets (see also Stevens (1998)). Importantly, the composition of this
hedge portfolio is determined by  1AAA, as in the basic framework.
C Asset pricing with two types of investors
In this subsection, we analyze what it means for the ination risk pre-
mium in the stock market when the fraction of investors that are able
to invest in the hedge asset varies over time. We assume there are
two types of investors: a fraction 'b;t (= 1 'e;t) of investors (basic)
that is unable to invest in the hedge asset and a fraction 'e;t of in-
vestors (extended) that is able to do so. These time-varying fractions
can be motivated by noting that investors will not add a new asset
to their portfolio over night. Rather the investment decision is often
conditional on observing market performance and liquidity reaching
a critical level. In the case of TIPS, a¢ rmation of commitment to
the program by the Treasury was particularly important. In addition,
Sack and Elsasser (2004) argue that investors had a benign outlook for
ination in the late nineties, thus lowering demand for TIPS initially.
Consequently, TIPS market size grew only slowly after the Treasury
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rst auctioned $7 billion of 10-year TIPS on January 29, 1997. After
the Treasury a¢ rmed its commitment in 2002, market size increased
rapidly from $168 billion to $800 billion at the end of 2011.
We assume that the two investors do not di¤er in their exposure
to the risk factor on aggregate, such that qb;t = qe;t = qm;t. Using the
optimal portfolios given in Equations (2) and (3) and the procedure
outlined in Appendix A, we nd that the wealth-weighted (market)





AAA;t    1m;t 1AAAQt: (4)
This portfolio adjusts the Markowitz demand with a hedge demand
over the aggregate exposure Qt = m;t((1 'e;t)qm;t+'e;tw0spec). As in
the basic framework, the exposure qm;t is hedged with the risky assets
by a fraction (1   'e;t) of investors. As in the extended framework,
the exposure qm;t is hedged with the hedge asset by a fraction 'e;t
of investors. Consequently, for these investors only the speculative
investment in the hedge asset (w0spec) is left to be hedged with the
risky assets.
From the two-factor asset pricing model that is implied by this









Appendix C shows that this two-factor model can be equivalently writ-
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ten in beta form:
Et(r
A
n;t+1) = n;mEt(rm;t+1) + n;HEt(rH;t+1), (6)
where rH;t+1 is a return on a hedge portfolio that is long high and
short low ination beta stocks with expected excess return Et(rH;t+1)
determined by the value of Qt. In our empirical work, we assume that
portfolio sorts and cross-sectional regressions make rH;t+1 observable.
A note on integration The asset pricing model in Equation (6) follows
from focusing on the expected returns of the initial set of N risky
assets (stocks) only. We do not assume that the market for the risky
asset and the hedge asset are segmented, however. In Appendix D, we
derive the model that jointly prices the extended set of assets, with
risk premiums for the N risky assets that are identical to Equation
(6). When 'e;t approaches one, this joint model collapses to the model
implied by Equation (3), which includes the market portfolio of the
extended set of assets (rmX ;t+1) and the hedge asset as priced factors:
Et(r
A
n;t+1) = n;mXEt(rmX ;t+1) + n;0Et(r0;t+1). (7)
D Testable implications and empirical content
To derive the main testable implications for a time-varying ination
risk premium in the stock market, we focus on two elements of the
aggregate exposure: the fraction of investors with access to the hedge
asset 'e;t and the markets coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion m;t.
This focus is motivated by the introduction of TIPS and evidence
suggestive of a procyclical ination risk premium in Chen et al. (1986)
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and Ferson and Harvey (1991).9
Appendix E expands Qt = m;t((1   'e;t)qm;t + 'e;tw0spec) around
'e;t = 0 and m;t = 1, so as to mimic the basic framework with log
utility. We consider two specications of the aggregate exposure Qt
to guide our empirical analysis, which are nested in the model
Qt = 0 + 1'e;t + 2m;t + 3('e;t  m;t). (8)
First, we focus on the role of TIPS and restrict 2 = 3 = 0. Thus,
when TIPS are not available (i.e., 'e;t = 0), the aggregate exposure to
ination is negative, i.e., Qt = m;tqm;t < 0. In this setting, investors
pay high prices for stocks that covary with ination risk to hedge
and therefore we predict 0 < 0 in Equation (8). When TIPS are
introduced and 'e;t increases, the ination risk premium increases as
well, provided that the diversication benets of TIPS are not too low
(Equation (48) in Appendix E). The intuition is that fewer investors
are hedging qm;t in the stock market.
When all investors have access to TIPS ('e;t = 1), the aggrate ex-
posure collapses to Qt = m;tw
0
spec: Now suppose that TIPS provide
positive diversication benets, i.e., w0spec > 0. In this setting, the
ination risk premium will reverse to being positive, because the in-
centive to hedge this speculative investment will dominate in the stock
market. In case w0spec = 0, ination risk is not priced in the stock
market directly, but indirectly, through the exposure of the market
portfolio to t+1. This result is clear from Equation (3), where the
9Albeit weak, their evidence, respectively, suggests the ination risk premium is largest when
ination is most volatile and when the Default Spread and the Dividend Yield are large. Both
coincide with recessions.
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demand for stocks collapses to the tangency portfolio of stocks, thus
leading to the one-factor CAPM.
Evidence in Roll (2004), Khotari and Shanken (2004), Mamun and
Visaltanachoti (2006) and Briere and Signori (2009) suggests that a
reasonable lower bound for the diversication benets of TIPS is zero.
Also, positive diversication benets are consistent with Fleckenstein
et al. (2013), who nd that TIPS are underpriced relative to a repli-
cating portfolio of nominal bonds and ination swaps, and Campbell
et al. (2009), who nd that the stock market beta of TIPS is negative,
whereas realized returns have been positive. Thus, we predict 1 > 0
and Qt  0 in Equation (8), such that the ination risk premium is
non-negative Post-TIPS.
Our second specication incorporates time-variation in the markets
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion m;t. When TIPS are not available,
the aggregate exposure to ination is negative and decreases further
with m;t, as this strenghtens the incentive to hedge. In addition, the
marginal e¤ect of 'e;t on the ination risk premium is increasing with
m;t, provided that w
0
spec is not too low (Equation (50) in Appendix
E). The intuition is that when the share of investors that hedge with
TIPS approaches one ('e;t ! 1), Qt approaches m;tw0spec. Thus, only
the (non-negative) speculative investment in TIPS needs to be hedged
in the stock market and the incentive to do so is increasing in risk aver-
sion. Combining, the additional predictions for the model in Equation
(8) are: 2 < 0 and 3 > 0.
As argued before, our model is derived under the assumption of
market integration, which means that the ination risk premium must
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be consistent with expected TIPS returns. This consistency is testable
only when 'e;t approaches 1, however (Equation (43) in Appendix D).
For this reason, we test in Section E whether the risk premium for
exposure to TIPS in the stock market converges to the average realized
return on TIPS towards the end of our sample.
B Methodology
This section presents our measures of ination risk and the sorting
procedure that is performed to estimate the time-varing ination risk
premium.
A Ination risk
We measure ination using the seasonally adjusted Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI) available from the Bureau of La-
bor Statistics. We measure risk as beta with respect to ination inno-
vations, because the expected component of ination is easily hedged
with nominal bonds and irrelevant for cross-sectional asset pricing.
Similar to Fama and Gibbons (1984), Vassalou (2000) and Campbell
and Viceira (2001), we lter the time-series of monthly ination rates
using an ARMA(1; 1)-model (It = It 1 + t   t 1, with b = 0:903
and b = 0:580) and use in our tests the monthly innovations denoted
t. Our conclusions are not sensitive to the specic method of extract-
ing the innovations.10 Also, we ascertain below that our conclusions
are robust for a truly out-of-sample exercise that uses ination in the
10Similar results obtain for ARIMA(0; 1; 1)-innovations, the di¤erence between ination and
the short-term t-bill return (following Fama and Schwert (1977) and Gorton and Rouwenhorst
(2006)) and the monthly change in annual ination (following Erb and Harvey (2006) and Hong
and Yogo (2012)). These results are available upon request. We can not use survey-based measures
of expected ination, because these gauge expectations over the (semi-) annual horizon only.
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real-time vintage CPI series (Irvt ), as in Ang et al. (2012).
11
To x ideas, it is important to note that the innovations t represent
the unexpected component of ination as well as changes in expected
ination from the model.12 As argued in Brennan and Xia (2002), this
model is the relevant case for investors when expected ination is not
observable and must be inferred from the price level itself. This dual
information is exactly why our monthly horizon is relevant. On one
hand, unexpected ination is more variable than changes in expected
ination at the monthly frequency (Nelson and Schwert (1977) and
Fama and Gibbons (1984)). On the other hand, (expected) ination
is persistent, which means that if a stock hedges the innovation this
month, it is also hedging ination a number of months ahead.
B Ination betas
We sort all ordinary common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ (excluding rms with negative book equity) on their ina-
tion betas and form portfolios at the end of each month t. We require
that stocks have at least two out of the last ve years of returns avail-
able. The sample period runs from August 1964 to December 2011,
which is often the focus in empirical work and coincides with the in-
troduction of AMEX stocks in the CRSP le.
We follow Duarte (2011) and estimate betas using a weighted least-
11Available from http://alfred.stlouisfed.org/.
12Taking expectations in the ARMA(1; 1)-model, we see that the change in expected ination
over month t  1 is perfectly correlated to the innovation t 1:
Et 1(It)  Et 2(It) = [It 1   t 1]  [Et 2(It 1)] =
[(It 2 + t 1   t 2)  t 1]  [(It 2   t 2)] = (   )t 1
(see also Fama and Gibbons (1984)).
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squares regression over all observations in the interval [1 : t].13 The
expanding window ensures that we use as much information as possi-
ble, whereas exponentially decaying weights ensure timeliness of the
estimated beta. Thus, for each stock i the estimator of i;t is given by






Ri;  RF   i;t   i;t
2
(9)
with weights K() =
exp( jt   j h)Pt 1
=1 exp( jt   j h)
. (10)
With h = log(2)60 , the half-life converges to 60 months for large t. We
transform the estimated ci;t using the Vasicek (1973) adjustment
cvi;t = ci;t + varTS(ci;t)h
varTS(ci;t) + varCS(ci;t)i
h
meanCS(ci;t)  ci;ti , (11)
where the subscripts TS and CS denote means and variances taken
over the time-series and cross-sectional dimension, respectively. In
this way, cvi;t is a weighted average of the estimated beta in the time
series and the cross-sectional average beta, where the former receives
a larger weight when it is estimated more precisely. For instance,
Elton et al. (1978) show that this adjustment makes ex-ante expo-
sures better predictors of ex-post exposures. Indeed, we nd the usual
rolling window betas to be more noisy, although they provide us with
largely similar evidence. Also, we ascertain below that our conclu-
sions are robust to controlling for the benchmark factors of the CAPM
(Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966)), the Fama-French
three-factor model (Fama and French (1993), denoted FF3M), and the
13For the out-of-sample exercise, we omit month t as ination is not announced until the middle
of month t+ 1.
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four-factor model of Carhart (1997; denoted FFCM) when estimating
ination exposures.
C Ination risk premium
This subsection explains how we bring the model with a time-varying
ination risk premium to the data. To be consistent with extant asset
pricing literature, we focus on the beta asset pricing model in Equation
(6), where expected returns of the market portfolio and the hedge










with zm;t = Qt(0N
 1
AAA) (Equation (32) in Appendix C). Thus,
both m;t = Et(rm;t+1) and h;t = Et (rh;t+1) are time-varying as lin-
ear functions of m;t and Qt. If the correlation between rm;t+1 and
rh;t+1 is equal to zero, Qt solely determines the expected return of the
ination hedge portfolio. If the correlation is unequal to zero or time-
varying, we can still back out the linear relation between rh;t+1 and
Qt by controlling for the market in either time-series or cross-sectional
regressions.14 Similarly, we control for the FF3M and FFCM, which
additional factors can be motivated as hedge portfolios for additional
risks.
14Note, the correlation between the aggregate stock market and ination has changed from
negative (the famous failure of the Fisher hypothesis) to positive around the turn of the century
(Campbell et al. (2013)). In Section G we analyze directly how this reversal impacts the ination
risk premium.
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Hedge portfolio returns We use two standard approaches to estimate
returns on the ination hedge portfolio rh;t+1: portfolio sorts and
cross-sectional regressions, which strategies have in common that they
construct a zero-investment portfolio that is long in high beta stocks
and short in low beta stocks. To start, we construct 30 market-value
weighted portfolios that are at the intersection of a two-way sort in
ten ination beta groups and three Size groups (denoted UI1S30).
Our choice for Size as control variable responds to Ang et al. (2012),
who nd that the best ination hedgers are the smallest stocks. The
main take-away of a time-varying ination risk premium is robust to
controlling for Book-to-Market or Momentum instead.15 We measure
Size as market cap at the end of month t and split into Micro, Small
and Big stocks at the 20th and 50th NYSE percentile as in Fama and
French (2008). Thus, our rst estimates of the ination risk premium
are the High minus Low (HLIB) spreading portfolios derived from this
two-way sort. In particular, we will focus on the Size-controlled HLIB
portfolio that averages over the three Size groups.
The second set of estimates of the ination risk premium is found
by conducting cross-sectional regressions for various sets of portfolios
and individual stocks. For these regressions, we construct a traded in-
ation factor INF. Similar to SMB and HML, we sort all CRSP stocks
independently into three ination beta groups (split at the terciles of
ranked values) and two Size groups (split at NYSE median market
cap). Then, the factor INF that captures the common variation in
returns related to ination betas is the average of the portfolios low
15These results are available upon request.
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beta, smalland low beta, bigminus the average of the portfolios
high beta, smalland high beta, big. In a number of robustness
checks, we use the non-traded ination innovations as risk factor in-
stead. Finally, we also conduct cross-sectional regressions using TIPS
returns as a risk factor.
We do not consider dividend yields as an alternative measure of
expected returns (see, e.g., Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and De Jong
and De Roon (2005)). The motivation is that dividend yields are not
particularly informative about expected returns in the cross-section
of ination beta-sorted portfolios Pre- versus Post-TIPS. According
to the present-value identity of Campbell and Shiller (1988), divi-
dend yields must predict either returns or dividend growth rates or
both. Cochrane (2008) nds that the evidence is in favor of return
predictability for the aggregate stock market. Maio and Santa-Clara
(2013), however, nd that this conclusion applies only to Big and
Growth stocks. Similarly, we nd that high ination beta stocks are
characterized by return predictability, but low beta stocks by dividend
growth predictability. Moreover, dividend growth rates di¤er between
high and low beta stocks and this di¤erence is strongly time-varying,
which further complicates making inferences.16
Proxy variables This subsection describes the proxies we use to bring
the unobservable model parameters 'e;t and m;t to the data. For 'e;t
we use the relative market share of TIPS (denoted TIPSt), measured
as the total value of outstanding TIPS (from Barclays) over the total
market value of all stocks in the CRSP le. This proxy takes into
16These results are available upon request.
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account that institutions cannot change their investment practices
overnight, whereas small investments in TIPS will likely have little
e¤ect on pricing in the stock market. For m;t we use the Chicago
FED National Activity Index (denoted CFNAIt).17 Our choice of a
business cycle indicator is consistent with countercyclical risk aversion
in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Brandt and Wang (2003), for
instance.
To sum up, we have two empirical specications
rh;t+1 = 0 + 1TIPSt + ut+1 and (12)
rh;t+1 = 0 + 1TIPSt + 2CFNAIt + 3(TIPSt  CFNAIt) + ut+1.(13)
Since risk aversion is countercyclical, the hypotheses developed in Sec-
tion A.D translate to the predictions: 0 < 0; 1 > 0; 2 > 0 and
3 < 0. In our cross-sectional regressions, we allow the risk premiums
of all factors to vary over time. The null hypothesis here is that nei-
ther TIPSt nor TIPSt  CFNAIt predicts, because the factor risk
premiums are the returns on artical portfolios that have no exposure
to ination risk. Time-varying risk aversion, on the other hand, may
well be relevant for all factors.
C Ination beta sorted portfolios
Table I describes the set of Ination beta and Size-sorted portfolios.
To conserve space, we present results for only four beta groups (High,
17Specically, we use the 3-month moving average of the index: CFNAI-MA3, available at:
http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/cfnai. Our results are similar for NBER dat-
ing, but we prefer the CFNAI because it is available in real-time (since 2001) and is known to be
a good predictor of ination.
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four, seven and Low) and the HLIB spreading portfolios. We report
pre- and post-ranking ination exposures as well as annualized average
return and standard deviation in Panels A to C.
Panel A demonstrates that there exist stocks across a wide spec-
trum of ex ante exposures ranging from -10.9 to 5.3. The post-
ranking betas line up monotonically and average out to 2.9 for the
Size-controlled HLIB portfolio. This exposure is signicant and eco-
nomically large, translating to an incremental monthly return of 73
basis points when t increases by one standard deviation (2:9 0:25).
In contrast, the ination beta of the aggregate stock market is -2.3,
such that it loses over 50 basis points on the same occassion. Thus,
we have created portfolios that are exposed to ination risk, which
implies ination is not a useless factor in the sense of Kan and Zhang
(1999) and is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the portfolios to
carry the risk premium. In fact, Table VI demonstrates that these
HLIB portfolios are present in the optimal ination hedge portfolio
historically.
Next, we see that average returns decrease with ination beta, but
the relation is not strictly monotonic. The HLIB spreads are signi-
cant, except amongMicro stocks, averageing out to -4.28% (t =  2:12)
for the Size-controlled HLIB portfolio.18 A negative unconditional in-
ation risk premium is consistent with previous estimates in Chen et
al. (1986) and Ferson and Harvey (1991), in a small set of stock port-
folios, and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005), Ang et al. (2008), Gurkaynak
et al. (2007) and DAmico et al. (2008), in the bond market. The
18Note, this estimate is insignicant when considering the data mining-corrected t-statistic cut-
o¤s in Harvey et al. (2013).
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estimate is sensitive to the exact specication, however, and weakens
when we control for the benchmark factors MKT, SMB, HML and
MOM when estimating ination betas in Panel B. This nding could
be due to substantial variation over time, as hypothesized in Section
A. Moreover, Ang et al. (2012) estimate an insignicant positive risk
premium among individual stocks over the same sample period. The
discrepancy is due to di¤erences in the sorting methodology, because
the conclusions from Panel A extend in the truly out-of-sample sort
on betas with respect to Irvt in Panel C.
19 Importantly, the conditional
evidence we present below is not sensitive to these di¤erences.
Panel D reports average portfolio characteristics: Size, Book-to-
market and Momentum.20 If these characteristics explain the cross-
section of expected returns completely, one would expect a positive
unconditional ination risk premium, because our strategy loads on
Small, Value andWinner stocks on average. Further, one would expect
the ination risk premium to increase Post-TIPS, because in these
years, the tilt towards Small and Winner stocks is stronger. In the
cross-sectional regressions of Table E, we test whether the ination
risk premium is separate to these characteristics.
In the Internet Appendix we characterize these portfolios further
in terms of industry composition (based on 48 industries available
from Kenneth Frenchs Web Site). In short, we nd that industry
composition needs to vary substantially over time to be maximally
19To be precise, Ang et al. (2012) (i) use 60 month rolling window betas, (ii) sort in ve beta
groups and (iii) do not control for Size.
20Size is market cap in billions of dollars. Book-to-Market (BM) is calculated in June as the
ratio of the most recently available book-value of equity in Compustat (assumed to be available six
months after the scal year-end) divided by Market Capitalization from CRSP (Size) at previous





exposed to ination (see also Ang et al. (2012)). Nevertheless, Panel
B demonstrates that an industry-neutral strategy, which exploits only
within-industry variation in ination betas, is also useful as an ina-
tion hedge.
D Time-series regressions
This section presents the rst formal tests of a time-varying ina-
tion risk premium, which hypotheses are derived in Section A and
summarized in Equation (8). We regress returns of (Size-controlled)
ination beta-sorted portfolios on the relative market share of TIPS
(TIPSt) and the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAIt). We
consider three specications and report the results in Table II. Speci-
cation (A) regresses returns on lagged TIPSt, for which regression the
model predicts a negative intercept 0 and a positive coe¢ cient 1 (see
Equation(12)). Specication (B) adds CFNAIt and the interaction
term TIPSt  CFNAIt, for which the model, respectively, predicts
a positive coe¢ cient 2 and a negative coe¢ cient 3 (see Equation
(13)). Model (C) adds four benchmark predictors: Dividend Yield
(DYt), Default Spread (DSt), Risk-Free Rate (RFt) and Term Spread
(TSt). All variables are standardized, except for TIPSt, which is
normalized to have standard deviation one only. This normalization
ensures that the intercept measures the unconditional ination risk
premium before TIPS were introduced. For Models (B) and (C), the
table presents the p-value of a Wald-test of the hypothesis that the
ination risk premium is not time-varying with TIPSt, CFNAIt and
TIPStCFNAIt. The sample period is July 1967 to December 2011,
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dictated by data availability.
Let us focus initially on the HLIB portfolio in Panel A. First, the
intercept 0 is negative and signicant in each specication around
-7.0%. A negative unconditional average return is consistent with our
model and the idea that ination is bad news on average. Second, 1
is positive and signicant at 5.85 in Model (A), which suggests that
TIPSt predicts HLIB portfolio returns to increase.21 This nding is
consistent with our model in that an increasing market share of TIPS,
which are the preferred hedge for ination risk, implies that fewer
investors are hedging in the stock market. Thus, forcing the ination
risk premium in the stock market up from its historically negative
value.
In Model (B), TIPSt is largely driven out by CFNAIt and the
interaction term, which coe¢ cients 2 and 3 are large and signicant
at 8.17 and -6.18, respectively. As a result, the Wald-test comfortably
rejects the hypothesis of no time-variation. These coe¢ cient estimates
are consistent with the model in that risk aversion is larger in reces-
sions, which implies for lower values of CFNAIt: (i) a lower ination
risk premium Pre-TIPS and (ii) a stronger e¤ect of increasing TIPS
market share. Note also that Model (B) ts considerably better than
Model (A) at an adjusted-R2 of 4.21% relative to 1.22%, which is
meaningful for a predictive regression of monthly returns. Plugging
in the realized values of the independent variables in 1967 and 2011,
the coe¢ cient estimates in Model (B) imply a reversal in the ination
21Note, the correlation between TIPSt and a linear (post-1997) time trend is 0.95. In results
that are available upon request, we nd that TIPSt predicts with the hypothesized sign even when
orthogonalized from this time trend.
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risk premium from a signicant -11.24% to an insignicant 7.36%. A
positive insignicant risk premium Post-TIPS is consistent with the
model in that investors that use TIPS to hedge ination risk, have
only the speculative investment in TIPS left to hedge in the stock
market. Previous literature suggests this speculative investment is
non-negative.
Two additional results stand out from Panel A. First, the coe¢ -
cients 0; 1; 2 and 3 vary monotonically with Ination Beta. Sec-
ond, controlling for the benchmark predictors in Model (C) leaves
these conclusions unchanged. Also, these conclusions are not a¤ected
much when excluding the nancial crisis. The only di¤erence is that
3 halves and is only marginally signicant, which is likely due to the
fact that we e¤ectively only have the recent recession to identify this
coe¢ cient.22
Panel B shows that the time-variation in the ination risk premium
weakens when we control for a stocks exposure to the benchmark
factors when estimating ination beta. A possible explanation is that
exposures to ination, a non-traded factor, are relatively small and
hard to estimate. We analyze the relation with the benchmark factors
more closely below. For now it is important to note that these models
do imply a similarly signicant reversal from about -6% in 1967 to
10% in 2011. Panel C demonstrates largely similar time-variation
in the risk premium from the truly out-of-sample sort on Irvt . The
only di¤erence with Panel A is a slightly smaller, although marginally
signicant, unconditional ination risk premium.
22In the Internet Appendix, we also document that an industry-neutral strategy, which exploits
only within-industry variation in ination betas, obtains similar time-varying returns, as well.
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The long-horizon regressions in Panel D further stress the economic
signicance of these results. We annualize returns over three forecast-
ing horizons k = 3; 12; 24 (standard errors are Newey - West with lag
length k). First, the estimated coe¢ cients 0 and 1 are similar to
the one-month horizon. In contrast, the coe¢ cients 2 and 3 shrink
as the horizon increases, which is due to turbulent economic times
(measured by the lowest CFNAIt-values) being relatively short-lived.
Nevertheless, the coe¢ cients are of the hypothesized sign at all hori-
zons, which translates to clear rejections in the Wald-test. Finally, R2
increases monotonically in the horizon from 4.21% for k = 1 to 28.93%
for k = 24 in Model (B) (see Fama and French (1988) and Campbell
(2001) for similar evidence for the aggregate stock market).
In conclusion, the ination risk premium, as measured by returns on
Ination Beta-sorted portfolios, is varying over time in the predicted
fashion with the market share of TIPS and over the business cycle. In
the Internet Appendix, we analyze whether this time-variation is ro-
bust to controlling for conditional exposures to the benchmark factors
of the CAPM, FF3M and FFCM, similar to Ferson and Harvey (1999).
We relegate this exercise to the Internet Appendix because it is not
clear ex ante why betas with respect to the benchmark factors should
vary over time, and, in particular, with TIPSt. First, we see that
the time-variation in Ination Beta-sorted portfolio returns is not ex-
plained in unconditional factor models. Exposures to the benchmark
factors are strongly varying over time, however, consistent with the
portfolio characteristics reported in Table I. In case of the CAPM and
FF3M, these time-varying exposures are not enough to fully explain
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the observed time-variation in HLIB returns. In contrast, a FFCM
that conditions exposures on TIPSt,CFNAIt and TIPStCFNAIt
completely eradicates the time-varying ination risk premium. We
nd that this supreme t is largely mechanical. Our WLS procedure
to estimate ination betas puts the largest weight on observations
close to t, such that the strategy loads on winners when ination in-
novations were high recently and vice versa.23
The cross-sectional regressions that follow explicitly control for the
relation between Ination Beta and Momentum as well as other fac-
tors and characteristics. Thus, this exercise allows us to answer the
ultimate question of whether ination betas contain independent in-
formation for expected returns in the cross-section.
E Cross-sectional regressions
The previous section analyzed the ination risk premium derived from
the returns of Ination Beta-sorted portfolios. We now turn to cross-
sectional estimates of the ination risk premium. Table III presents
summary statistics and some predictability evidence for the bench-
mark factors that we use as well as the ination factor INF. The
unconditional average return of INF is insignicantly negative at -
1.60%, which is small relative the benchmark factors. As before,
this unconditional estimate masks important time-variation. In the
full model, the intercept as well as the coe¢ cients on CFNAIt and
23Two additional pieces of information are necessary to fully understand the result. First, ina-
tion innovations are typically low in recessions, such that we load on losers. Second, a regression
of MOM on CFNAIt shows that MOM returns are similar in recessions and expansions Pre-TIPS,
but extremely low in the recent nancial crisis, when losers outperform winners by about 1.75%
per month on average.
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TIPSt  CFNAIt are large and signicant at -3.61, 5.85 and -3.51,
respectively, which adds up to a reversal from a signicant -6.72% in
1967 to an insignicant 5.61% in 2011. For the benchmark factors, the
Wald-test of no time-variation only rejects in case of SMB, which re-
turns are larger in recessions. Further, the R2 of the full model stands
out for Momentum at 7%, driven by a large and signicant coe¢ cient
on TIPSt  CFNAIt.
Table IV presents cross-sectional regressions where we allow risk
premiums to vary over time. We consider three types of regressions.
Type (A) is the standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional
regression estimate of the unconditional risk premium (with Shanken
(1992) standard errors). Type (B) and (C), respectively, condition
the risk premiums on M instruments, such that Zt = (1; T IPSt) or
Zt = (1; T IPSt, CFNAIt,TIPStCFNAIt). We estimate the time-




 Zt) + ui;t+1,
where [i;t 1 is a K   vector of estimated factor exposures for the
benchmark models and the models that add INF.  is the KM  1 
vector of parameters to be estimated. This pooled second stage gives
identical estimates to a three-stage setup, where the second stage runs
cross-sectional regressions in each month t+1 and the third stage runs
predictive regressions of the time-series of risk premium estimates on
the instruments.24 The three-stage approach is used in Ferson and
24This identity extends the analysis of cross-sectional regressions in Cochrane (2005, Ch. 12) to
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Harvey (1991) and Cohen et al. (2005) and is consistent under the
assumption that the measurement error in the betas is uncorrelated
with the instruments. The pooled regression is consistent under the
same assumption and is attractive, because it provides the standard
errors in one go, which we cluster on time. The rst-stage betas used
as independent variable in the second stage are the usual constant, full
sample betas. The regressions do not include an intercept to increase
e¢ ciency, but our conclusions are robust in this dimension.
In Panel A, we use 30 Ination Beta and Size-sorted portfolios
(UI1S30) as test assets. We present the estimated risk premiums (),
the time-series average of the second-stage cross-sectional R2t , a Wald-
test of the hypothesis that the ination risk premium does not vary
over time and the model-implied ination risk premium at the begin-
ning and the end of the sample period. The remaining Panels B to E
present a range of robustness checks where we omit the estimated risk
premiums for the sake of brevity. These can be found in the Internet
Appendix.
In short, Panel A demonstrates that exposure to ination risk is
compensated with a time-varying price that is consistent with realized
returns of the ination factor INF. First, the unconditional ination
risk premium is an insignicant -2% when INF is added to the CAPM,
FF3M and FFCM. Allowing for variation with the market share of
TIPS in Model (B), 0;INF turns signicant at about -4% in each
model, consistent with the idea that ination is bad news historically.
In Model (B), 1;INF is signicant positive at around 3.5. Thus, as
a conditional setting.
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hypothesized, when TIPS market share increases, the premium that
is required from low Ination Beta stocks decreases, because fewer
investors hedge ination risk in the stock market.
Model (C) conditions further on the state of the business cycle,
which results in TIPSt being driven out by CFNAIt and TIPSt 
CFNAIt, as before. The estimated coe¢ cients 2;INF and 3;INF
are large and signicant at 7 and -4, respectively, and imply that
the ination risk premium is largest (in absolute value) in recessions.
In sum, these cross-sectional regressions imply a reversal from -8%
to 5.5%, which is consistent with the model where investors hedge
ination risk in the stock market Pre-TIPS, but hedge a non-negative
speculative investment in TIPS in the stock market once TIPS are
introduced.
Finally, we see that adding INF improves the average cross-sectional
R2t considerably: from 4% to 21% in the CAPM, 36% to 44% in the
FF3M and 40% to 47% in the FFCM. The unconditional risk premi-
ums for MKT, SMB and HML are quite similar to the average realized
returns of these factors. MOM is an exception, however, with a small
and insignicant unconditional risk premium. In unreported results,
we nd that the time-variation in the SMB, HML and MOM risk
premiums weakens considerably whenever INF is included, which is
consistent with the idea that the set of Ination Beta-sorted portfo-
lios is hard-wired to attribute any commonvariation to INF.
This choice is not driving our results, however. Indeed, Panel B
presents largely similar results when we expend the set of test assets
with 17 industry (IND17) and 25 Size and Book-to-Market (25SBM)
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portfolios.25 To show that our results are not specic to constructing
the traded factor INF either, Panel C uses as measure of ination
risk the non-traded ination innovations t. In this case, the implied
reversals are slightly weaker in absolute value, which is likely due to
larger noise in the estimated exposures.26 Panel D shows that our
conclusions also survive the test of model misspecication proposed in
Berk (1995) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996), that is the inclusion
of characteristics.27
As a nal check of robustness, Panel E presents rm-level cross-
sectional regressions. Here we use a three-stage setup and estimate
the conditional risk premiums by regressing the second stage Fama
and MacBeth (1973) estimates (that use the time-varying betas that
were previously used to sort) on the instruments. We present results
for two models: FF3M+t and FFCM+t, both ex- and including
characteristics, which are standardized cross-sectionally.28 Note, con-
sistent with previous literature, the average cross-sectional R2 among
individual stocks is small compared to using portfolios.
Without characteristics, the Wald-test of no time-variation in the
ination risk premium in Model (C) rejects marginally. Further, the
coe¢ cients for the time-varying ination risk premium have the hy-
pothesized sign, but are less signicant and imply a reversal that is
scaled di¤erently, from an insignicant -2.5% in 1967 to an insignif-
25Both available from Kenneth Frenchs Web site.
26To calculate implied risk premiums that are comparable to Panel A and B, we scale the
coe¢ cient estimates from Panel C by the post-ranking beta of the HLIB portfolios from Panel B
of Table I.
27These characteristics are standardized cross-sectionally at each time t. For IND17 and SBM25,
Prior return is estimated using the returns on the portfolios, not the stocks inside.
28Note, these cross-sectional regressions are biased in favor of characteristics, which unlike betas,
can be measured without error.
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icant 10% in 2011.29 This discrepancy with previous portfolio-level
evidence weakens, however, when we include characteristics. In this
case, the implied reversal again runs from a large and signicant -5%
in 1967 to a marginally signicant 11% in 2011.
In the end, all specications provide us with evidence of an ina-
tion risk premium that varies with both the market share of TIPS
and over the business cycle. In cross-sectional regressions, the ina-
tion risk premium cannot be explained by the benchmark factors and
characteristics, which suggests that ination beta contains orthogo-
nal information about expected returns. The exact magnitude of the
implied reversal does vary across specications, which is likely due to
two problems. First, exposures to a non-traded factor are relative dif-
cult to estimate. Second, the cross-sectional distribution of ination
exposures is varying over time. Both problems are most severe for the
case of individual stocks analyzed in Panel E.
A Joint pricing of stocks and TIPS
This subsection presents preliminary evidence that the pricing of in-
ation risk in the stock market is consistent with the pricing of TIPS,
using the available 15 years of TIPS returns. To be precise, our model
suggests that the risk premium in the stock market for a unit exposure
to TIPS converges to the expected return on TIPS towards the end of
the sample.
In Panel A of Table V, we present cross-sectional regressions using
the set of 30 Ination Beta and Size-sorted portfolios (UI1S30) as test
29To calculate implied risk premiums that are comparable to the previous panels, we scale the
coe¢ cient estimates from Panel E by the average pre-ranking beta of the HLIB portfolios in 1967
and 2011, which is about 13.
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assets. The asset pricing model includes the CRSP VW market port-
folio and a portfolio of TIPS (an index of all maturity TIPS available
from Barclays Capital) as factors.30 To alleviate concerns about noisy
TIPS prices in the markets early years, we use a 60 month rolling
window to estimate betas and impute the rst set of estimated betas
in February 2002 for the ve years before.
In short, we nd that the estimated risk premium for exposure to
TIPS in the stock market (TIPS) is indeed converging to the average
excess return on TIPS (rTIPS), which is presented as well. In the rst
ve-year period from 1997 to 2001, the two risk premiums di¤er by a
large and signicant 8.72% (TIPS = 10:17% versus rTIPS = 1:45%).
In the two subsequent ve-year periods, the di¤erence is small and
insignicant at -0.41% and 0.11%, respectively.31
Another way to test this convergence is by asking whether the
model with TIPS predicts a cross-section of expected returns that is
similar to predictions from the original model, which includes the in-
ation factor INF. To this end, Panel B presents the same set of cross-
sectional regressions for this original model and, in the last column,
the cross-sectional correlation between expected returns for the set of
30 portfolios predicted by these two competing models.32 Expected re-
turns are calculated in each month t by multiplying the rolling window
30In contrast to what is implied by our model, our proxy of the market portfolio does not include
TIPS. The motivation is that the relative market value of TIPS is small.
31This conclusion is largely robust to including SMB, HML and MOM and using the larger set
of 72 portfolios. These results are available upon request.
32Note that TIPS returns are less time-varying than returns on the ination factor INF. This
nding is not inconsistent with the model. Consider Equation (39) of Appendix D, which equates




spec   qm;t). We see that
the hedge demand for TIPS (that is, qm;t) is not likely to cause a strong upward pressure on TIPS
prices through the equilibrium quantity w0spec. The reason is that the share of investors that is able
to invest in TIPS ('e;t) was small when TIPS were introduced, but increases gradually over the
sample period as does the supply of TIPS by the Treasury.
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betas with the ex-post average factor risk premiums in each ve-year
period. We nd that the average cross-sectional correlation is increas-
ing from -0.03 in the rst ve-year period, to 0.60 and 0.65 in the
two subsequent ve-year periods. Although preliminary, this evidence
suggests that the pricing of ination risk in the stock market is in-
creasingly consistent with realized TIPS returns as this market grows
and matures.
F Do stock portfolios and TIPS hedge ination risk?
This section asks whether our stock portfolios as well as TIPS are an
important component of the portfolio that optimally hedges ination
risk. TIPS hedging ability is necessary for our model to have economic
content, but is not a given in practice. For instance, TIPS hedging
ability may be hampered by a three month indexation lag, illiquidity
in the markets early years and volatile prices in the recent nancial
crisis. For this reason, Table VI presents regressions of ARMA(1; 1)-
innovations in ination (Panel A) and ination itself (Panel B) on
gross returns of the one-month t-bill (TB1, from CRSP), the 10 year
constant maturity treasury bond (CMT10, from CRSP), the ination
factor (INF, a zero-investment strategy) and the portfolio of TIPS.33
In the period before TIPS, TB1 and INF, with long positions, and
CMT10, with a short position, are signicant components of the op-
timal ination hedge portfolio with a joint R2 of 7.34%. Out of these
three assets, INF obtains the highest R2 in isolation at 4.07% with a
33Results are similar when we use the sort in ten ination beta groups and when we substitute
CMT10 with the Merrill Lynch U.S. Treasury bond Index from Datastream.
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coe¢ cient of 0.020 (t = 3:94).34
Post-TIPS, both CMT10 and INF are marginally signicant in iso-
lation, but little variation is explained at R2s of 3.22% and 1.06%,
respectively. Combining a short position in CMT10 with TIPS im-
proves the t considerably to an R2 of 11.32%. In fact, only CMT10
and TIPS are signicant in the joint regression with similarly large
positions of -0.07 and 0.07. This combination intuitively captures an
innovation in ination, i.e., unexpected ination plus changes in ex-
pected ination. On one hand, TIPS compensate the investor for
realized ination. On the other hand, the investor pays expected in-
ation on the short position in CMT10, which asset loads negatively
on changes in expected ination.
Panel B demonstrates that these results are robust to hedging total
ination instead. Pre-TIPS, TB1 is the best hedge at an R2 of 23.94%,
which conrms Ang (2012). INF is, however, a signicant component
of the joint hedge portfolio that obtains an R2 of 26.91%. Post-TIPS,
TB1 and INF are driven out by the long-short combination of TIPS
and CMT10, with the joint model achieving an R2 of 11.12% relative
to 0.20% for TB1 in isolation. In unreported results we nd that these
conclusions extend for ination (innovations) compounded up to three
months in the future, after which the hedging ability of both INF and
TIPS starts to weaken.
To conclude, we nd that our ination beta-sorted stock portfolios
were present in the optimal hedge portfolio for ination risk histori-
cally. However, after the introduction of TIPS, this asset provides for
34The aggregate stock market achieves a similar R2 of 4.74%. However, the required position is
negative (-0.011, t =  3:64), consistent with the historical failure of the Fisher hypothesis.
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a much better hedge when combined with a short position in nominal
bonds. This nding means that substituting part of an existing po-
sition in nominal bonds, which have a negative exposure to ination,
with TIPS is desirable for many institutions. In terms of our model,
such reallocation implies that investors can unwind their hedge posi-
tions in the stock market post-1997, which leads to the documented
reversal in the ination risk premium.
G The ination risk premium and the nominal-real covari-
ance
So far we have focused on TIPS to explain the reversal in the ina-
tion risk premium. Now, we ask whether a time-varying nominal-real
covariance has also contributed to this reversal. This question is moti-
vated by a reversal in the relation between ination and future macro-
economic activity, the nominal-real covariance, towards the end of the
nineties. In related work, Campbell et al. (2013) use this nominal-real
covariance as a state variable that governs time-variation in nominal
bond returns and estimate a consequent reversal in term premia over
the recent decade.
Panel A of Table VII summarizes the evidence for a reversal in the
nominal-real covariance. We regress ination (from t  2 to t  1) on
future (log) industrial production growth and (log) non-durables and
services consumption growth. We denote the coe¢ cients b1IP and b
1
CG,
when using the growth rate from t to t+1 , and b12IP and b
12
CG; for twelve
month cumulative growth rates from t to t + 12. For comparison to
Campbell et al. (2013), we also present the negative of the stock mar-
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ket beta of the 10 year constant maturity government bond bond (b1B).
In short, we see that over the second half of the last decade ination
largely predicts negative changes in macroeconomic activity, whereas
in the recent decade ination predicts positive changes. Indeed, both
ination and real activity were low in the recent crisis.
A Testable implications, empirical content and proxy variables
In the model of Section A, the investors fundamental exposure to in-
ation qm;t can be motivated by noting that ination is a state variable
for consumption-investment opportunities in an Intertemporal CAPM
along the lines of Cochrane (2005, Ch. 9), Vassalou (2003) and Koi-
jen et al. (2013), for instance. Indeed, ination shocks can be either
good or bad news for investors, depending on how ination predicts
macroeconomic activity.
To set the stage, we go back to the model outlined in Section A
and consider the second-order Taylor expansion using one additional
element of the aggregate exposure: the markets exposure to ination
risk qm;t. Starting from Qt = m;t((1 'e;t)qm;t+'e;tw0spec), Appendix
F derives the following extended model for the aggregate exposure
Qt = 0 + 1'e;t + 2m;t + 3('e;t  m;t) + (14)
4qm;t + 5(qm;t  m;t) + 6('e;t  m;t),
where we predict 4 > 0; 5 > 0 and 6 < 0, in addition to 0 < 0,
1 > 0, 2 < 0 and 3 > 0, which were derived before.
First, the ination risk premium increases with qm;t. The intuition
is that when a shock to ination contains less adverse news about
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macroeconomic activity, the investors incentive to hedge weakens and
the ination risk premium will adjust accordingly. Second, the mar-
ginal e¤ect of qm;t is increasing with m;t, when the investors incentive
to hedge is larger. Finally, the marginal e¤ect of qm;t is decreasing with
'e;t. For if all investors hedge using TIPS, no one is hedging the ex-
posure qm;t in the stock market.
We follow a simple, but exible approach and use backward-looking
estimates of the relation between ination and real activity, consump-
tion or stock returns to proxy for qm;t. These running estimates are
obtained by running the regressions in Panel A of VII using historical
data only in each month t. The specication is similar to the ina-
tion betas of Equation (9): using an expanding window and Weighted
Least Squares.35 Thus, we regress returns (or twelve month ahead











B;t) and the control vari-
ables:
rINF;t+1 = 0 + 1TIPSt + 2CFNAIt + 3(TIPSt  CFNAIt) +(15)
4bIP;t + 5(b
1
IP;t  CFNAIt) + 6(b1IP;t  TIPSt) + ut+1,
where the additional hypotheses are 4 > 0, 5 < 0 and 6 < 0:
B Empirical evidence
In Panel B of Table VII we consider three versions of Equation (15).
Model (A) focuses on the nominal real-covariance and restricts 1 =
2 = 3 = 5 = 6 = 0. Model (B) allows for business cycle variation
35The expanding window starts in February 1959, dictated by consumption data availability.
The WLS procedure uses an exponential weighting scheme with a half-life of 60 months.
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and restricts 1 = 3 = 6 = 0. Model (C) is the full specica-
tion for which we also present a Wald test of the hypothesis that the
nominal-real covariance does not add anything to the model analyzed
in previous sections, i.e., 4 = 5 = 6 = 0.
In short, we see that our proxies of the nominal-real covariance,
which are all standardized, predict largely with the right sign unless
we control for TIPSt. Focusing on the rst proxy bIP;t, we see that
4 is signicant at 3.73 in Model (A). In Model (B), both b1IP;t and
its interaction with CFNAIt are signicant with the hypothesized
sign (4 > 0 and 5 < 0). These ndings are consistent with the
model and suggest that as the systematic economic news contained
in ination shocks becomes more adverse, the risk premium decreases
and particularly so in recessions. Intuitively, in this scenario, high
ination beta stocks become more attractive as a hedge and therefore
have higher prices (lower expected returns), which e¤ect is particularly
strong when risk aversion is large. In Model (C) all coe¢ cients related
to bIP;t turn insignicant, however, and the Wald-test cannot reject.
In contrast, both CFNAIt and TIPSt CFNAIt are similarly large
and signicant to Table III.
For twelve month compounded returns, 4 and 5 become more
signicant in Model (A) and (B). This is consistent with idea that
the nominal-real covariance captures a slow-moving component of the
ination risk premium. This is also clear from the R2s, which are
much larger at 18% versus 3% in Model (B), for instance. However,
again, the Wald-test cannot reject the hypothesis that the nominal-
real covariance is superuous in Model (C). Indeed, results for the
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alternative proxies bCG;t and bB;t are by and large similar.
In summary, we nd that the ination risk premium is predictable
with various proxies of the nominal-real covariance, which extends the
bond market evidence in Campbell et al. (2013). Our evidence sug-
gests, however, that the nominal-real covariance has little to add to
a model that already includes the market share of TIPS. A possible
explanation for the di¢ culty in disentangling the two e¤ects follows
from observing that (i) the Post-TIPS sample is short and (ii) the ad-
mittedly noisy proxies of the nominal-real covariance have seen a very
pronounced upward shift that roughly coincides with the introduction
of TIPS in 1997.36 Indeed, Panel C shows that bIP 1t predicts with a
large coe¢ cient only in the Post-TIPS period.
H Conclusion
This paper follows a long tradition of papers at the intersection of
macroeconomics and asset pricing and nds that there exists an ina-
tion risk premium (IRP) in the cross-section of US stocks that reverses
from -8.0% in the sixties to an insignicant 5.5% in recent years. We
uncover three forces that guide this time-variation. First and foremost
important for the reversal is that the IRP is increasing in the market
share of TIPS. Second, the IRP and the e¤ect of TIPS are larger in
recessions, consistent with time-varying risk aversion. Finally, a time-
varying nominal-real covariance contributes to the reversing IRP in
isolation. This predictability is largely driven out by TIPS, however,
which could be due to the fact that our noisy proxies of the nominal-
36In the time-series the correlation between various measures of the nominal-real covariance and
TIPSt is about 0.70.
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real covariance experience a pronounced upward shift around the same
time TIPS were introduced.
We derive a simple asset pricing model to motivate the reversal.
Ination may enter the model as an exogenous risk or as a state vari-
able. In either case, it is natural to assume that ination is typically
bad news for the average investor. Historically, real bonds are not
available and nominal bonds are exposed with a negative sign. Conse-
quently, high ination beta stocks are attractive as a hedge, such that
a negative IRP obtains Pre-TIPS. Since 1997, however, TIPS allow the
investor to hedge ination more adequately, leaving only the specula-
tive investment in TIPS to be hedged in the stock market. Previous
literature suggests that this investment is non-negative, in which case
our model indicates that the IRP reverses.
An alternative explanation for the reversal focuses on the role of
ination as a state variable, with ination shocks predicting nega-
tive changes in macroeconomic activity until the end of the nineties.
In contrast, ination shocks predict positive changes over the recent
decade, such that ination is not necessarily bad news anymore. Our
evidence surely favors the market share of TIPS as driving factor of
the reversal, however.
A number of extensions come to mind. First, a thorough investiga-
tion of the nominal-real covariance, and the independent information
this variable contains for the IRP in the stock market, may benet
from directly modelling the stochastic discount factor in the economy,
as in Campbell et al. (2013). Relatedly, Campbell et al. (2009) note
that the nominal-real covariance may well change sign again, which
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could present an ideal opportunity to test our model out-of-sample.
Furthermore, we leave open the question of why rms ination ex-
posures di¤er in the cross-section, which is analyzed in Duarte and
Blomberger (2012). Finally, because we have a short sample of TIPS
returns, our evidence is only suggestive that the pricing of ination
risk in the stock market is consistent with TIPS.
Appendix: Derivations
A Basic framework
This section presents a detailed derivation of the basic framework of
the model outlined in Section A.A. Dening as ;t and 
2
 the expected
returnand variance of the risk factor, respectively, the expected re-




















where A is the N  1 covariance matrix of the risky assets and
the risk factor. Although we assume constant covariances the model
can be extended to incorporate time-varying (co-) variances.
With the assumption that the portfolio problem of the agent de-
pends only on the mean and variance of portfolio returns, the problem












Plugging in equations (16) and (17) we obtain the following rst-
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order condition for each agent j
A;t = j;tAAw
A
j;t + jAqj;t. (19)
Aggregating over all agents j = 1; :::; J , weighting by their relative
wealth xj;t = Xj;t=
JP
j=1
























AAA;t    1AAAqm;t. (22)
where  1m;t, w
A
m;t and qm;t are the wealth-weighted risk tolerance, in-
vestments in risky assets, and exposure to the risk factor, respectively,
of the marketm. This demand is easily rearranged to a standard two-





n;t+1; rm;t+1) + m;tqm;tCov(r
A
n;t+1; t+1) (23)
where both exposures to the market and ination risk are priced.
B Extended framework
This section presents a detailed derivation of the extended framework
of the model, where we introduce an asset that hedges the risk factor
perfectly as described in Section A.B.
Using the same notation as before, denote the expanded set of N+1
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assets X, such that X;t =
0@ 0;t
A;t
1A, a (N + 1)  vector of expected
excess returns; XX =
0@ 00 0A
A0 AA
1A, a (N+1)(N+1) matrix of
(co-) variances; and, X =
0@ 0
A
1A, a (N+1) vector of covariances
with the risk factor. From the optimization problem in equation (18),









XXX;t    1XXXqj;t. (25)
This Appendix serves to dene the total demand, separated in a
speculative and a hedge demand, in more detail. Consider the auxil-




t+1+e0;t+1, which hedgesthe risk in the
new asset, r0t+1, with the risky assets, r
A
t+1. Thus, a0 is the hedged ex-
pected return on the hedge asset, b0 are the minimum-variance hedge
weights, and ee is the idiosyncratic variance of the hedge asset. From
the denition of a partitioned inverse the hedge demand will equal
 1XXX =
0@  1ee   1ee b00







0@  1ee b00A +  1ee e    1ee b00A
  1ee b0b
0








0A + e = 0. If the asset r
0
t+1 is indeed perfectly correlated
to the risk factor t+1, we get that  1ee e = 1 and b0 = 
 1
AAA, such





An intuitive result, because with a perfect hedge asset available,
agents will only use this asset to hedge.37 Plugging this hedge demand
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ee a0, a Markowitz de-
mand for the hedge asset given that it is hedged using the auxiliary
regressions. Initially, we focus on the stock market and derive from
this demand the expected returns for the initial set of N risky assets
only. In Appendix A.4, we derive the joint pricing model for the set
of N + 1 assets.
37Note that the unit investment in the hedge asset can be scaled by the ratio 0 if these standard
deviations are unequal.
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C A beta asset pricing model








to a beta-form, that is, in terms of betas to and expected returns of
the market portfolio and a hedge portfolio as in Fama (1996). Dene













with 0NH = 1, such that H is a vector of scaled regression coef-
cients from a regression of t+1 on rAt+1, a hedge portfolio. Starting
from equation (31) we have
A;t = m;tAm + AA
 1
AAAQt (34)
= m;tAm + AHzm;t. (35)
Using that the rst-order conditions in equation (35) must also hold










Inverting equation (36), which solves for m;t and zm;t, and substi-
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n;t+1) = n;mEt(rm;t+1) + n;HEt(rH;t+1), (38)
that is, a simple beta-APM in exposures to and expected excess re-
turns of the market portfolio and the hedge portfolio for non-tradable
ination risk.
D A joint pricing model
In this appendix, we derive a joint pricing model for stocks and TIPS
that gives expected returns for the N risky assets that are identical to
Equation (6). We start by aggregating the demand for the initial set
of N risky assets (stocks) and the N+1th hedge asset (TIPS) over the
two types of investors. Naturally, for the basic investors (with wealth





















































XXX;t, the tangency port-
folio of the set of N and N + 1 assets, respectively. This demand can
be rewritten to the beta asset pricing model
Et(rn;t+1) = n;mXEt(rmX ;t+1) + n;HXEt(rHX ;t+1), (44)
where the two priced factors are the return on the extended market
portfolio rmX ;t+1 and the return on the pseudo hedge portfolio rHX ;t+1.
The latter portfolio is not a hedge portfolio in the usual sense, because
it combines the minimum-variance hedge demands for investors with-
out and with excess to the hedge asset. Because both factors may be
partly invested in the hedge asset, this model is not testable, except
when 'e;t = 1. In this case, the joint pricing model collapses to
Et(rn;t+1) = n;mXEt(rmX ;t+1) + n;0Et(r0;t+1), (45)
where the hedge asset itself is the second priced factor.
E Testable implications I
In this appendix we derive the main testable implications for the time-
variation in the aggregate exposure Qt driven by time-variation in m;t
and 'e;t. Start from Qt = f(m;t; 'e;t) = m;t((1 'e;t)qm;t+'e;tw0spec)
and expand around the base case scenario given by the point (1, 0):
Then we have
f(1; 0) = qm;t; (46)
which means that in the base case scenario, the ination risk pre-
mium equals qm;t, which is assumed to be negative. The two rst order
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derivatives are given by
fm;t = ((1  'e;t)qm;t + 'e;tw
0
spec), fm;t(1; 0) = qm;t; (47)
f'e;t = M;t( qm;t + w
0
spec), f'e;t(1; 0) =  qm;t + w
0
spec; (48)
Thus, the ination risk premium decreases with m;t, but increases
with both qm;t, provided that w0spec is not too negative. The four second
order terms are given by
fm;tm;t = 0; f'e;t'e;t = 0; (49)
fm;t'e;t = f'e;tm;t =  qm;t + w
0
spec , fm;t'e;t(1; 0; 1) = 1 + w
0
spec;(50)
The second line implies that f'e;t increases with M;t:
F Testable implications II
In this appendix we derive additional testable implications when Qt
varies with qm;t. In this case, we expand around m;t = 1, 'e;t = 0
and qm;t =  1. Thus, start from Qt = f(m;t; 'e;t; qm;t) = m;t((1  
'e;t)qm;t+'e;tw
0
spec) and expand around the base case scenario given by
the point (1, 0; 1):We present only the with respect to qm;t, because
the derivatives for m;t and 'e;t are unchanged with qm;t =  1:
The rst order derivative is given by
fqm;t = M;t(1  'e;t), fqm;t(1; 0; 1) = 1;
which means that the ination risk premium increases with qm;t. The
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relevant second order terms are
fqm;tqm;t = 0; (51)
fm;tqm;t = fqm;tm;t = (1  'e;t), fm;tqm;t(1; 0; 1) = 1; (52)
f'e;tqm;t = fqm;t'e;t =  M;t , fqm;t'e;t(1; 0; 1) =  1: (53)
The second line implies that fqm;t increases with M;t: The third line






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table II: Forecasting returns of Ination Beta-sorted portfolios with
TIPSt and CFNAIt
This table presents evidence that returns of Ination Beta-sorted portfolios vary over
time with the market share of TIPS (TIPSt) and over the business cycle (CFNAIt).
The sample period is July 1967 to December 2011. We consider three predictive re-
gressions: Model (A) includes only TIPSt; Model (B) adds CFNAIt and an inter-
action; and, Model (C) additionally controls for the standard predictors (Dividend
Yield, Default Spread, Risk-Free Rate and Term Spread). In Panel A, we present
results for ve Size-controlled t-beta portfolios (High, 4, 7, Low and HLIB). Panel
B presents results for sorts that control for the benchmark factors of the CAPM,
FF3M and FFCM, whereas Panel C presents results for the truly out-of-sample sort
on total ination in the vintage CPI series Irvt It. Panel D presents long- horizon
regressions for k-month compounded returns (k = 3; 12; 24). In each panel, the
rst nine columns present the estimated slope coe¢ cients and adjusted-R2 (x100).
Column ten presents the p-value (in brackets) of a Wald-test of the hypothesis that
TIPSt, CFNAIt and TIPSt CFNAIt are insignicant in Models (B) and (C).
***,**,* denote signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively, using
Newey-West standard errors with k lags.
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Table II continued
Rt+1 = 0 + 1TIPSt + 2CFNAIt + 3(TIPSt  CFNAIt) + (controls) + ut+1
Panel A: Size-controlled t-beta portfolios
0 1 2 3 cDY cDS cRF cTS R
2 H0 : 1 = 2
= 3 = 0
High (A) 2.10 4.93 0.19
(B) 3.55 -0.54 -3.60 -5.08 1.08 (0.424)
(C) 6.90 -5.51 -2.54 -2.59 16.35** 2.10 -24.16*** -4.10 2.88 (0.717)
4 (A) 5.51* 2.17 -0.08
(B) 7.01** -1.71 -7.62** -1.96 1.36 (0.061)
(C) 9.31** -5.14 -6.55** -0.26 10.79** 1.38 -14.33* 0.99 2.86 (0.148)
7 (A) 6.91* 0.83 -0.17
(B) 8.39** -1.88 -9.94*** 0.14 1.47 (0.031)
(C) 11.11*** -5.82 -8.26** 2.34 11.39** 3.31 -16.23** 0.46 3.30 (0.053)
Low (A) 8.87** -0.92 -0.17
(B) 10.45** -3.31 -11.77*** 1.10 1.39 (0.028)
(C) 13.90*** -8.67* -10.18** 3.25 9.35 4.48 -17.30* -0.71 2.36 (0.022)
HLIB (A) -6.77*** 5.85** 1.22
(B) -6.90*** 2.77 8.17*** -6.18** 4.21 (0.001)
(C) -7.01*** 3.16 7.64*** -5.84** 7.00 -2.38 -6.86 -3.39 4.32 (0.005)
Panel B: Sorts control for benchmark factors
CAPM: MKT
HLIB (A) -6.15*** 5.01* 1.02
(B) -6.04*** 2.62 4.08 -4.06* 2.08 (0.085)
FF3M: MKT, SMB and HML
HLIB (A) -4.80*** 5.60** 1.98
(B) -4.43** 3.14 1.44 -3.29 2.83 (0.144)
FFCM: MKT, SMB, HML and MOM
HLIB (A) -4.74*** 5.96** 2.48
(B) -4.35*** 3.30 1.60 -3.57 3.68 (0.076)
Panel C: Size-controlled Irvt -beta portfolios
High (A) 3.18 5.52 0.29
(B) 4.68 0.10 -4.20 -4.83 1.22 (0.384)
4 (A) 6.90** 2.10 -0.08
(B) 8.46** -2.13 -7.53** -2.39 1.48 (0.066)
7 (A) 6.95* 0.51 -0.18
(B) 8.33** -1.85 -9.65*** 0.44 1.21 (0.060)
Low (A) 7.95* -1.19 -0.17
(B) 9.52** -2.61 -13.73*** 2.85 1.60 (0.027)
HLIB (A) -4.77* 6.70** 1.46
(B) -4.84* 2.71 9.52*** -7.68** 5.46 (0.001)
Panel D: Long-horizon regressions
Rt+1:t+3
HLIB (A) -6.82*** 6.65** 4.27
(B) -6.77*** 3.48 6.50*** -5.60*** 10.28 (0.000)
Rt+1:t+12
HLIB (A) -6.33*** 7.64*** 15.92
(B) -6.53*** 6.67*** 4.25** -2.28** 21.09 (0.000)
Rt+1:t+24
HLIB (A) -5.90*** 8.46*** 26.53
(B) -5.76*** 6.93*** 1.75 -1.68* 28.93 (0.000)
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Table III: Summary statistics and predictability of asset-pricing factors
This table presents the factors we use in our cross-sectional asset pricing tests: INF,
MKT, SMB, HML and MOM. The ination factor INF is constructed similar to
SMB, HML andMOM using an independent double sort in three Ination innovation
(t) beta groups and two Size groups. Panel A presents annualized average return
and standard deviation. Panel B presents the usual forecasting exercise of returns
on TIPSt in Model (A) and in addition on CFNAIt and their interaction in Model
(B). For each factor, we also present the p-value (in brackets) of a Wald test of the
hypothesis that the factor risk premium is not time-varying in Model (B). ***,**,*
indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively, using Newey-West
standard errors with 1 lag.
Panel A: Summary statistics
INF MKT SMB HML MOM
Avg. Ret. -1.60 5.07** 2.49 4.60*** 8.37***
St.Dev. 9.90 16.13 11.05 10.41 15.33
Panel B: Ft+1 = 0 + 1TIPSt + (2CFNAIt + 3(TIPSt  CFNAIt) + ut+1
INF MKT SMB HML MOM
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
0 -3.35** -3.61** 4.95* 5.75** 1.86 2.60 5.71*** 5.55*** 11.78*** 10.20***
1 3.31** 1.91 0.23 -1.33 1.17 -0.07 -2.10 -2.60* -6.42 1.62
2 5.85*** -5.20* -5.17*** 2.88 -0.75
3 -3.51*** -0.09 0.27 -1.52 9.46**
R2 0.74 3.23 -0.19 0.25 -0.09 1.12 0.15 0.35 1.28 6.77
H0 : 1 =














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table VI: Do the ination factor and TIPS really hedge ination risk?
This table presents hedge regressions of ARMA(1; 1)-innovations in ination (t,
Panel A) and total ination (It, Panel B) on gross returns of (1) the one-month
t-bill (RTB1;t), (2) the 10 year constant maturity treasury bond (RCMT10;t), (3) the
ination factor (RINF;t) and (4) a portfolio of TIPS (RTIPS;t). Multiple regres-
sions (5) and (6) combine these assets in the optimal hedge portfolio. We present
the regressions for two sub-periods: Pre-TIPS (1964-08 to 1997-02) and Post-TIPS
(1997-03 to 2011-12). ***,**,* denote signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level,
respectively, using Newey-West standard errors with 1 lag.
E.g., t = a+ bTB1RTB1;t + bCMT10RCMT10;t + bINFRINF;t + bTIPSRTIPS;t + et
Model (#) a bTB1 bCMT10 bINF bTIPS R2
Panel A: ARMA(1; 1)-innovations in ination (t)
Pre-TIPS
(1) -0.001** 0.156*** 2.17
(2) 0.000*** -0.011** 1.18
(3) 0.000*** 0.020*** 4.07
(5) -0.001** 0.175*** -0.010* 0.019*** 7.34
Post-TIPS
(1) 0.000 0.025 -0.55
(2) 0.000 -0.028* 3.22
(3) 0.000 0.011* 1.06
(4) 0.000 0.017 0.32
(6) 0.000 0.081 -0.066** 0.004 0.073** 11.32
Panel B: Total Ination (It)
Pre-TIPS
(1) 0.001 0.694*** 23.94
(5) 0.001 0.722*** -0.017** 0.015** 26.91
Post-TIPS
(1) 0.002*** 0.157 0.20
(6) 0.001*** 0.203 -0.068** -0.001 0.072** 11.12
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Table VII: The ination risk premium and the nominal-real covariance
This table presents evidence linking the stock market-based ination risk premium
to the nominal-real covariance, as is done in Campbell et al. (2013) for nominal
bonds. In Panel A, we present our proxies of the nominal-real covariance. We
regress (cumulative) log future Industrial Production growth and Non-Durables and
Services Consumption growth on lagged ination, and calculate the negative of
the stock market beta of the ten year constant maturity bond. We present the
coe¢ cients and R2s for various sub-periods, starting from February 1959 (coinciding
with the availiability of monthly consumption data) to December 2011. In Panel
B, we forecast the ination risk premium (measured by the return on the ination
factor INF) one month-ahead (or compounded twelve month-ahead) with running
estimates of the nominal-real covariance. These running estimates use only historical
data as described in Section VI.A. We present results for three models. Model (A)
includes only the estimated running proxy of the nominal-real covariance (dbIP;t,[bCG;t
ordbB;t, which are standardized); Model (B) adds CFNAIt and an interaction term;
and, Model (C) adds TIPSt and TIPSt  CFNAIt. We present the estimated
coe¢ cients, adjusted R2s and a Wald test of the hypothesis that the terms related
to the nominal-real covariance are jointly insignicant in a model that includes
TIPSt; CFNAIt and TIPSt  CFNAIt. In Panel C, we present select results for
the Pre- and Post-TIPS period. ***,**,* indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent level, respectively, using Newey-West standard errors with k lags.
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Table VII continued
Panel A: Time-varying nominal-real covariance
St:t+k = a+ bSIt 1 + et:t+k RB10;t+1 = a+ bB( RM;t+1) + et+1




Full sample 1 -0.32 1.33 -0.09* 0.58 -0.07** 1.67
12 -4.74*** 9.61 -0.76 2.67
1967-07 to 1 -0.80** 6.81 -0.35*** 6.86 -0.16*** 13.05
1979-12 12 -10.58*** 26.60 -1.88*** 14.29
1980-01 to 1 -0.64** 7.47 -0.20* 2.52 -0.17* 6.13
1989-12 12 -5.37*** 18.44 -1.90*** 30.03
1990-01 to 1 -1.15*** 11.81 -0.27 2.05 -0.15** 9.70
1999-12 12 -7.68*** 22.62 -3.69*** 32.66
2000-01 to 1 0.34 1.59 0.04 -0.41 0.13*** 7.95
2011-12 12 -1.86 0.81 0.04 -0.75
Panel B: Predicting the ination risk premium using proxies for the nominal-real covariance
RINF;t:t+k = 0 + 1TIPSt + 2CFNAIt + 3(TIPSt  CFNAIt)+
4dbS;t +5(dbS;t  CFNAIt) + 6(dbS;t  TIPSt) + ut:t+k
S = Industrial Production (dbIP;t)
k 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 R
2 H0 : 4 =
5 = 6 = 0
INF 1 (A) -1.60 3.73*** 1.00
(B) -1.89 2.01 2.97** -3.06** 2.65
(C) -2.65 -0.29 5.97** -3.90** 2.38 0.41 0.20 2.92 (0.558)
12 (A) -1.40 3.17*** 8.63
(B) -1.89 1.68 3.56*** -2.32** 17.77
(C) -2.73** -3.69 4.73*** -2.11*** 1.09 1.52 4.48* 27.75 (0.144)
S = Consumption Growth ([bCG;t)
INF 1 (A) -1.60 2.45 0.32
(B) -1.68 1.05 1.65 -3.26** 1.74
(C) -3.28* -2.41 6.46** -4.15** 0.59 0.74 3.03 2.85 (0.835)
12 (A) -1.40 4.04*** 14.15
(B) -1.33 0.79 3.66*** -1.57 17.95
(C) -2.77*** -2.29 3.79*** -1.91*** 1.76* 0.79 3.63 28.69 (0.142)
S = Bond beta (dbB;t)
INF 1 (A) -1.60 2.26* 0.25
(B) -2.83* 3.51** 2.51** -6.15*** 3.18
(C) -2.89 -1.88 4.96*** -2.26 1.69 -2.97 1.34 2.89 (0.839)
12 (A) -1.40 2.91*** 7.24
(B) -2.13* 2.55*** 3.11*** -3.56*** 20.07
(C) -2.66** -12.00 3.26** -0.65 0.13 -1.01 9.18* 30.99 (0.223)
Panel C: Pre- versus Post-TIPS era (S = Industrial Production (dbIP;t))
Pre-TIPS
INF 1 (A) -2.20 2.19 0.34
(B) -2.18 5.17** 1.43 -0.12 3.27
(C)
Post-TIPS
INF 1 (A) -0.38 6.29* 1.45
(B) -1.86 0.40 5.55 -4.38 1.69
(C) -6.19 5.29 14.10 -5.37 13.30 -3.60 -6.20 2.81 (0.410)
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III State variables, macroeconomic activity and
the cross-section of individual stocks
Abstract
I revisit the question of whether risk premiums for ICAPM-motivated state variables
are consistent with how these variables predict consumption-investment opportunities. To
this end, I run long-horizon regressions for macroeconomic activity and cross-sectional
regressions for individual stocks. I nd that the state variable risk premiums in the cross-
section are consistent with investors incentives to hedge against the systematic economic
news that the state variables contain in the time-series. This nding adds to existing
portfolio-level evidence that is mixed on the issue of pricing, but, as shown in Maio and
Santa-Clara (2012), certainly suggestive that risk premiums are not consistent with the
ICAPM of Merton (1973).
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I link the time-series to the cross-section in the context of asset pric-
ing. I nd that risk premiums in the cross-section of individual stocks
for exposure to Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) motivated state vari-
ables are consistent with how these variables predict macroeconomic
activity in the time-series. This time-series and cross-sectional con-
sistency alleviates concerns about "factor shing" and is consistent
with the idea that investors desire to hedge against shocks to macro-
economic activity. This nding resuscitates a central role for business
cycle risk in asset pricing along the lines suggested by Cochrane (2005,
Ch. 9) and Koijen et al. (2013).
The empirical method consists of two elements. First, long-horizons
regressions establish whether and how a candidate state variable fore-
casts macroeconomic activity, as measured by Industrial Production
growth or the Chicago FED National Activity Index. Second, to es-
tablish whether this state variable is a priced risk factor, I directly
identify the individual stocks that are exposed to innovations in the
state variable. Following Campbell (1996), these innovations are taken
from a V AR(1).1 I use these exposures to run cross-sectional regres-
sions and sort stocks into portfolios. In this way, I use a broad and
heterogenous cross-section of exposures, which is attractive for hedg-
ing. Moreover, using individual stocks responds to recent asset pricing
literature that suggests rm-level tests are relatively e¢ cient (Litzen-
berger and Ramaswamy (1979) and Ang et al. (2011)), whereas infer-
ences from portfolio-level tests depend critically on the chosen set of
1Note, measuring exposures to innovations in the state variables, rather than their levels, sep-
arates this work from versions of the Conditional CAPM in Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and
Cochrane (1996).
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test portfolios (Ahn et al. (2009) and Lewellen et al. (2010)).
The main contribution of this study is in establishing that these
two elements are consistent in sign. The sign restriction follows from
a stochastic discount factor that prices systematic economic news and
therefore exposure to state variables that contain this news. This sign
restriction is a simple alternative to directly imposing intertemporal
restrictions on the risk prices, such as in the V AR ICAPM of Camp-
bell (1996), to guard against "factor shing". This concern tradition-
ally undermines tests of the ICAPM (Fama (1991) and Black (1993)).
Indeed, existing portfolio-level evidence on the pricing of these state
variables is mixed, but certainly suggestive that pricing is inconsistent
with how the state variables predict the aggregate stock market port-
folio, which relation is implied by the ICAPM of Merton (1973) (see
Maio and Santa-Clara (2012)).2 However, the aggregate stock mar-
ket return is likely a poor proxy for the return on aggregate wealth
(Roll (1977)), which is the opportunity set of interest to the represen-
tative investor. Because investors own human capital, houses, shares
of small businesses and other non-marketed assets, besides stocks and
bonds, Cochrane (2005, Ch. 9) advocates the search for "recession
state variables", i.e., variables that predict macroeconomic activity.
To start out, I focus on the three most commonly used state vari-
ables in the literature: Dividend Yield (DY), Default Spread (DS) and
Term Spread (TS). I nd that DS forecasts negative changes in macro-
economic activity (consistent with Chen (1991) and Gilchrist and Za-
2A long history of papers test whether ICAPM-motivated state variables are priced in a set of
predetermined portfolios. An incomplete list includes Shanken (1990), Ferson and Harvey (1991),
Campbell (1996), Brennan et al. (2004), Petkova (2006), Hahn and Lee (2006) and Kan et al.
(2012).
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krajsek (2012)), TS forecasts positive changes (consistent with Estrella
and Hardouvelis (1991) and Adrian and Estrella (2008)), whereas DY
is not a robust predictor. Thus, the ICAPM suggests that only expo-
sures to DS and TS risk are priced. Moreover, the ICAPM suggests
that the DS risk premium is negative and the TS risk premium posi-
tive. Indeed, high DS and low TS exposure stocks pay o¤when macro-
economic activity is expected to decrease, which makes these stocks
attractive as a hedge and lowers their expected returns. Consistent
with these predictions, I estimate an annualized average risk premium
of -6.5% for DS, 6.0% for TS and around zero for DY in quarterly
cross-sectional regressions. The corresponding absolute Sharpe ratio
is large at 0.41 and 0.48 for DS and TS, respectively, relative to 0.30
for the market portfolio.
Next, I show that this time-series and cross-sectional consistency
is general to the broader set of ICAPM-motivated state variables an-
alyzed in Maio and Santa-Clara (2012). First, I analyze the model
of Petkova (2006), which includes the risk-free rate (RF) next to DY,
DS and TS.3 Second, the model of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004),
which includes TS, the price-earnings ratio (PE) and the value spread
(VS). Third, the model of Koijen et al. (2013), which includes the
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) bond market factor (CP) and a fac-
tor that measures the level of the term-structure (LVL). In the long-
horizon regressions, RF and VS forecast negative changes in macro-
economic activity, CP forecasts positive changes, whereas PE and LVL
3Inspired by Lioui and Poncet (2011), who highlight multicolinearity problems between RF and
TS, I consider two versions. First, I substitute RF for TS. Second, I add RF orthogonalized from
TS to the original set of state variables. The latter version shows that RF has little to add to a
model that already includes TS in both the time-series and the cross-section.
126
are not robust predictors. Consistent with this time-series evidence, I
estimate that RF, VS and CP capture an annualized risk premium of
-4.0%, -5.5% and +4.5% (an absolute Sharpe ratio of 0.26, 0.38 and
0.33), respectively, whereas PE and LVL risk are not priced.
I nd that these conclusions are robust. First, the results are con-
sistent when the time-series and cross-sectional regressions are run
at the monthly frequency instead. This nding alleviates concerns
about potential horizon-e¤ects in the predictive relations and is im-
portant because the investment horizon of the representative agent is
unknown (Kothari et al. (1995), Campbell (1996) and Brennan and
Zhang (2012)). Also, the results are qualitatively similar when using
exposures to rst-di¤erences in the state variables instead of V AR(1)-
innovations.
Finally, the risk premiums are consistent in sign and often in magni-
tude for value- and equal-weighted High minus Low quintile portfolios.
This nding suggests suggests that transaction costs are unlikely to
eradicate the risk premiums for the priced state variables (DS, TS,
RF, VS and CP) completely. These individual stock-based strategies
can be thought of as simple, out-of-sample proxies for the maximum
correlation portfolio of Breeden et al. (1989). Because I construct
portfolios that are maximally exposed ex ante, an important question
is whether the portfolios are exposed ex post. I nd that they are,
which suggests that the state variables are not useless factors in the
sense of Kan and Zhang (1999). Combining, the evidence suggests
that these strategies are useful for investors that desire to tilt their
equity portfolio towards or away from these intertemporal risks.
127
I conclude that pricing is consistent with investors incentives to
hedge business cycle risk, which extends Koijen et al. (2013), who fo-
cus on the pricing of CP alone. This nding advances an ICAPM liter-
ature, starting with Chen et al. (1986) and Ferson and Harvey (1991),
that routinely includes term structure variables as risk factors. In a
closely related paper, Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) conclude however
that portfolio-level risk premiums for these state variables are incon-
sistent with hedging incentives in the ICAPM of Merton (1973). Al-
though, Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) estimate risk premiums for DS,
RF, VS and CP that are consistent in sign with my estimates, they are
largely insignicant. This nding suggests that using individual stocks
is indeed more e¢ cient. It is only in case of VS and CP, however, that
the sign of the risk premium is consistent with how the level forecasts
aggregate stock market returns. Moreover, while TS predicts positive
stock market returns as it does macroeconomic activity, the sign of its
risk premium is sensitive to the choice of portfolios. Finally, DY, PE
and LVL are not priced among portfolios either, but do forecast stock
market returns, especially at longer horizons.4
This paper also contributes to the debate on whether the Fama and
French (1993) factors proxy for intertemporal risk and, as such, to the
risk factor versus characteristics controversy discussed in Fama and
French (1992), Daniel and Titman (1997) and Chordia et al. (2012).
For instance, results in Petkova (2006) and Hahn and Lee (2006) sug-
gest that SMB and HML can substitute for state variables in portfolio-
level tests. I conrm evidence to the contrary in Cederburg (2011) and
4Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) nd that risk premiums are similarly inconsistent with how the
state variables predict market variance and a measure of market Sharpe ratio.
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Maio and Santa-Clara (2012). The risk premiums for the priced state
variables (DS, TS, RF, VS and CP) are not driven out by exposures
to SMB and HML in rm-level cross-sectional regressions.
In contrast, the DS risk premium is captured by the characteristic
Size. This Size e¤ect is consistent with Perez-Quiros and Timmer-
mann (2000) and Baker and Wurgler (2012), who argue that small
stocks are more sensitive to business cycle variation in credit con-
ditions. Similarly, the CP risk premium is eradicated by including
Size and Book-to-Market. The link between CP exposures and Book-
to-Market is studied in more detail in Koijen et al. (2013). These
ndings are perhaps unsurprising, because characteristics can be mea-
sured without error, whereas exposures need to be estimated. Yet, TS,
RF and VS are not fully driven out by characteristics, which means
that these state variables do contain independent information about
the cross-section of expected individual stock returns.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section A motivates
the link between macroeconomic activity and state variable risk pre-
miums in a stochastic discount factor framework. Section B describes
the data and methods used. Section C tests for time-series and cross-
sectional consistency in the pricing of state variable risk. Section D
analyzes individual stock-based state variable mimicking portfolios.
Section E confronts the state variable risk premiums with the Fama




Consider the conditional asset pricing model Et(mt+1ri;t+1) = 0; where
ri;t+1 is the excess return on asset i and mt+1 is the stochastic discount
factor (SDF) that exists when the law of one price holds, with the
expectation taken given investors information set at time t. In most
equilibrium models, the SDF is a nonlinear function of factors and the
models parameters. Following the standard procedure, I assume that
the SDF can be approximated by a constant linear function of factors
mt+1 = a  b0ft+1, (1)
where the factors are the return on the market portfolio as in the
CAPM and innovations in a set of K state variables ("z;k;t+1 = zk;t+1 
Et(zk;t+1) for k = 1; ::; K).5 Thus, ft+1 = (rm;t+1; "0z;t+1)





In this paper, I test the hypothesis that bz;k > 0 when zk;t predicts
macroeconomic activity with a positive sign and vice versa. This hy-
pothesis can be motivated by a rational ICAPM, where investors wish
to hedge their risk exposure to state variables that contain news about
future macroeconomic activity, with good news lowering marginal util-
ity (see Chen et al. (1986), Vassalou (2003), Cochrane (2005, Ch. 9)
and Koijen et al. (2013) for similar arguments).
This model is similar to the ICAPM of Merton (1973), where expo-
sure to state variables that predict consumption-investment opportu-
nities are priced in addition to market beta. In his economy, there exist
5It is straightforward to extend the analysis to allow the SDF-coe¢ cients to vary over time, for
instance, as a linear function of instruments (see Cochrane (2005, Ch, 8).
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only stocks (and a risk-free asset), such that the opportunity set can
be summarized by the rst two moments of the aggregate stock mar-
ket return. The testable implication is that bz;k > 0 when zk;t predicts
high returns or low volatility or both, in which case marginal utility is
low. Using the CRSP value-weighted stock market portfolio, Maio and
Santa-Clara (2012) nd that for a range of ICAPM-motivated state
variables, the estimated risk premiums are generally inconsistent with
this logic.
A possible explanation for this inconsistency, which I explore in this
paper, follows from Rolls critique (1977) of the CAPM. The aggre-
gate stock return may be poor proxy for the return on the aggregate
wealth portfolio, which is the opportunity set of interest to the rep-
resentative investor. In fact, previous research establishes that state
variables, such as the Default Spread (DS) and the Term Spread (TS),
predict returns on various components of wealth, which need not all
be traded assets (see Cochrane (2005, Ch. 9)). First, both DS and
TS predict returns in stock as well as government and corporate bond
markets, consistent with their common use as proxies for credit mar-
ket conditions and the stance of monetary policy, respectively (Keim
and Stambaugh (1986) and Fama and French (1989)). In addition,
Fama and French (1989) argue that TS captures a term premium that
is common to all long maturity assets. Consistent with this argu-
ment, Campbell (1996) nds that TS predicts human capital returns.
Finally, Hong and Yogo (2012) nd that a combination of DS and
TS predicts returns in commodity markets, whereas Ang et al. (2013)
show that a factor that is common to public and private real estate
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loads on DS.
A possible solution is to broaden the proxy of the wealth portfolio
and include, for instance, non-traded human capital as in Campbell
(1996). To sidestep the need to dene the exact composition of the
wealth portfolio, I follow the advice in Cochrane (Ch. 9) and in-
stead seek "recession state variables", that is, variables forecasting
macroeconomic activity.6 This approach essentially uses macroeco-
nomic growth as a broad proxy for returns on the various components
of wealth, such that changes in consumption-investment opportunities
are described by those state variables that contain news about future
growth rates. Fundamentally, this approach assumes that returns on
large components of the wealth portfolio are procyclical, which is con-
sistent with extant evidence of a positive correlation between stocks
and, for instance, commodities (Hong and Yogo (2012)), human capi-
tal (Campbell (1996)) and real estate (Ang et al. (2013)). Moreover,
this procyclicality is present in equilibrium asset pricing theory, as
noted in Chen (1991) for stocks and bonds. Since nancial securities
are claims against output, an increase in the productivity of capital
positively impacts expected stock returns (see, e.g., Cox et al. (1985)).
At the same time, individuals would want to smooth consumption by
attempting to borrow against expected future outputs, thereby bid-
ding up long-term interest rates.
Equation (1) implies the following beta asset pricing model:
Et (ri;t+1) = m;ti;m;t + 
0
z;ti;z;t, (2)
6By directly dening the proxy, Campbell (1996) is able to derive intertemporal restrictions on
the risk prices. Such restrictions are lost in the general SDF-approach applied here.
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where Et (ri;t+1) is the expected excess return (ri;t+1 = Ri;t+1 Rf;t+1)
of asset i; the exposures i;m;t and i;z;t are the slope coe¢ cients from
the return-generating process ri;t+1 = i;t + i;m;trm;t+1 + 
0
i;z;t"z;t+1 +
i;t+1; and, m;t and z;t are the market and state variable risk pre-
miums, respectively, all conditional on the information set at time t.






V art(ft+1)=Et(mt+1)b, where Et(mt+1) is positive in the absence of
arbitrage opportunities. Thus, an additional component in expected
return is required and obtained whenever an asset is inuenced by sys-
tematic economic news, which is consistent with the general conclusion
of asset pricing theory (Chen et al. (1986)).
In the following, I analyze the pricing implications from this model
using a standard approach, which entails running Fama and MacBeth
(1973) cross-sectional regressions of asset returns on historical betas
in each period t+1 (for more detail, see Section B). To derive testable
unconditional implications, note that the periodic risk premium es-
timates from these regressions equal the return on a zero-investment
portfolio that has a beta of one with respect to each respective factor
and a beta of zero with respect to the other factors (Fama (1976)).
Let us dene these risk premiums as rFMBm;t+1 and r
FMB
z;k;t+1 for k = 1; ::; K
in the context of Equation (2). Moreover, going back to Equation (1),
dene the factors without loss of generality so as to have conditional
mean equal to zero (f t+1 = ft+1 Et(ft+1)) and normalize the SDF as





m;t+1) = 1 m;t and Et(rFMBz;k;t+1) = 1 z;k;t for k = 1; ::; K, (3)
which conditions down to
E(rFMBm;t+1) = m and E(r
FMB








t+1)b by the law of iterated expectations. Thus,
in this paper I estimate the unconditionally expected excess return
investors require to invest in a portfolio with a conditional factor beta
equal to one.
As pointed out in Fama (1996), the sign of the market risk premium
in this ICAPM is indeterminate, because it may hedge against state
variable risk. However, when the innovations in the state variables
are (close to) orthogonal to the market, which is the relevant case in
this paper, m is positive and must equal the expected return on the
market portfolio. When the innovations are also (close to) orthogonal
to each other, the state variable risk premiums in z are multiples of
the respective elements of bz, such that their signs must be identical.
Hence, if a state variable predicts economic activity with a positive
sign, an asset that covaries with innovations in this state variable earns
a positive risk premium. The intuition is that the asset does not allow
the investor to hedge against business cycle risk, such that he will not
be willing to pay a high price for this asset.
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B Methodology and data
This section describes the data and methods used to test the ICAPM
derived above. First, I introduce the long-horizon regressions that
determine whether a candidate state variable forecasts macroeconomic
activity. Second, I introduce the cross-sectional regression that tests
whether exposure to the state variable is priced in a consistent manner.
A Predicting macroeconomic activity
I use two measures of macroeconomic activity: the Industrial Produc-
tion Index (IP) and the Chicago FED National Activity Index (CF).
Both indexes are designed to gauge real output and overall economic
activity in the US and are available from the FRED R database of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. IP is seasonally-adjusted and for
both series I use the latest vintage.7 In this paper, I focus mainly on
a quarterly frequency.8 Throughout, I present select results for the
monthly frequency as a check of robustness.
In order to test whether the state variables predict macroeconomic
activity, I conduct long-horizon predictive regressions, which are com-
mon in the time-series predictability literature:
yt;t+S = aS + b
0













growth over S periods; zt is a set of candidate state variables and
et;t+S is a forecasting error with zero mean conditional on zt. The sign
7Results for the real-time vintage series are similar.
8Quarterly IP compounds monthly growth rates, whereas quarterly CF is a 3-month moving
average.
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of the slope coe¢ cients in bS indicates whether a given state variable
forecasts positive or negative changes in macroeconomic activity. In
the ICAPM of Equation (2), this sign determines the sign of the risk
premium for exposure to that state variable in the cross-section. Simi-
larly, Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) conduct these regressions with ag-
gregate stock market returns on the left-hand side to test the ICAPM
of Merton (1973). The original sample is 1962.Q1 to 2011.Q4, which
corresponds to the time span used in most empirical asset pricing
studies of the cross-section.
In the main analysis, zt includes three popular state variables that
are known to predict returns in various asset classes: the Dividend
Yield (DY) of the CRSP value-weighted stock portfolio (the ratio of
dividends over the last 12 months and the current level of the index),
the Default Spread (DS) between the yield of long-term corporate
BAA and AAA bonds (both monthly averages) and the Term Spread
(TS) between the yield of the ten and one year government bond (both
observed at month-end).9 Data on bond yields are from the FRED R
database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
In a number of studies, e.g., Petkova (2006) and Kan et al. (2012),
the Risk-Free rate (RF) is included as fourth state variable. I nd that
RF is largely redundant in the presence of TS and therefore exclude it
in the main analysis. The exclusion of RF is attractive also, because
it allows me to estimate one beta less per stock, per period. I present
results for RF as a robustness check throughout the paper. In this
9Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) propose an alternative measure of default risk that is a better
predictor of macroeconomic aggregates, based on the cross-section of corporate bond yields. I
discuss the pricing of this alternative to DS in a robustness check.
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robustness check, I also present results for two competing models.
First, the model of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), which includes
TS, the price-earnings ratio (PE) and the value spread (VS).10 Second,
the model of Koijen et al. (2013), which includes the Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2005) bond market factor (CP) and the level factor (LVL).11
B Cross-sectional regressions
In order to test the pricing model in Equation (4), I run Fama and
MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of individual stock returns
on conditional betas with respect to innovations in the state variables.
First, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) and Ang et al. (2011)
argue that rm-level tests may be more e¢ cient than portfolio-level
tests, because the wider dispersion in betas, should more than make
up for the larger degree of noise in the estimated betas when esti-
mating risk premiums. Second, conditional exposures ensure that the
investor can apply these strategies in real-time and are consistent with
extant evidence that rm-level exposures are time-varying. This sub-
section describes the two main ingredients for these regressions: state
variable innovations and betas. Finally, I interpret the cross-sectional
regression as a portfolio strategy.
Innovations I adopt the approach of Campbell (1996) and assume
the state variables follow a rst-order Vector Auto-Regressive process
10PE is the log ratio of the price of the S&P 500 index to a ten-year moving average of earnings.
VS is calculated from six Size and Book-to-market sorted portfolios as in Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004).
11CP is the tted value from a regression of an average of excess bond returns on forward rates.
LVL is the rst principal component of the one- through ve-year Fama-Bliss forward rates, which
is highly correlated to RF (the correlation coe¢ cient equals 0.97 at both frequencies). For details
on the construction of both series see Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).
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(V AR(1)).12 To be consistent with previous work, I use the CRSP
value-weighted stock market return as proxy for the market portfolio.
To ensure the betas are fully conditional, the V AR uses only historical




 , where the su-
perscript t indicates that  = 1; ::; t. Moreover, yt = (rm;t; z0t)
0, where
zt collects the state variables, such that zt = (DYt; DSt; TSt)0 in the
main analysis. Following Petkova (2006), the innovations et are or-
thogonalized from the market return rtm; and scaled to have the same
variance as rtm; . This orthogonalization is particularly important for
DY. When the V AR is estimated over the full sample, the correlation
between the excess market return and innovations in DY is -0.89. The
innovations are not orthogonalized from each other, because (i) their
correlations are below 0.20 and (ii) this could add additional noise
through the arbitrary ordering of the variables.13 The transformed in-
novations in the state variables, used as risk factors in the asset pricing








Betas I use all ordinary common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX
and NASDAQ (excluding rms with negative book equity). To be
consistent with previous work, I exclude nancial rms. Although
nancials are potentially useful for hedging, their inclusion does not
meaningfully alter the main conclusions. Furthermore, I require that
at least four out of the last ve years of returns are available for a
stock to be included. I use a weighted least-squares regression over
12The results are qualitatively similar for innovations from a V AR(2), an AR(1) and for rst-
di¤erences in the state variables. Select results from these robustness checks are discussed below.
13Lioui and Poncet (2011) show that results for a VAR-ICAPM are sensitive to the orthogonal-
ization procedure. This sensitivity is particularly strong for RF as is shown in Section C.C.
138
all observations  = 1; :::; t and shrink these betas as suggested in
Vasicek (1973). These modications to the usual rolling-window beta
are important, because exposures to non-traded factors tend to be
small and hard-to-estimate.14 The expanding window ensures that we
use as much information as possible, whereas an exponential decay in
the weights ensures timeliness of the estimated betas. Thus, for each














with weights K() =
exp( jt   j h)
tP
=1
exp( jt   j h)
.
With h = log(2)20 in case of quarterly data (and h =
log(2)
60 in case of
monthly data), the half-life converges to 5 years for large t. Next, I
perform the Bayesian transformation





where the subscripts TSD and CSD denote means and variances taken
over the time-series dimension  and cross-sectional dimension i, re-
spectively. In this way, dvi;k;t is a weighted average of the estimated
beta and the cross-sectional average beta, where the former receives
a larger weight when it is estimated more precisely. Among others,
Elton et al. (1978) and Cosemans et al. (2012) show that this adjust-
ment improves forecasted exposures. For the state variables studied
14The main results are qualitatively similar, but weaker for the more noisy rolling-window betas.
139
in this paper, the cross-sectional average of the fraction in Equation
(7) is about 0.30. Thus, the average amount of shrinkage in this pa-
per is similar to Bloombergs estimate for market betas. From this
point forward, all results are based on these adjusted exposures, sim-
ply denoted i;k;t. Accounting for a burn-in period of ve years when
estimating beta, the sample period amounts to a total of 179 quarterly
(537 monthly) cross-sectional regressions from 1967Q2 to 2011Q4.
Mimicking portfolio interpretation In each period t, I estimate risk
premiums t = (m;t; 
0
z;t)
0 by running Fama and MacBeth (1973)
cross-sectional regressions for i = 1; :::; Nt:
ri;t+1 = 0;t + m;t[i;m;t + 0z;tci;t + i;t. (8)
As shown in Fama (1976), this cross-sectional regression implicitly de-
nes a strategy that is the purest way to hedge state variable risk,
as each element of t can be interpreted as the return on a zero-
investment portfolio that has a conditional beta of one with respect to
the factor of interest and a conditional beta of zero with respect to all
other factors. This result follows from post-multiplying the portfolio
weights for state variable k, i.e., the k+2-th row of (B0tBt)
 1B0t (where
Bt has typical row Bi;t = (1; i;m;t; 
0
i;t)), with Bt itself. In the follow-
ing, I present select for a cross-sectional regression that restricts the
intercept to zero (0;t = 0), as dictated by the ICAPM in Equation
(2). In this case, the unit exposure portfolio strategy is not restricted
to be zero-investment anymore.
Note, because Bi;t contains pre-ranking betas, which are noisy, the
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post-ranking exposure to factor k is likely smaller than one (and to
the other factors unequal to zero). To ensure that the state variables
are not useless factors in the sense of Kan and Zhang (1999), I test
whether the cross-sectional regression portfolios are exposed ex-post
to the respective state variable innovation in Section D.
The cross-sectional regression portfolio can be thought of as simple,
out-of-sample proxy of the maximum correlation mimicking portfolio
of Breeden et al. (1989). This portfolio cannot be estimated, because
there are more stocks than time-series observations. The alternative,
using a small set of portfolios as base assets, is unattractive as long
as we are uncertain that these portfolios span the cross-section or
when these portfolios have a strong factor structure (Lewellen et al.
(2010)). For instance, Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) nd di¤erences, in
both absolute value and sign, between risk premiums estimated using
25 Size and Book-to-Market portfolios and 25 Size and Momentum
portfolios.
As a benchmark, I also present results for both market value- and
equal-weighted High minus Low spreading portfolios (HLSP) in Sec-
tion D, which are split at the quintiles of ranked exposures. These
HLSPs are likely more interesting from a practical point of view, be-
cause they require an investment in a subset of the available stocks
only.
C Time-series and cross-sectional consistency
This section presents the main test of this paper and asks whether the
risk premium for exposure to state variable risk in the cross-section
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of individual stocks is consistent with how this state variable pre-
dicts macroeconomic activity in the time-series. First, I present both
time-series and cross-sectional regressions for the three most popular
state variables in the empirical asset pricing literature, that is, the
Dividend Yield (DY), Default Spread (DS) and Term Spread (TS).
Subsequently, I ask whether the main conclusions from this exercise
are general to a broader set of ICAPM-motivated state variables.
A Do state variables predict macroeconomic activity?
Time-series predictability is a necessary condition for a state variable
to be priced in the ICAPM of Equation (2). When there are multiple
state variables, we should focus on the marginal predictive role of each
variable, conditional on all other variables. For this reason, Table I
presents both single and multiple regressions of current and future
Industrial Production Growth (IP) or Chicago Fed National Activity
Index (CF) on the state variables, where all variables are standardized
to accomodate interpretation.15 I use as forecasting horizon S = 0,
1, 2, 4, 8 and 20 quarters in Panel A and S = 0, 1, 6, 12, 24 and 60
months in Panel B. I use both Newey and West (1987) and Hansen
and Hodrick (1980) asymptotic standard errors with S lags to correct
for the serial correlation in the residuals induced by the overlapping
data.
Let us initially focus on the single regressions for IP at the quar-
terly frequency. First, DY predicts current and next quarter IP with
a marginally negative coe¢ cient that translates to an R2 of about 3%,
15R2 is not reported for the single regressions, because it is equal to the square of the estimated
regression coe¢ cient.
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but does not predict at longer horizons. Similarly, DS predicts cur-
rent and short-term future IP with a negative sign. The coe¢ cient
is signicant up to two quarters ahead and translates to an R2 that
falls from 20% for S = 0 to 6% for S = 2. In contrast, TS predicts
short- and long-term future IP with a positive sign. The coe¢ cient is
signicant up to eight quarters out and translates to an R2 increasing
from 3% for S = 1 to 13% for S = 8. In unreported results, I nd
that the TS coe¢ cient is positive and signicant up to S = 18, but
peaks around S = 8.
In multiple predictive regressions, the three variables jointly explain
about 15% to 20% of the variation in both short- and long-term fu-
ture IP. The coe¢ cients for DS and TS are consistent in sign with, but
strenghten relative to the single regressions. DS is the most important
predictor of current and short-term future IP, with a negative coe¢ -
cient that remains signicant up to S = 8. TS is the most important
predictor of long-term future IP, with a positive coe¢ cient that is sig-
nicant up to S = 20. In the presence of DS and TS, DY turns out to
be a positive predictor of long-term future IP, in contrast to the single
regression. The DY coe¢ cient for S > 8 is economically large above
0.30, but typically insignicant, however. In the remaining blocks of
Panel A, we see that these results are robust for CF. Moreover, Panel
B demonstrates that these conclusions largely extend at the monthly
frequency.
In terms of the model, these predictive regressions clearly indicate
what the sign of the risk premium for exposure to DS and TS must be.
DS predicts short-term future economic activity with a negative sign,
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consistent with evidence in Chen (1991) and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012). In contrast, TS predicts (long-term future) economic activ-
ity with a positive sign. In fact, a negative TS has preceded all US
recessions since the 50s, with only one false signal (see, e.g., Adrian
and Estrella (2008)). Thus, it is natural to interpret an increasing DS
as bad news and an increasing TS as good news, such that their risk
premiums must be negative and positive, respectively.16
In contrast, the regressions do not allow for a clear-cut interpreta-
tion of an increasing DY as either good or bad news. On one hand,
DY predicts positive changes in long-term future macroeconomic ac-
tivity in multiple regressions, which suggests the risk premium must
be positive. On the other hand, these positive long-term coe¢ cients
are (i) poorly estimated, (ii) insignicant in single regressions, where
the short-term coe¢ cients are actually marginally signicant with the
opposite sign, and (iii) sensitive to the chosen sample period. For
instance, DY predicts current and short-term future macroeconomic
activity with a marginally negative coe¢ cient pre-1990 in multiple
regressions, consistent with Chen (1991).17
Finally, note that DY, DS and TS all predict positive stock market
returns in Maio and Santa-Clara (2012), such that the ICAPM of
Merton (1973) implies that all three risk premiums are positive. Next,
I estimate risk premiums in the cross-section of individual stocks to
16In unreported results, I run predictive regressions for realized variance in stock and bond
markets as well as consumption. The results are very much consistent with the interpretation
of an increasing DS as bad news, because it predicts realized variance with a positive sign and
consumption with a negative sign, and an increasing TS as good news, because it predicts realized
variance with a negative sign and consumption with a positive sign. In fact, in absolute magnitude
the coe¢ cients for consumption and IP are similar.
17The results for DS and TS are qualitatively similar pre- and post-1990. These results are
available upon request.
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evaluate these two competing sets of predictions.
B Is exposure to state variable risk priced?
Table II presents results for the Fama and MacBeth (1973) rm-level
cross-sectional regressions of Equation (8). For the periodically esti-
mated risk premiums t = (m;t; 
0
z;t)
0, I present the annualized uncon-
ditional average: b = 1T P
t
bt, which is my estimate of the state vari-
able risk premium, as well as the Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistic,
which uses the time-series standard deviation of the estimate. Also,
I present the average cross-sectional R2 = 1T
P
t
R2t . Consistent with
the long-horizon regressions in Table I, I consider a two-factor model
that includes DY, DS or TS next to MKT as well as a joint four-factor
model.
Let us initially focus on the quarterly regressions in Panel A. In the
two-factor models, only the DS risk premium is signicant at -8.15%
(t =  3:24). The TS risk premium is non-negligible economically at
2.85%, but insignicant (t = 1:34), whereas the DY risk premium is
essentially zero. In the four-factor model, which is most relevant in
the presence of multiple state variables, the risk premium for DS and
TS are large and signicant at -6.50% (t = 2:75) and 5.77% (t = 3:20),
respectively. In both cases, this risk premium is consistent with the
predictive regressions of Table I and the consequent interpretation of
an increasing DS as bad news and an increasing TS as good news.
Again, the DY risk premium is small and insignicant, which is con-
sistent with the absence of a robust relation between DY and macro-
economic activity.
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In the joint model, the average cross-sectional R2 equals 3.71%,
which is typical for this exercise (see, e.g., Fama and French (2008)).
Throughout, the MKT risk premium is positive, but small and in-
signicant at about 2%. When we restrict the intercept to zero, the
MKT risk premium changes dramatically to a large and signicant
7%. This result is common in the literature. When the intercept is
restricted to zero, MKT beta is used to t the equal weighted aver-
age return of the tests assets in the cross-sectional regression, because
this beta is centered around one. This estimate is close to the sam-
ple average return on the MKT portfolio and implies an economically
plausible relative risk aversion coe¢ cient of about 2 in the ICAPM
of Merton (1973) and Campbell (1996).18 Moreover, when we restrict
the intercept to zero, the TS risk premium is larger by about 1% and
as a result marginally signicant in the two-factor model at 3.74%
(t = 1:72).
The estimates are quantitatively similar at the monthly frequency
in Panel B. For instance, in the four-factor model, the risk premi-
ums for DS and TS are large and signicant at -5.28% (t =  2:21)
and 5.49% (t = 2:69), respectively, whereas the risk premium for DY
remains insignicant at 1.54%. Moreover, these results are qualita-
tively robust in Panel C, where we estimate exposures with respect to
rst-di¤erences in the state variables instead of V AR(1)-innovations.19
Quantitatively, two di¤erences stand out, however. First, the risk pre-
18To be precise, because the state variable innovations are orthogonalized from MKT, the esti-
mated relative risk aversion coe¢ cient is the ratio of the estimated MKT risk premium and the
variance of the MKT portfolio, that is, 0:07=40:092 = 2:16:
19Further, the Internet Appendix demonstrates that the results are both qualitatively and quan-
titatively similar for V AR(2)-innovations in the state variables.
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mium for TS is smaller by about 2%, but typically remains signicant.
Second, the DY risk premium turns negative and signicant when ex-
cluding the intercept. The latter result is solely due to the fact that
simple changes in DY are strongly correlated with the MKT return,
which is why I have orthogonalized the V AR(1)-innovations from the
MKT as in Campbell (1996).
To sum up, I estimate risk premiums for DY, DS and TS in the
cross-section of individual stocks that are largely consistent with the
ICAPM derived in Section A. DS and TS are robust predictors of
macroeconomic activity and their respective risk premiums are large
and signicant around -6% and +6%, respectively.20 Throughout the
DY risk premium is positive, but insignicant, which is consistent with
how DY predicts macroeconomic activity. On one hand, DY predicts
long-term future activity with a positive sign in multiple regressions.
On the other hand, this relation is poorly estimated and not robust
across specications and sample periods. In fact, when I split the
sample in two, the average DY risk premium equals -1.79% pre-1990
and 4.24% post-1990. This increase is consistent with the nding that
DY predicts negative changes in macroeconomic activity in multiple
regressions pre-1990, but positive changes over the full sample.
These rm-level risk premium estimates compare to previous portfolio-
level estimates as follows. First, the DS risk premium is also negative
among portfolios, but insignicant, which suggests this risk premium
is indeed estimated more e¢ ciently using individual stocks. Second,
20The Internet Appendix demonstrates that the alternative measure of default risk in Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek (2012) is priced similar to DS with a quarterly risk premium of -5.89% relative to
-5.83% for DS over the period 1978.Q2 to 2010.Q3, which is dicated by data availability. Moreover,
the correlation over time between the two risk premiums is 0.75. This nding suggests that DS
contains a large chunk of the information relevant for pricing in the alternative measure.
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the estimated DY risk premium is typically negative and insignicant
among portfolios. As Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) note, the sign of
the portfolio-level estimate is inconsistent with the ICAPM of Mer-
ton (1973), because both DS and DY predict positive stock market
returns. Third, Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) nd that the sign of the
TS risk premium is sensitive to the choice of portfolios. A positive TS
risk premium is consistent with both versions of the ICAPM, however,
as TS predicts both positive stock market returns and macroeconomic
activity.
C Alternative ICAPM-motivated state variables
Having established that the time-series is consistent with the cross-
section in case of DY, DS and TS, this subsection asks whether this
consistency is general to a broader set of ICAPM-motivated state
variables. For this exercise, I focus on four alternative models in-
spired by Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) as described in Section B.
First, I analyze a three-factor model that replaces TS with RF, the
3 month t-bill rate. Second, I include RF next to DY, DS and TS.
Here, I rst orthogonalize RF from TS (denoted RFjTS), to allevi-
ate multicollinearity concerns due to a high correlation between the
levels of these variables: -0.62, but even more so their (full sample)
V AR(1)-innovations: -0.82. Third, I consider the model of Campbell
and Vuolteenaho (2004), which includes TS, the price-earnings ratio
(PE) and the value spread (VS). Finally, I analyze the model of Koijen
et al. (2013), which includes the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) bond
market factor (CP) and a term structure level factor (LVL).
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Time-series Table III presents the time-series regressions of IP and
CF on the alternative state variables, similar to Table I. For this ex-
ercise, I focus solely on the quarterly frequency, because results at
the monthly frequency are largely similar.21 Moreover, I focus solely
on the coe¢ cients for the new state variables, because the evidence
for DY, DS and TS is largely unchanged from Table I. In this table,
***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, re-
spectively, using the more conservative Hansen and Hodrick (1980)
asymptotic standard errors with S lags. To conserve space, I report
results only for multiple regressions and three horizons S = 1; 4; 8.
In Model (1), RF predicts four and eight quarter ahead IP and CF
with a signicant negative coe¢ cient. In unreported results, I nd
that this predictability is signicant from S = 3 to S = 24, and peaks
at S = 8. This pattern is similar to TS and consistent with evidence
in Chen (1991) and Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), among others.
These authors argue that higher real rates today imply low current
investment opportunities and lower output in the future. Thus, I
predict a negative risk premium for exposure to RF, because high RF
exposure stocks are attractive as a hedge.
Also, consistent with Chen (1991) and Estrella and Hardouvelis
(1991), RF does not contain much independent information about
future macroeconomic activity relative to TS. In Model (2), the mag-
nitude of the negative coe¢ cient for RFjTS is about half what it is
in Model (1) for S = 4 and 8. In case of CF, these coe¢ cients are
practically zero. Thus, I conclude that the risk premium for RFjTS
21These results are presented in the Internet Appendix.
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should be zero.
In Model (3), VS predicts next-quarter IP with a negative co-
e¢ cient that is signicant at the 5%-level. VS is more important
in predicting CF, with a negative coe¢ cient that is signicant at
the 1%-level for S = 1 and 4. In fact, in unreported results I nd
that VS predicts future CF with a negative and signicant coe¢ cient
up to S = 7. This predictability is consistent with Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004), who nd that shocks to VS are an important
component of market cash ow news, with a negative correlation be-
tween the two. Indeed, if a positive shock to VS predicts lower macro-
economic activity, one would expect market cash ows (dividends) to
fall. In contrast, PE only predicts one quarter ahead IP with a mar-
ginally positive coe¢ cient, whereas this variable is insignicant at all
three horizons in case of CF. In single regressions, PE is also largely
insignicant, whereas VS remains an important negative predictor of
CF, in particular. Consequently, the risk premium for exposure to VS
should be negative, whereas exposure to PE risk should not be priced.
In Model (4), CP predicts predicts eight quarter ahead macroeco-
nomic activity with a positive coe¢ cient that is signicant at the 1%-
level, consistent with Koijen et al. (2013). For both IP and CF, this
predictability is (marginally) signicant from about one to ve years
into the future, with a peak around three years. The coe¢ cient for
the LVL factor is negative at all three horizons and for both IP and
CF, which is consistent with RF. However, there is likely not enough
information for an investor to use this variable to hedge against time-
varying investment opportunities, because it is only marginally signif-
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icant at S = 8 in case of IP. Consequently, I predict a positive risk
premium for CP, whereas exposure to LVL risk should not be priced.
Cross-section Table IV presents rm-level Fama and MacBeth (1973)
cross-sectional regressions for the alternative sets of state variables
(with conditional betas estimated as in Equations (6) and (7)). The
structure is similar Table II and I present unconditional average an-
nualized risk premiums, the corresponding Fama and MacBeth (1973)
t-statistics (in parentheses), and the average cross-sectional R2.
In Model (1), the risk premium for RF is negative, as predicted, at a
marginally signicant -3.64% (t =  1:77). The inclusion of RF instead
of TS has little e¤ect on the risk premiums for DY and DS. A negative
RF risk premium is consistent in sign with previous portfolio-level
evidence with one caveat: RF has little to add to a model that already
includes TS. Indeed, in Model (2), RFjTS is insignicant at 1.43%,
consistent with the fact that RFjTS does not predict macroeconomic
activity in the presence of TS.22
In Model (3), the risk premium for exposure to innovations in
PE is insignicant at 1.67%, as hypothesized. In contrast, expo-
sure to VS is priced at an economically large and signicant -5.23
(t =  2:56). These ndings are consistent with evidence in Campbell
and Vuolteenaho (2004) in that shocks to VS (PE) are an impor-
tant negative component of market cash ow news (market discount
rate news), whereas the risk premium for exposure to market cash
ow news is large relative to the risk premium for exposure to mar-
22The reverse is not true: TSjRF remains signicant in the cross-sectional regression when RF
is included already. The same result obtains for 25 Size and Book-to-Market portfolios. These
results are available upon request.
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ket discount rate news. In model (4), exposure to CP is priced at
4.21% (t = 2:23), which is consistent with the nding that CP pre-
dicts macroeconomic activity with a positive sign as in Koijen et al.
(2013). In contrast to these authors, but consistent with the lack of
a robust relation between LVL and future macroeconomic activity, I
nd that LVL is insignicant at 2.35%.23
These results are robust to restricting the intercept to zero. In this
case, the MKT risk premium is again forced up to about 7%, whereas
the risk premiums for RF, VS and CP are slightly larger in absolute
value. Moreover, the results are largely similar at the monthly fre-
quency. The main di¤erence is that the risk premiums for VS and CP
increase considerably to -8.63% (t =  3:44) and 5.85% (t = 2:64),
respectively. Also, the Internet Appendix presents similar pricing ev-
idence when exposure is measured with respect to rst-di¤erences or
V AR(2)-innovations in the alternative state variables.
To sum up, I nd that the risk premiums for innovations in the
set of alternative state variables RF, PE, VS, CP and LVL are also
consistent with whether or not their level is a robust predictor of
macroeconomic activity in the time-series and, when it is, with the sign
of the predictive relation. This result compares to Maio and Santa-
Clara (2012) as follows. In case of RF, VS and CP the estimated
risk premium has the same sign among portfolios, but is insignicant,
which again suggests that using individual stocks is more e¢ cient. In
case of VS and CP, the sign is consistent with how each variables
23Because LVL and RF are highly correlated, I add LVL to DY and DS in a robustness check.
In this setup, the LVL risk premium turns negative, but remains small and insignicant. These
results are available upon request.
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predicts stock market returns and therefore the ICAPM of Merton
(1973). In contrast, the risk premium for RF is negative, whereas this
variable predict positive market returns. Finally, the risk premiums
for PE and LVL are similarly insignicant among portfolios, and as
argued in Maio and Santa-Clara (2012), this nding is inconsistent
with the fact that these variables do predict stock market returns.
D Individual stock-based state variable mimicking portfo-
lios
This subsection presents the portfolios implicit in the cross-sectional
regression procedure in more detail. As a benchmark, I present re-
sults for market value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios split at
the quintiles of ranked values. First, I test whether each portfolio is
exposed to the risk factor it is supposed to mimick ex post, which
is a prerequisite for the portfolios to capture a risk premium and as-
certains that the state variables are not useless factors in the sense
of Kan and Zhang (1999). Next, I analyze whether the portfolios (i)
load on stocks with certain characteristics and (ii) are costly to trade.
Throughout, I focus on the quarterly frequency, because these portfo-
lios mimick better, whereas quarterly rebalancing reduces transaction
costs.24 As before, I focus rst on DY, DS and TS. Subsequently, I
present outtakes of largely consistent results for the alternative state
variables.
24Select results at the monthly frequency are described below. The complete set of results can
be found in the Internet Appendix.
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A Dividend Yield, Default Spread and Term Spread
Panel A of Table V presents post-ranking exposures (m; 
0)0 from the





0 + ut as well
as the weighted cross-sectional average pre-ranking exposure within a
portfolio. The innovations "Full
t
are estimated with a single V AR(1),
where the residuals are orthogonalized from rm;t and scaled to have the
same variance as rm;t. For each state variable k, I present exposures
for three mimicking portfolios: the cross-sectional regression portfolio
(FMB) as well as a market value-weighted and an equal-weighted
spreading portfolio (HLMV and HLEW ).25
In short, all strategies create a mimicking portfolio that is exposed
to the relevant risk factor ex post. The typical mimicking portfolio
is only exposed to the one state variable that it is trying to mimick.
Moreover, we see a roughly monotonic pattern moving from High to
Low among the long-only market-value weighted portfolios. The load-
ings are typically signicant and smallest for HLEW at about 0.10
and largest for FMB at 0.29, 0.32 and 0.17 in case of DY, DS and
TS, respectively. The relative success of FMB in creating an ex post
exposure could be due to the fact that it can exploit cross-sectional
correlation between exposures to the factors that is stable over time.
The di¤erence between ex post exposures and ex ante exposures, which
are about one for all strategies, is due to imperfect prediction of the
betas. This nding is common in out-of-sample exercises with non-
traded factors. Nevertheless, the ex-post exposures are economically
meaningful, translating to incremental quarterly returns ranging from
25I do not present results for the cross-sectional regression portfolio where the regression restricts
the intercept to zero, because this portfolio is not zero-investment.
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1.5% to 2.8% in case of FMB for a standard deviation increase in the
risk factors. Thus, I conclude that these state variables are not useless
factors.
The remaining columns of Panel A present annualized uncondi-
tional average return, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio. First, the
average returns forHLMV (DY ) andHLEW (DY ) are similarly small
and insignicant as FMB(DY ), suggesting again that DY risk is not
priced. In contrast, DS risk is rewarded with a consistent negative pre-
mium. In case of HLEW (DS); the risk premium is slightly smaller
than, but similarly signicant as FMB(DS) at -4.59% (t =  2:37)
versus -6.56% (t =  2:75). The absolute Sharpe ratio for these two
strategies is large relative to the aggregate stock market at 0.35 and
0.41 relative to 0.30. The risk premium is insignicant in case of
HLMV (DS), however, which is suggestive of a Size e¤ect. Finally,
TS risk is rewarded with a consistent positive risk premium. The risk
premiums are large and signicant in all weighting schemes at over
4.90% per annum, which translates to Sharpe ratios ranging from 0.34
for HLMV (TS) to 0.54 for HLEW (TS).
At the monthly frequency, these results are largely similar for DY
and TS, in which case the post-ranking exposures are only slightly
smaller. In case of DS, the post-ranking exposures are positive, but
insignicant, however. The presence of a Size e¤ect is even more ev-
ident at this frequency, given large and signicant negative DS risk
premiums for HLEW (DS) and FMB(DS), but an insignicant pos-
itive risk premium for HLMV (DS). This variability is perhaps un-
surprising given that these portfolios are not strongly exposed ex post
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to DS risk in the rst place.
Panel B of Table V describes the DY, DS and TS mimicking portfo-
lios in terms of various characteristics. In each period, Size ($ billion),
Book-to-Market andMomentum are weighted cross-sectional averages,
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. (9)
The numerator sums all absolute changes in the portfolio weights from
the instant before rebalancing to the instant after, where the latter is
scaled to ensure that the long and short position grow equally over
time. The denominator scales by the size of the portfolio. For FMB,
the total long and short position do not equal one dollar and vary over
time. To ensure that trading keeps the pre-ranking beta equal to one,
Turnover is calculated asP
i
jwi;t 1   wi;t 2 (1 + ri;t 1)jP
i
jwi;t 2 (1 + ri;t 1)j
. (10)
To start, note that none of the strategies consistently loads on win-
ners or losers and let us focus on HLEW , because this weighting
scheme presents results that are typical and most comparable to pre-
26Book-to-Market (BM) is calculated in June as the ratio of the most recently available book-
value of equity in Compustat (assumed to be available six months after the scal year-end) di-
vided by Market Capitalization from CRSP (Size) at previous year-end. Momentum is dened as
1Q
j=4
(1 + ri;t j) and
2Q
j=12
(1 + ri;t j) at the quarterly and monthly frequency, respectively.
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vious work.27 First, high DY exposure stocks are smaller and have
marginally higher Book-to-Market ratios. Second, Size and Book-to-
Market are also signicant for DS mimicking portfolios at 0.91$ billion
and -0.36, respectively. This Size e¤ect is consistent with Perez-Quiros
and Timmermann (2000), who argue that small rms are more vulner-
able to variation in credit market conditions over the business cycle,
such that an increasing DS signals higher discount rates for smaller
stocks. Since low DS beta stocks are also volatile, one can consider
them "speculative" in the sense of Baker and Wurgler (2012). Sim-
ilarly, because high Book-to-Market is indicative of relative distress
(Fama and French (1995)), a negative relation with DS risk is natural.
Third, high TS exposure stocks are smaller by 1.29$ billion, whereas
their Book-to-Market ratio is higher by 0.17. Both characteristics are
consistent with Petkova (2006) and Hahn and Lee (2006). A possible
explanation is that small rms are marginal rms and therefore more
sensitive to news about the business cycle (Chan and Chen (1991)).
Further, Cornell (1999), Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) and Da
(2009), among others, argue that value stocks are low duration as-
sets, such that when an increasing TS signals higher discount rates on
long-term assets, value will outperform growth contemporaneously.
In unreported results, I nd that Book-to-Market is monotonically
related to pre-ranking exposures to DY, DS and TS. In contrast, Size
presents an inverted U-shape, because small stocks have more extreme
betas. I conclude that if the characteristics Size and Book-to-Market
explain the cross-section of expected returns completely, one would
27Note, Size is extreme in case of HLMV , because this strategy implicity squares market values.
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expect an unconditional risk premium that is positive for DY and TS,
but negative for DS. In Section E, I test whether these benchmark
characteristics are able to capture the risk premiums for DS and TS
consistent with this hypothesis.
In terms of transaction costs, theHLMV portfolio is likely most at-
tractive. This portfolio invests only in a subset of the available stocks,
whereas larger stocks are more liquid. Also, the Herndahl-index sug-
gests that this portfolio is most concentraded. In terms of concen-
tration, FMB is similar to HLEW , which suggest that the former
is not requiring an investor to take extreme positions. Rather, FMB
requires the investor to take many small positions. Nevertheless, trans-
action costs are unlikely to completely wipe out the average returns
for either of these strategies. In particular, I nd that average annual
Turnover is about 1.6 for all strategies. This gure implies that an in-
vestor who is long and short one dollar and rebalances quarterly, will
trade 3.2 dollars per year.28 Assuming a conservative average quoted
half-spread of 25 basis points, these trades add up to transaction costs
of about 80 basis points (see, e.g., Chordia et al. (2011) and Hender-
shott et al. (2011)). As a benchmark, I calculate the amount of trading
required to construct comparable portfolios for exposures to SMB and
HML as well as for the characteristics Size and Book-to-Market. For
these strategies, transaction costs are lower, but only by about 30%.
On the other hand, for comparable Momentum strategies, the required
amount of trading is larger by over 100%.
28Rebalancing the portfolios monthly increases the amount of trading by about 30%. Rebalancing
the portfolios only at the end of the year rougly halves the amount of trading required and leaves
all other results largely unchanged.
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B Alternative ICAPM-motivated state variables
This subsection compares the unconditional performance of the three
mimicking portfolios (FMB;HLMV and HLEW ) for the alternative
state variables and asks whether these portfolios are exposed ex post.
To conserve space, Table VI presents results only for the quarterly fre-
quency and excludes the second model with DY, DS, TS and RFjTS.29
Moreover, I do not analyze the mimicking portfolios for DY, DS and
TS here, because these results are largely similar to Table V.
First, the risk premiums for RF, VS and CP are consistent in sign
over the three strategies. In case of RF, the three risk premiums
are signicant and range from -6.34% for HLEW (RF ) to -3.64 for
FMB(RF ). In case of VS and CP, there is more variation in absolute
magnitude, which is suggestive of a Size e¤ect that is further explored
in Section E. The risk premiums are insignicant in case of HLMV ,
but signicant otherwise at -3.79% (-5.23%) and 2.98% (4.21%), re-
spectively, in case of HLEW (FMB). Second, average returns are
small and insignicant across the board for mimicking portfolios of
innovations in PE and LVL.
To sum up, I nd that the cross-sectional risk premiums for the
alternative factors are robust in portfolio sorts. In case of RF, VS and
CP, the various strategies typically obtain Sharpe ratios that are in
the same order of magnitude as the aggregate stock market. More-
over, in unreported results, I nd that the required amount of trading
to execute these strategies is similar to DS and TS, such that transac-
tion costs are unlikely to eradicate these average returns completely.
29Results at the monthly frequency can be found in the Internet Appendix.
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These conclusions come with the caveat that the post-ranking expo-
sure of these mimicking portfolios to the relevant factor is not always
signicant at the quarterly frequency. The exposures are consistently
positive, however. Moreover, in the Internet Appendix, I show that
post-ranking exposures are typically larger at the monthly frequency,
whereas the risk premiums are largely similar.30
In unreported results, I nd that these portfolios load distinctively
on the characteristics Size and Book-to-Market, which is similar to DS
and TS. To be precise, RF (VS and CP) portfolios demonstrate a large
cap (small cap) tilt, whereas RF and VS (CP) portfolios demonstrate
a Growth (Value) tilt. To analyze whether the state variables contain
independent information for the cross-section of expected returns, the
next section includes these characteristics (and the factors SMB and
HML derived from them) in cross-sectional regressions.
E Relation to the Fama and French (1993) factors
This section analyzes how the state variable risk premiums relate to
both the Fama and French (1993) factors (SMB and HML) and their
underlying characteristics (Size and Book-to-Market). In this way,
I respond to (i) Fama and French (1993, 1996), who appeal to the
ICAPM for theoretical justication, (ii) Petkova (2006) and Hahn and
Lee (2006), who argue that innovations in similar sets of state variables
may substitute for SMB and HML, and (iii) the risk factor versus
characteristic controversy discussed in Fama and French (1992), Daniel
30Koijen et al. (2013) perform a sort on rolling 60-month covariances with CP innovations in
ve market-value weighted groups. The high minus low return spread is 2.5%, but its t-statistic is
not reported. In the monthly sort reported in the Internet Appendix, I nd a similar risk premium
of 3.08%.
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and Titman (1997) and Chordia et al. (2012), among others.
A Dividend Yield, Default Spread and Term Spread
To start, Panel A of Table VII presents time-series regressions of the
Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression risk premiums
on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF3M) as well as
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (FFCM). Results are similar at
the quarterly and monthly frequency, so let us focus on the former.
First, the portfolios FMB(DY ); FMB(DS) and FMB(TS) are
exposed to SMB and HML in a manner that is largely consistent with
the characteristics of Table V. In case of TS, a large and signicant
loading on HML captures its risk premium only partially, leaving an
economically large and signicant FF3M  of 4.20%, down from 5.79%.
In contrast, a large part of the negative DS risk premium is captured by
negative loadings on SMB, in particular, and HML, leaving an insignif-
icant FF3M  of -2.89%, up from -6.50%. Adding MOM increases the
 slightly for TS, but dramatically for DS, to an economically large,
although insignicant FFCM  of -5.26%. In both the FF3M and
FFCM, the DY risk premium remains small and insignicant.
In all, these time-series regressions suggest that the DS risk pre-
mium is a compensation for exposure to SMB and HML, whereas the
TS risk premium is not. This suggestion does not mean, however,
that exposures to DS and TS do not contain independent information
about average returns in the cross-section. To answer this question,
we must perform high-dimensional portfolio sorts or cross-sectional
regressions. I follow the advice in Cochrane (2011) and run rm-level
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cross-sectional regressions, where the set of independent variables in-
cludes (i) conditional exposures to V AR(1)-innovations in the state
variables DY, DS and TS, (ii) conditional exposures to the bench-
mark factors (MKT, SMB, HML and MOM), and (iii) characteristics
(Size, Book-to-Market and Prior return).31
Using the procedure set out in equations (6) and (7), I start out
regressing returns in each expanding window on an extended factor
model that includes the benchmark factors SMB and HML. Then, in
each period t, I estimate





First, I restrict 0z;t = 
0
c;t = 0 to answer the question whether the
benchmark factors SMB and HML are priced in the cross-section of
individual stocks. Second, I restrict 
0
c;t = 0 to test whether exposures
to DS and TS contain information about average returns that is or-
thogonal from SMB and HML. Third, I restrict s;t = h;t = 0 to test
whether the state variable risk premiums are robust to the inclusion of
characteristics, which is a simple test of model misspecication (Berk
(1995) and Jagannathan and Wang (1998)). Note, however, that this
test is biased in favor of characteristics, because these are measured
without error.32 Fourth, I estimate the full model in Equation (11).
Finally, I estimate an extended model that includes both the momen-
31Following Chordia et al. (2012), Size is the natural logarithm of Market Capitalization and
Book-to-Market (BM) is the natural logarithm of the Book-to-Market ratio winsorized at the 0.5th
fractile. All characteristics are standardized cross-sectionally.
32Indeed, the errors-in-variables bias introduced by using estimated exposures (ci;t) likely causes
these regressions to understate the importance of intertemporal risk.
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tum factor (MOM) and characteristic (Prior return). Throughout, I
also present results for a model that restricts 0;t = 0.
Let us rst consider the quarterly frequency in Panel B. In the
FF3M, the risk premiums for SMB and HML are positive at 1.91%
and 2.63%, respectively. Even though HML is signicant at the 5%-
level, this estimate is small relative to the factors average return of 5%.
The FF3M explains a similar amount of cross-sectional variation as the
ICAPM-model in Table II at an R2 of 4.24%. In fact, adding SMB and
HML to this model has only a minor e¤ect on the risk premiums for
DS and TS, which remain large and signicant at -5.58% (t = 2:52)
and 4.20% (t = 2:61), respectively. Conversely, the risk premiums
for SMB and HML do not change much relative to the FF3M either.
These ndings imply that DS and TS contain orthogonal information
about average returns in the cross-section of individual stocks.
When substituting Size and Book-to-Market for exposures to SMB
and HML, the two characteristics are signicant at the 1%level at
-3.23 and 2.96, respectively. In the presence of these characteristics,
DS exposures are driven out, leaving a small and insignicant DS risk
premium of -1.77% (t =  1:06). In unreported results, I nd that the
same result obtains when including Size alone, which again suggests
the DS risk premium is a Size e¤ect. In contrast, TS survives and
its risk premium remains large and signicant at 4.28% (t = 2:79).
In the full model, that includes both the benchmark factors and their
underlying characteristics, the conclusions for DS and TS are largely
similar. Moreover, exposures to SMB and HML are driven out, as
expected.
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These conclusions are robust when we restrict the intercept to zero.
In this case, the risk premiums for the factors DS, TS, SMB and HML
are slightly larger in absolute value, whereas the MKT risk premium
is large and signicant, as before. These conclusions are also robust at
the monthly frequency in Panel C. The main di¤erence is that the risk
premiums for both DS and TS are slightly smaller in absolute value. In
case of TS, the di¤erence is small when restricting the intercept to zero.
Without this restriction, the TS risk premium remains economically
large, but is not always signicant. Finally, these conclusions are
largely unaltered in the model that also controls for exposures to MOM
and PRET. The MOM risk premium is negative, however, which is
consistent with the idea that this factor is not a compensation for
risk.
To conclude, these cross-sectional regressions suggest DS is largely
a Size e¤ect in an ex ante sense. DS mimicking portfolios are long
big stocks and short small stocks. As a result, the factor SMB, which
loads on Size in the opposite manner, captures a large chunk of the DS
risk premium in time-series regressions. Moreover, DS is driven out by
the characteristic Size in cross-sectional regressions. In contrast, DS is
not driven out by the inclusion of exposures to SMB.
Although, TS and HML are correlated risk factors, for instance,
because TS mimicking portfolios load on Value stocks, the positive
TS risk premium survives in both time-series and cross-sectional re-
gressions.33 Similar to SMB, HML is eradicated by its underlying
33Another indication that the TS risk premium is robust comes from running cross-sectional
regressions within three Size, Book-to-Market or momentum groups, as in Fama and French (2008).
I nd that the TS risk premium is positive in all nine control groups at over 2.3% and signicant at
over 5% in seven (except among Big and low Book-to-Market stocks). These results are available
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characteristic in cross-sectional regressions, however. These ndings
extend Petkova (2006) and Hahn and Lee (2006), who nd that TS
exposures contain orthogonal information (relative to HML and Book-
to-market) in pricing a set of 25 Size and Book-to-Market portfolios,
whereas DS exposures do not.
B Alternative ICAPM-motivated state variables
Table VIII is similar to Table VII, but focuses on cross-sectional re-
gressions that ask whether the risk premiums for the alternative state
variables are robust to the inclusion of SMB and HML (Model (I)) and,
in addition, Size and Book-to-Market (Model (II)). I do not present
time-series regressions to conserve space. In sum, these time-series re-
gressions suggest that the risk premiums for RF and CP are captured
largely by SMB and HML, similar to DS, whereas the risk premium
for VS is not, similar TS.
First, exposures to SMB and HML do not fully drive out exposures
to RF, VS and CP in cross-sectional regressions, which is similar to
the case of DS and TS. In the quarterly regressions that include an
intercept, the risk premiums for RF, VS and CP are economically large
at about 3% in absolute value, although the estimate is only signicant
for VS. At the monthly frequency, the risk premiums for VS and CP
strenghten and are signicant at -7.06% and 3.43%, respectively.
Second, adding characteristics does not fully drive out RF expo-
sures either. The RF risk premium is insignicant, though econom-
ically meaningful when including an intercept at -2.50% at both fre-
upon request.
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quencies. Moreover, the monthly RF risk premium is signicant in the
specication that restricts the intercept to zero at -3.43% (t =  2:00).
Although weaker, this pattern is similar to TS, which is perhaps un-
surprising, because the two factors are correlated. Indeed, we nd
that TSjRF has little to add to a specication that already includes
TS, even when including the benchmark factors and characteristics.
Although VS is driven out by characteristics at the quarterly fre-
quency, it is not at the monthly frequency with a large and signicant
VS risk premium of -4.97% (t =  2:24) in the full model. Note, the
monthly frequency is more relevant for this factor, because the ex post
exposure to VS innovations is much larger at this frequency (see Table
VI). In contrast, the risk premium for CP is small and insignicant
when including characteristics at both frequencies. In unreported re-
sults, I nd that the eradication of CP is driven quite equally by Size
and Book-to-Market. Similarly, Koijen et al. (2013) nd that covari-
ances with CP innovations are correlated to Book-to-Market in the
cross-section. Finally, for PE and LVL, the risk premiums remain
small and insignicant in the presence of the benchmark factors and
characteristics, which is similar to DY.
Thus, exposures to DS and CP are driven out unequivocally by
characteristics, which suggests these state variables are not separate
in an ex ante sense. In contrast, exposures to TS, RF and VS contain
orthogonal information about the cross-section of expected returns.
This result represents a success for the state variables, in particular,
because these exposures are measured with error, whereas the charac-
teristics are measured without error. Following this line of reasoning,
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a possible explanation for why DS and CP are not driven out by expo-
sures to SMB and HML is that these benchmark exposures also su¤er
from measurement error.
F Conclusion
This paper follows a long tradition of papers at the intersection of
macroeconomics and asset pricing. I nd that the risk premiums for
exposure to ICAPM-motivated state variables in the cross-section are
consistent with how these variables forecast macroeconomic activity
in the time-series. Following recent advice in the literature, I estimate
the risk premiums using rm-level cross-sectional regressions and my
evidence suggests this practice is indeed more e¢ cient than using port-
folios. This time-series and cross-sectional consistency is an important
guard against factor shing and is consistent with the idea that in-
vestors desire to hedge against adverse macroeconomic shocks. Thus,
following advice in Cochrane (2005, Ch. 9), I identify "recession state
variables".
My method consists of two elements. First, long-horizons regres-
sions establish whether and how a candidate state variable predicts
macroeconomic activity. Second, rm-level cross-sectional regressions
establish whether a state variables is priced in a consistent manner. I
consider four models with di¤erent state variables. First and foremost,
I focus on a model with the Dividend Yield (DY), Default Spread (DS)
and Term Spread (TS). Next, I analyze whether and how the risk-free
rate (RF) adds to this model. Third, I consider the model of Camp-
bell and Vuolteenaho (2004), which includes TS, the price-earnings
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ratio (PE) and the value spread (VS). Finally, I consider the model of
Koijen et al. (2013), which includes the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)
bond market factor (CP) and a factor that measures the level of the
term-structure (LVL).
I nd that DS, RF and VS forecast negative changes in macroeco-
nomic activity, TS and CP forecast positive changes, whereas DY, PE
and LVL are not robust predictors. Consistent with this evidence, I
estimate rm-level risk premiums that range from -6% to -3% for ex-
posure to DS, RF and VS; that range from 4% to 6% for exposure to
TS and CP; and, that are essentially zero for the remaining factors.
The risk premiums for the priced state variables translate to Sharpe
ratios in the same order of magnitude as the market portfolio: 0.30. I
nd similar pricing evidence among portfolio sorts, which suggests the
state variable risk premiums are investible. Finally, I add to the de-
bate on whether risk exposures or characteristics determine expected
returns. I nd that the benchmark factors SMB and HML do not
eradicate the state variable risk premiums in cross-sectional regres-
sions. Their underlying characteristics Size and Book-to-Market drive
out DS, which is largely a Size e¤ect, and CP, however. In contrast,
RF, VS and especially TS do contain orthogonal information about
the cross-section of expected returns.
A number of extensions come to mind. First, I have largely ignored
how exactly the pre- and post-ranking betas vary cross-sectionally and
over time, which is relevant for more advanced hedging strategies and
portfolio optimization. Second, I leave open the question of how to
determine the optimal out-of-sample hedge portfolio, which for most of
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the state variables in this paper likely loads on bonds. Relatedly, I have
not analyzed whether the various ICAPM-models are able to price the
cross-section of stocks and (government) bonds simultaneously, as in
Koijen et al. (2013).
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Table I: Do DY, DS and TS predict macroeconomic activity?
This table reports the results for single and multiple regressions of current and future
industrial production growth (IP) and the Chicago Fed National Activity index (CF)
on the Dividend Yield (DY), Default Spread (DS) and Term Spread (TS). Panel A
uses quarterly data and considers horizons S = 0; 1; 2; 4; 8; 20; Panel B uses monthly
data and considers horizons S = 0; 1; 6; 12; 24; 60: The original sample is 1962.Q1 to
2011.Q4, and S-1 observations are lost in each of the respective S-horizon regressions.
All variables are standardized. The rst block of results in each panel presents
the single regressions, where I report the slope estimates bS (which squares equal
the regression R2) and t-ratios using asymptotic Newey-West (in parentheses) and
Hansen-Hodrick (in brackets) standard errors computed with S lags. The second
block of results in each panel presents the multiple regressions, where I report slope
estimates, t-ratios and R2s.
yt;t+S = b
0












Panel A: Quarterly data
Dividend Yield Default Spread Term Spread
S bS tS;NW tS;HH bS tS;NW tS;HH bS tS;NW tS;HH R
2
Single predictive regressions
IP 0 -0.17 (-2.04) [-2.05] -0.45 (-5.70) [-5.71] -0.05 (-0.79) [-0.79]
1 -0.19 (-1.73) [-1.53] -0.30 (-3.31) [-2.97] 0.18 (2.04) [1.89]
2 -0.16 (-1.34) [-1.17] -0.24 (-2.35) [-2.09] 0.23 (2.37) [2.03]
4 -0.06 (-0.48) [-0.42] -0.13 (-1.07) [-0.98] 0.28 (2.67) [2.34]
8 0.07 (0.46) [0.40] -0.04 (-0.31) [-0.29] 0.36 (3.43) [3.02]
20 0.15 (0.67) [0.60] -0.06 (-0.34) [-0.31] 0.19 (1.21) [1.30]
CF 0 -0.11 (-1.31) [-1.32] -0.52 (-6.18) [-6.20] -0.11 (-1.81) [-1.81]
1 -0.13 (-1.11) [-0.95] -0.35 (-3.12) [-2.70] 0.12 (1.29) [1.14]
2 -0.09 (-0.74) [-0.62] -0.28 (-2.22) [-1.90] 0.17 (1.70) [1.43]
4 0.00 (-0.02) [-0.02] -0.15 (-1.07) [-0.95] 0.26 (2.44) [2.12]
8 0.13 (0.78) [0.68] 0.01 (0.10) [0.10] 0.39 (4.14) [4.23]
20 0.31 (1.49) [1.75] 0.27 (1.78) [1.81] 0.18 (1.39) [1.62]
Multiple predictive regressions
IP 0 0.06 (0.85) [0.86] -0.49 (-5.88) [-5.92] 0.06 (0.94) [0.95] 0.20
1 0.04 (0.35) [0.31] -0.36 (-3.24) [-2.93] 0.26 (3.34) [3.17] 0.14
2 0.07 (0.53) [0.47] -0.33 (-2.58) [-2.24] 0.31 (4.03) [3.55] 0.13
4 0.16 (1.17) [1.02] -0.27 (-2.00) [-1.79] 0.38 (3.98) [3.56] 0.12
8 0.32 (1.95) [1.78] -0.28 (-1.82) [-1.67] 0.49 (4.42) [4.16] 0.20
20 0.39 (1.29) [1.17] -0.30 (-1.08) [-0.88] 0.32 (2.59) [2.99] 0.13
CF 0 0.20 (2.56) [2.58] -0.62 (-7.17) [-7.23] 0.02 (0.30) [0.30] 0.29
1 0.16 (1.16) [1.01] -0.46 (-3.34) [-2.92] 0.22 (2.81) [2.56] 0.16
2 0.18 (1.16) [0.99] -0.40 (-2.57) [-2.18] 0.27 (3.46) [3.00] 0.13
4 0.26 (1.63) [1.36] -0.33 (-2.03) [-1.74] 0.37 (4.13) [3.68] 0.14
8 0.38 (2.17) [1.88] -0.25 (-1.56) [-1.45] 0.52 (5.16) [4.91] 0.24

















Panel B: Monthly data
Dividend Yield Default Spread Term Spread
S bS tS;NW tS;HH bS tS;NW tS;HH bS tS;NW tS;HH R
2
Single predictive regressions
IP 0 -0.12 (-2.66) [-2.66] -0.34 (-6.50) [-6.51] 0.01 (0.16) [0.16]
1 -0.13 (-2.30) [-2.02] -0.31 (-5.35) [-4.80] 0.06 (1.41) [1.28]
6 -0.14 (-1.35) [-1.11] -0.25 (-2.52) [-2.15] 0.22 (2.46) [2.01]
12 -0.06 (-0.49) [-0.41] -0.13 (-1.13) [-1.00] 0.29 (2.81) [2.37]
24 0.07 (0.47) [0.40] -0.04 (-0.30) [-0.27] 0.37 (3.56) [3.09]
60 0.14 (0.63) [0.56] -0.05 (-0.30) [-0.28] 0.19 (1.23) [1.29]
CF 0 -0.10 (-1.96) [-1.97] -0.45 (-8.52) [-8.53] -0.05 (-1.31) [-1.31]
1 -0.10 (-1.54) [-1.30] -0.41 (-5.87) [-4.98] 0.02 (0.47) [0.41]
6 -0.08 (-0.67) [-0.53] -0.29 (-2.48) [-2.02] 0.17 (1.76) [1.41]
12 0.00 (0.03) [0.02] -0.16 (-1.13) [-0.98] 0.27 (2.54) [2.13]
24 0.14 (0.82) [0.70] 0.02 (0.10) [0.11] 0.41 (4.21) [4.23]
60 0.30 (1.43) [1.68] 0.27 (1.80) [1.83] 0.19 (1.47) [1.74]
Multiple predictive regressions
IP 0 0.08 (1.66) [1.67] -0.39 (-6.71) [-6.73] 0.11 (2.65) [2.66] 0.12
1 0.08 (1.51) [1.37] -0.38 (-5.68) [-5.12] 0.16 (3.50) [3.19] 0.11
6 0.11 (0.95) [0.78] -0.37 (-3.01) [-2.53] 0.33 (4.30) [3.57] 0.15
12 0.17 (1.33) [1.11] -0.30 (-2.22) [-1.95] 0.40 (4.43) [3.78] 0.14
24 0.33 (2.02) [1.78] -0.30 (-2.01) [-1.76] 0.51 (4.76) [4.32] 0.22
60 0.38 (1.25) [1.12] -0.30 (-1.06) [-0.86] 0.33 (2.57) [2.85] 0.13
CF 0 0.20 (4.18) [4.19] -0.56 (-9.84) [-9.86] 0.09 (2.42) [2.42] 0.22
1 0.20 (3.23) [2.79] -0.53 (-6.94) [-5.95] 0.16 (3.26) [2.82] 0.19
6 0.22 (1.74) [1.39] -0.45 (-3.16) [-2.56] 0.29 (3.82) [3.13] 0.16
12 0.28 (1.89) [1.52] -0.36 (-2.27) [-1.91] 0.40 (4.54) [3.89] 0.16
24 0.40 (2.29) [1.93] -0.27 (-1.72) [-1.53] 0.55 (5.57) [5.08] 0.27
60 0.34 (1.23) [1.23] 0.05 (0.23) [0.21] 0.27 (1.98) [1.91] 0.17
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Table II: Is exposure to DY, DS and TS priced among individual stocks?
This table presents annualized average risk premiums from rm-level cross-sectional
regressions for the asset-pricing model with DY, DS and TS as state variables over
the period 1967.Q2 to 2011.Q4 (i.e., 179 quarterly and 537 monthly return observa-
tions). Row-wise I consider two-factor models that include each state variable next
to the CRSP VW market portfolio as well as a joint four-factor model. Regressions
of Type (A) include an intercept, whereas Type (B) does not. Panel A uses quar-
terly data, Panel B uses monthly data and Panel C replaces the V AR(1)-innovations
in the state variables with their rst-di¤erences when estimating the rst-stage be-
tas. *, ** and *** indicate signicance at the 10, 5 and 1%- level, respectively,
using Fama and MacBeth (1973) standard errors. For the four-factor models, the
t-statistics are also reported in parentheses. R2 is the time-series average of the
cross-sectional R2ts.
Model (A): ri;t+1 = 0;t + m;t\i;m;t + 
0
z;t
ci;t + i;t; Model (B): ri;t+1 = m;t\i;m;t + 0z;tci;t + i;t
0 m DY DS TS R
2
Panel A: Quarterly data
(A) MKT+DY 8.38*** 2.09 0.69 0.028
(A) MKT+DS 8.27*** 1.33 -8.15*** 0.030
(A) MKT+TS 7.97*** 2.33 2.85 0.029
(A) MKT+DY+DS+TS 7.39*** 1.49 0.37 -6.56*** 5.79*** 0.037
(3.80) (0.63) (0.17) (-2.75) (3.20)
(B) MKT+DY 7.99*** 1.41 0.016
(B) MKT+DS 7.04** -8.31*** 0.018
(B) MKT+TS 7.74*** 3.74* 0.019
(B) MKT+DY+DS+TS 6.61** 1.17 -6.35*** 6.93*** 0.026
(2.43) (0.47) (-2.60) (3.75)
Panel B: Monthly data
(A) MKT+DY 9.58*** 0.30 3.45 0.021
(A) MKT+DS 9.27*** 0.72 -6.18** 0.022
(A) MKT+TS 9.19*** 0.81 3.48 0.022
(A) MKT+DY+DS+TS 8.23*** 0.78 1.54 -5.28*** 5.49*** 0.027
(5.13) (0.32) (0.54) (-2.21) (2.69)
(B) MKT+DY 7.98*** 4.55 0.015
(B) MKT+DS 7.97*** -5.44** 0.016
(B) MKT+TS 7.82*** 6.06*** 0.015
(B) MKT+DY+DS+TS 7.18*** 3.43 -4.61* 7.62*** 0.021
(2.78) (1.18) (-1.92) (3.77)
Panel C: First-di¤erences in state variables
Quarterly data
(A) MKT+DY+DS+TS 7.76*** 1.09 -0.18 -5.47*** 2.34 0.037
(3.98) (0.43) (-0.07) (-2.86) (1.43)
(B) MKT+DY+DS+TS 6.63** -5.99** -5.15*** 4.16** 0.027
(2.38) (-2.24) (-2.64) (2.45)
Monthly data
(A) MKT+DY+DS+TS 8.34*** 0.83 0.29 -4.93** 4.15** 0.026
(5.08) (0.30) (0.11) (-2.40) (2.01)
(B) MKT+DY+DS+TS 7.52*** -7.20*** -4.28** 7.07*** 0.022
(2.87) (-2.80) (-2.06) (3.34)
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Table III: Predicting macroeconomic activity with alternative state vari-
ables
This table presents multiple regressions of macroeconomic activity (measured either
with Industrial Production growth (IP) or the Chicago Fed National Activity Index
(CF)) on alternative sets of ICAPM-motivated state variables. Model (1) replaces
TS with RF. Model (2) includes RF (orthogonalized from TS) next to DY, DS and
TS. Model (3) uses the state variables of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004): TS,
PE and VS. Model (4) uses the state variables of Koijen et al. (2013): CP and LVL.
(See Section B for a description of the variables.) The regressions use quarterly
data and consider three horizons S = 1; 4; 8. *, ** and *** indicate signicance at
the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respectively, using the more conservative Hansen and
Hodrick (1980) asymptotic standard errors with S lags.
yt;t+S = b
0












S bDY;S bDS;S bTS;S bRF;S / bRF jTS;S bPE;S bV S;S bCP;S bLV L;S R2
(1) zt = (DYt; DSt; RFt)0
IP 1 -0.02 -0.27** -0.07 0.09
4 0.27 -0.14 -0.41*** 0.10
8 0.52** -0.09 -0.61*** 0.21
CF 1 0.04 -0.38** 0.01 0.12
4 0.31 -0.24 -0.29 0.06
8 0.52*** -0.13 -0.47** 0.12
(2) zt = (DYt; DSt; TSt; RFtjTSt)0
IP 1 -0.05 -0.40*** 0.24*** 0.16 0.15
4 0.25 -0.24 0.40*** -0.16 0.13
8 0.49** -0.20 0.54*** -0.32* 0.25
CF 1 -0.05 -0.47*** 0.19** 0.29 0.20
4 0.22 -0.33* 0.37*** 0.05 0.13
8 0.41** -0.24 0.53*** -0.03 0.24
(3) Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004): zt = (TSt; PEt; V St)0
IP 1 0.20** 0.20* -0.16** 0.06
4 0.30** 0.09 -0.12 0.08
8 0.36*** -0.08 0.02 0.12
CF 1 0.19* 0.20 -0.34*** 0.09
4 0.34*** 0.06 -0.31*** 0.14
8 0.45*** -0.16 -0.16 0.21
(4) Koijen et al. (2013): zt = (CPt; LV Lt)0
IP 1 0.14 -0.15 0.03
4 0.14 -0.22 0.05
8 0.33*** -0.24* 0.14
CF 1 0.11 -0.01 0.01
4 0.17* -0.05 0.02
8 0.40*** -0.04 0.15
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Table IV: Firm-level risk premiums for alternative state variables
Row-wise this table presents annualized average risk premiums among individual
stocks. Each quarter (Panel A) or month (Panel B) risk premiums are estimated
with the two-stage cross-sectional regression method of Fama and MacBeth (1973).
I consider multi-factor asset-pricing models that include the CRSP VW market
portfolio and one of four di¤erent sets of ICAPM-motivated state variables zt. In
Model (1), I substitute RF for TS, such that zt = (DYt; DSt; RFt)0. In Model
(2), I include both TS and RF, but orthogonalize RF from TS rst, such that
zt = (DYt; DSt; TSt; RFtjTSt)0. Model (3) follows Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004)
and denes zt = (TSt; PEt; V St)0. Model (4) follows Koijen et al. (2013) and denes
zt = (CPt; LV Lt)
0. For each model, I present cross-sectional regressions with and
without an intercept (Type (A) and (B), respectively). For each cross-sectional
risk premium estimate, corresponding Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistics are
presented underneath each estimate in parentheses. R2 is the time-series average of
the cross-sectional R2t .
Model (A): ri;t+1 = 0;t + m;t\i;m;t + 
0
z;t
ci;t + i;t; Model (B): ri;t+1 = m;t\i;m;t + 0z;tci;t + i;t
0 m DY DS TS RF / RF jTS PE V S CP LV L R2
Panel A: Quarterly data
(1.A) 7.87 1.34 -0.78 -7.70 -3.64 0.037
(4.05) (0.58) (-0.37) (-3.16) (-1.77)
(1.B) 6.90 -0.01 -7.70 -3.86 0.026
(2.53) (0.00) (-3.04) (-1.84)
(2.A) 7.33 1.89 -1.13 -7.33 5.50 1.43 0.040
(3.87) (0.83) (-0.58) (-3.11) (3.26) (0.61)
(2.B) 6.92 -0.50 -7.21 6.73 2.65 0.029
(2.61) (-0.23) (-3.00) (3.85) (1.05)
(3.A) 7.21 2.92 3.02 1.67 -5.23 0.036
(3.77) (1.19) (1.59) (0.82) (-2.56)
(3.B) 7.98 4.07 1.33 -5.50 0.026
(2.80) (2.10) (0.63) (-2.74)
(4.A) 8.37 1.77 4.21 2.35 0.032
(4.48) (0.75) (2.23) (0.93)
(4.B) 7.56 4.84 2.08 0.022
(2.71) (2.54) (0.78)
Panel B: Monthly data
(1.A) 8.38 0.89 -0.02 -6.00 -3.28 0.027
(5.20) (0.35) (-0.01) (-2.51) (-1.45)
(1.B) 7.47 1.69 -5.26 -4.94 0.022
(2.85) (0.57) (-2.18) (-2.20)
(2.A) 8.27 0.66 -0.03 -5.65 5.09 1.64 0.029
(5.17) (0.27) (-0.01) (-2.45) (2.61) (0.77)
(2.B) 6.99 1.59 -4.82 7.43 2.18 0.024
(2.75) (0.55) (-2.08) (3.79) (1.01)
(3.A) 8.40 1.33 3.85 2.99 -8.63 0.027
(5.25) (0.55) (1.92) (1.51) (-3.44)
(3.B) 7.89 5.95 3.80 -10.07 0.022
(3.08) (2.98) (1.86) (-3.91)
(4.A) 9.25 0.57 5.85 1.07 0.025
(5.68) (0.23) (2.64) (0.43)
(4.B) 7.79 7.03 -1.10 0.019
(3.03) (3.10) (-0.44)
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Table V: Pre- and post-ranking analysis of DY, DS and TS mimicking
portfolios
This table presents the portfolios that are implicit in the cross-sectional regres-
sion procedure, denoted FMB, in more detail. As a benchmark, the table also
presents results for market value-weighted portfolios, that is, a one-dimensional
sort in ve quintiles (MV;H to MV;L) as well as the resulting spreading port-
folio (HLMV ), and an equal-weighted spreading portfolio (HLEW ). Panel A
presents (i) post-ranking exposures (m; 






0+ ut, (where standard errors are Newey-West with
lag length one), (ii) average pre-ranking exposure within the portfolio, and (iii) an-
nualized performance (average return, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio). Panel
B focuses solely on the three mimicking strategies and presents pre-ranking char-
acteristics: Size ($ billion), Book-to-Market and Momentum, which are weighted
cross-sectional averages (and where standard errors are Newey-West with lag length
ten), as well as HH, which is a cross-sectional Herndahl-index, and annualized
Turnover. Wherever necessary *, ** and *** indicate signicance at the 10, 5 and
1% -level, respectively.
Panel A: Exposures and unconditional performance
Post-ranking exposures Pre-rank. Avg. St. Sharpe
 m DY DS TS R
2 exposure ret. dev. ratio
Dividend Yield mimicking portfolios
MV;H 0.00 1.31*** 0.22*** 0.03 -0.12*** 0.87 0.52 6.55* 25.76 0.25
MV; 2 0.00 1.07*** 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.90 0.21 7.14** 20.26 0.35
MV; 3 0.00 0.93*** 0.01 0.04** 0.02* 0.94 0.05 5.89** 17.30 0.34
MV; 4 0.00** 0.85*** -0.04** -0.02 0.00 0.93 -0.10 5.89** 15.90 0.37
MV;L 0.00 1.01*** -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.88 -0.36 6.70** 19.32 0.35
HLMV 0.00 0.30*** 0.22*** 0.05 -0.14*** 0.23 0.88 -0.15 14.96 -0.01
HLEW 0.00 0.09* 0.11* 0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.99 0.65 10.85 0.06
FMB 0.00 0.16** 0.29*** -0.04 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.37 14.43 0.03
Default Spread mimicking portfolios
MV;H 0.00 1.03*** 0.10** 0.06** -0.06* 0.88 0.32 5.77* 19.87 0.29
MV; 2 0.00 0.89*** 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.94 0.05 5.08** 16.53 0.31
MV; 3 0.00** 0.94*** -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.89 -0.12 6.95*** 17.94 0.39
MV; 4 0.01** 1.11*** 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.87 -0.29 8.25*** 21.41 0.39
MV;L 0.00 1.31*** 0.10* -0.05 0.06 0.82 -0.62 7.61* 26.05 0.29
HLMV 0.00 -0.28*** 0.01 0.11** -0.12* 0.12 0.94 -1.84 15.20 -0.12
HLEW -0.01** -0.17** 0.03 0.08** -0.03 0.05 1.02 -4.59** 12.97 -0.35
FMB -0.01*** -0.21** -0.02 0.32** -0.04 0.17 1.00 -6.56*** 15.93 -0.41
Term Spread mimicking portfolios
MV;H 0.01 1.13*** 0.10* -0.09** 0.11*** 0.80 0.60 8.02** 22.95 0.35
MV; 2 0.01* 1.01*** 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.88 0.29 7.55*** 19.40 0.39
MV; 3 0.00 0.93*** -0.04 0.00 0.04** 0.92 0.11 5.83** 17.32 0.34
MV; 4 0.00 0.93*** -0.01 0.05*** -0.03 0.93 -0.05 4.99* 17.32 0.29
MV;L -0.01** 1.05*** 0.06 0.03 -0.05** 0.87 -0.30 3.13 20.18 0.16
HLMV 0.01* 0.08 0.04 -0.11** 0.16*** 0.04 0.90 4.90** 14.50 0.34
HLEW 0.02*** -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.10** 0.03 1.02 5.62*** 10.35 0.54
FMB 0.01*** -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.17** 0.06 1.00 5.79*** 12.12 0.48
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Table V continued
Panel B: Pre-ranking portfolio characteristics
Size Book-to-Market Momentum HH Turnover
Dividend Yield mimicking portfolios
HLMV -16.23** 0.10* 6.92 0.062 1.673
HLEW -0.96*** 0.11* 1.54 0.004 1.837
FMB -1.38*** 0.13* 4.92 0.008 1.482
Default Spread mimicking portfolios
HLMV 8.19 -0.20** -9.79 0.074 1.595
HLEW 0.91*** -0.36*** 0.01 0.004 1.702
FMB 1.13*** -0.43*** 2.45 0.006 1.492
Term Spread mimicking portfolios
HLMV -8.46 0.20*** 0.44 0.070 1.556
HLEW -1.29*** 0.17*** -0.26 0.004 1.746
FMB -0.82*** 0.15*** 1.93 0.009 1.460
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Table VI: Mimicking portfolios for alternative state variables
This table presents the portfolios that are implicit in the cross-sectional regression
procedure, denoted FMB, and the benchmark spreading portfolios (HLMV and
HLEW ) for the alternative sets of state variables. Panel A presents results for the
model where zt = (DYt; DSt; RFt)0; Panel B for zt = (TSt; PEt; V St)0 as in Campbell
and Vuolteenaho (2004); and, Panel C for zt = (CPt; LV Lt)0 as in Koijen et al.
(2013). Focusing solely on the mimicking portfolios for the alternative state variables
that are priced in Table IV: RF, PE, VS, CP and LVL, I report (i) post-ranking
exposures (m; 
0)0 from the model rp;t = + mrm;t + 
0"Fullzt + ut, (where standard
errors are Newey-West with lag length one) and (ii) annualized performance (average
return, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio). *, ** and *** indicate signicance at
the 10, 5 and 1%- level, respectively.
Panel A: zt = (DYt; DSt; RFt)0





0 + ut Avg. St. Sharpe
 m DY DS RF R
2 ret. dev. ratio
RF mimicking portfolios
HLMV -0.01** -0.09 0.01 0.00 0.16** 0.03 -4.59** 14.09 -0.33
HLEW -0.02*** -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.12* 0.03 -6.34*** 11.15 -0.57
FMB -0.01** 0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.20** 0.08 -3.64* 13.79 -0.26
Panel B: Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004): zt = (TSt; PEt; V St)0




; "FullV St )
0 + ut Avg. St. Sharpe
 m TS PE V S R
2 ret. dev. ratio
PE mimicking portfolios
HLMV 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.20*** 0.06 -0.56 13.59 -0.04
HLEW 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.08* -0.09 0.02 0.44 11.29 0.04
FMB 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.19** -0.11 0.07 1.67 13.57 0.12
VS mimicking portfolios
HLMV -0.01 0.35*** -0.12* 0.01 0.21** 0.18 -1.72 17.53 -0.10
HLEW -0.01*** 0.20*** -0.03 -0.04 0.11 0.12 -3.79** 11.20 -0.34
FMB -0.02*** 0.24*** -0.03 -0.05 0.10 0.11 -5.23** 13.67 -0.38
Panel C: Koijen et al. (2013): zt = (CPt; LV Lt)0




)0 + ut Avg. St. Sharpe
 m CP LV L R
2 ret. dev. ratio
CP mimicking portfolios
HLMV 0.00 0.31*** 0.12*** 0.05 0.17 3.24 14.15 0.23
HLEW 0.01 0.11* 0.03 0.01 0.02 2.98* 10.62 0.28
FMB 0.01** 0.02 0.07 -0.08 0.01 4.21** 12.60 0.33
LVL mimicking portfolios
HLMV -0.01 0.55*** 0.12** 0.31*** 0.39 0.98 18.12 0.05
HLEW 0.00 0.36*** 0.08 0.23*** 0.29 1.41 14.06 0.10
FMB 0.00 0.34*** 0.11 0.32*** 0.24 2.35 16.90 0.14
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Table VII: Are DY, DS and TS risk premiums captured by the factors
and characteristics of Fama and French (1992, 1993)?
This table analyzes whether the risk premiums for DY, DS and TS can be captured
by the benchmark factors SMB and HML (and MOM) as well as their underlying
characteristics Size and Book-to-Market (and Prior return). To this end, Panel
A presents time-series regressions of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional
regression risk premiums (from Table II) on the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model (FF3M) as well as the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (FFCM) using
both quarterly and monthly data. t-statistics based on Newey-West standard errors
with lag length one are in parentheses. Next, I present cross-sectional regressions
that additionally include the benchmark factors and characteristics at the quarterly
frequency (Panel B) and the monthly frequency (Panel C). Model (1) presents results
for the FF3M. Model (2) adds the state variables. Model (3) adds the state variables
to the characteristics Size and Book-to-Market instead. Model (4) includes the state
variables, SMB, HML, Size and Book-to-Market. Model (5) adds to this model the
MOM factor and the Momentum characteristic. Throughout, Type (A) includes an
intercept, whereas Type (B) restricts the intercept to zero. For each cross-sectional





bt, with Fama and MacBeth (1973) t statistics in parentheses, and the





Panel A: Time-series regressions
Quarterly data Monthly data
rFMB(k);t = + mrm;t + smbrsmb;t + hmlrhml;t + (momrmom;t) + "t
 m smb hml mom R
2  m smb hml mom R
2
Dividend Yield mimicking portfolio (FMB(DY ))
0.25 0.02 0.34 -0.19 0.10 1.03 0.10 0.46 -0.27 0.14
(0.13) (0.24) (2.43) (-1.82) (0.37) (1.44) (3.72) (-2.05)
1.69 0.00 0.30 -0.23 -0.12 0.11 4.26 0.05 0.46 -0.37 -0.29 0.19
(0.76) (-0.02) (2.11) (-2.11) (-1.26) (1.31) (0.70) (4.04) (-2.77) (-2.19)
Default Spread mimicking portfolio (FMB(DS))
-2.89 -0.12 -0.56 -0.32 0.22 -2.22 -0.14 -0.58 -0.17 0.19
(-1.38) (-1.15) (-5.44) (-2.60) (-1.01) (-2.32) (-6.35) (-1.64)
-5.26 -0.08 -0.49 -0.26 0.20 0.25 -4.38 -0.11 -0.57 -0.11 0.20 0.23
(-1.27) (-1.03) (-3.73) (-2.09) (0.86) (-1.75) (-1.90) (-6.76) (-1.18) (2.30)
Term Spread mimicking portfolio (FMB(TS))
4.20 0.06 -0.05 0.29 0.06 3.10 -0.03 0.18 0.45 0.11
(2.33) (0.85) (-0.50) (2.94) (1.49) (-0.47) (2.29) (4.26)
4.72 0.05 -0.07 0.28 -0.04 0.06 3.76 -0.04 0.18 0.43 -0.06 0.12
(2.78) (0.76) (-0.65) (2.87) (-0.58) (1.78) (-0.68) (2.28) (4.19) (-1.20)
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Table VII continued
ri;t+1 = 0;t + m;t\i;m;t + 
0
z;t
ci;t + 0f;t( \i;smb;t; \i;hml;t; \i;mom;t)0 + 0c;t(Sizei;t; BMi;t; PRETi;t)0 + i;t
0 m DY DS TS smb hml mom Si ze BM PRET R
2
Panel B: Cross-sectional regressions - Quarterly data
(1.A) 6.95 1.58 1.91 2.63 0.042
(3.77) (0.67) (1.24) (2.03)
(1.B) 6.54 3.33 2.03 0.035
(2.54) (2.04) (1.54)
(2.A) 6.69 1.78 0.39 -5.58 4.20 2.17 2.24 0.048
(3.58) (0.82) (0.22) (-2.52) (2.61) (1.41) (1.78)
(2.B) 6.56 0.60 -5.21 4.95 3.57 1.64 0.040
(2.64) (0.30) (-2.41) (3.05) (2.16) (1.29)
(3.A) 7.50 2.59 -1.34 -1.77 4.28 -3.23 2.96 0.059
(3.74) (1.22) (-0.71) (-1.06) (2.79) (-2.72) (4.35)
(3.B) 7.68 -0.22 -2.30 5.08 -2.87 3.22 0.049
(2.75) (-0.10) (-1.20) (3.26) (-2.52) (4.73)
(4.A) 7.17 3.58 -0.80 -1.92 3.32 0.39 0.18 -3.53 2.68 0.066
(3.69) (1.72) (-0.47) (-1.13) (2.29) (0.33) (0.16) (-3.12) (4.21)
(4.B) 8.42 -0.10 -2.25 3.78 2.06 -0.24 -3.22 2.86 0.057
(3.20) (-0.05) (-1.21) (2.59) (1.49) (-0.21) (-2.92) (4.55)
(5.A) 7.98 2.56 -0.02 -2.56 2.54 0.56 -0.26 -2.20 -3.61 2.75 0.87 0.073
(3.81) (1.38) (-0.01) (-1.79) (2.00) (0.51) (-0.26) (-2.02) (-3.38) (4.42) (1.04)
(5.B) 7.95 1.10 -3.35 3.17 2.53 -0.58 -3.20 -3.11 2.96 0.42 0.065
(3.07) (0.61) (-1.87) (2.55) (1.83) (-0.54) (-2.52) (-3.03) (4.76) (0.54)
Panel C: Cross-sectional regressions - Monthly
(1.A) 8.09 -0.12 1.70 3.16 0.035
(5.50) (-0.05) (1.12) (2.12)
(1.B) 6.28 2.97 3.12 0.031
(2.63) (1.90) (2.08)
(2.A) 7.66 0.12 0.39 -4.56 3.46 1.62 2.93 0.040
(5.18) (0.05) (0.16) (-2.42) (1.91) (1.08) (2.03)
(2.B) 6.15 1.71 -4.05 4.64 2.85 2.89 0.036
(2.60) (0.67) (-2.15) (2.58) (1.84) (1.99)
(3.A) 7.27 2.81 0.97 -0.33 2.84 -4.11 2.55 0.044
(4.57) (1.19) (0.38) (-0.18) (1.65) (-3.77) (4.67)
(3.B) 8.32 2.61 -0.05 4.77 -4.03 2.76 0.039
(3.15) (1.00) (-0.03) (2.69) (-3.76) (4.90)
(4.A) 7.39 4.34 1.28 -1.44 2.59 -1.89 0.14 -4.85 2.35 0.050
(4.91) (1.96) (0.54) (-0.84) (1.58) (-1.54) (0.11) (-4.81) (5.11)
(4.B) 10.06 2.77 -1.26 3.69 -0.67 0.17 -4.85 2.38 0.047
(4.12) (1.12) (-0.73) (2.22) (-0.52) (0.12) (-4.86) (5.24)
(5.A) 7.97 4.09 2.14 -1.67 2.36 -2.23 -0.27 -2.56 -5.41 2.29 2.59 0.057
(5.14) (1.98) (1.00) (-1.01) (1.60) (-1.88) (-0.22) (-1.81) (-5.68) (4.98) (4.11)
(5.B) 10.31 3.85 -1.61 3.52 -0.82 -0.23 -3.18 -5.36 2.35 2.38 0.054
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